bound to prove a failure unless the machinery for working the entire fabric is well devised and can move smoothly and harmoniously It has been recently shown only too plainly that this harmonious and combined action has long been absent from our War Office. One system after another has been tried, and all successively have been found almost equally unworkable. It is therefore satisfactory to learn that Mr. Brodrick has himself suggested modifications of the 1895 Order in Council, which even in the opinion of a most severe critic of that system, Lord Wolseley, would meet, at all events as a temporary measure, the circumstances of the case. I think all will admit, whatever view they may take of the recent debates in the House of Lords on the position of the Commander-in-Chief, that the discussion was of the most painful character. We need not, however, regret it if in any way it tends to place our War Office on a businesslike and practical footing.

To achieve this end it seems unnecessary to copy Continental models, but let us content ourselves, as recently advocated in the Times, with the example shown us by our military organisation in India. I am sure that no one who has served both at home and in the East can fail to have been much impressed by the difference as regards efficiency between the two armies-in fact it seems hard at first to realise that they both belong to the same country. Having had some opportunity of studying Continental military systems, I think I may say that our Army in India, as regards immediate preparedness for war, is superior to that of any other country, except perhaps Germany. Why, therefore, should we not adapt our Eastern methods to this country, more especially as our present Commanderin-Chief, to whom more than any other our Indian Army owes its efficiency, can give us the benefit of his unrivalled experience?

It appears that the organisation might be somewhat as follows. The Secretary of State would be supreme like the Viceroy. Under him there would be two great military officials: one the Commanderin-Chief, responsible for the inspection, training, discipline, and patronage of the Army; the other charged with the supply, transport, clothing, ordnance, and fortification. Of course there would be the subordinate heads of departments, as at present; but above all let these various chiefs be allowed to spend the money allotted to their special branch without immediate interference, in all matters of detail, from the civilian side of the War Office. It is needless to add that there would have to be a financial clerk attached to each department, and also the final audit by the Accountant-General as a wholesome and necessary check on expenditure. It would seem that in this way much unnecessary labour might be saved, friction avoided, and procedure greatly expedited.

There is another point, to which, I am glad to see, attention has been called by several critics in the press. It has been shown quite

clearly by recent events and disclosures that it is not sufficient merely to collect information; it is also necessary to digest it and profit by it. No official with many administrative duties to perform has the leisure to draw up elaborate and detailed schemes of military operations. This duty, in other great armies, is performed by the General Staff Department, which does not exist in this country, and which, I hold, should be at once created, the so-called Intelligence branch being merged in it.

Similarly as regards the training and selection of staff officers, these duties have hitherto not been carried out on a definite and methodical principle in our Army; one officer may be an excellent draughtsman or first-rate in an office, but may hate the sight of a horse and be perfectly useless in the field; another may be excellent in a subordinate position, but may lack the nerve, backbone so to speak, and determination which would fit him for a post of responsibility. It is detrimental to the interests of the Service and unfair to the officer himself to reject him entirely because in, say, a round hole he may prove to be a square peg. Personal knowledge of the individual can alone decide the position which he will fill with most credit and advantage; hitherto there has been no official in the British Service who has been afforded this opportunity of observation, or to whom the responsibility has been deputed of making these important selections.

It now only remains to express a hope that friction at headquarters may be a thing of the past, that Mr. Brodrick may be as successful as he is known to be sincere and energetic, and that the luminous and able manner in which he introduced his scheme to the House of Commons and the country may be a good augury of the reputation which he will bequeath to posterity as a great War Minister.

FRANK S. RUSSELL,
Major-General.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ARMY REFORM

I

MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOLS FOR LADS

THE scheme of Army reform and reorganisation which Mr. Brodrick has submitted to Parliament as the outcome of his unremitting labours during the winter consists largely of matter which it is best to leave to be dealt with by intellects specially trained and fitted to handle it. Professional opinion and experience must deservedly weigh more with the Secretary of State than the theories of those whom Mr. Balfour has spoken of good-humouredly as 'amateur strategists.' Nevertheless there is one point-the vital point upon which the success of the new scheme hinges-whereon a mere civilian may feel entitled to express his views, and may possibly contribute some suggestion not altogether devoid of practical value.

6

The point referred to as vital to the prospects of Mr. Brodrick's scheme is the future supply of recruits. We have never,' said the Secretary of State in a speech equally remarkable for frankness and lucidity, we have never had such recruiting as we had last year under the influence of the warlike spirit that pervaded the country. That spirit brought us the largest number of recruits to the Army in any year in any period of our history.'

Many an anxious glance upon the future must Mr. Brodrick and Lord Roberts have cast in regard to this crucial point. They have refrained, and most wisely refrained, from proposing anything of the nature of conscription. It has fallen out of the recollection of most people, I think, that on one occasion in the last century Parliament did decree conscription, or what was tantamount to conscription. In 1803, when Napoleon held 120,000 men at Boulogne ready for the invasion of Great Britain, Mr. Addington's Government carried through both Houses, without a single division on the principle, a Bill calling to arms and providing for the training of every male subject between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five. This Act for a levy en masse was never put into force, because such was the patriotic spirit at that time that when Parliament reassembled in 1804 there was a Volunteer force already enrolled and armed of no fewer than 379,943 officers and men. The nation of shopkeepers

had shown itself, as has always been the case, quite ready to keep the shop.

These figures appear the more remarkable when it is remembered that in 1803 the total population of Great Britain and Ireland scarcely exceeded 15 millions. The experience of the last two years shows that long years of peace have not availed to damp the military spirit of our people. Were a similar emergency to that of 1803 to recur in 1903, it would be safe to assume that the proportion of the population ready to fly to arms would be no whit less than it was 100 years ago, and that our present population of upwards of 40 millions would produce nothing short of one million Volunteers.

But that, of course, is not what is wanted. It may go far to reassure us against the possibility of successful invasion, but it does little or nothing to guarantee the success of Mr. Brodrick's scheme. Our Imperial liabilities render it indispensable that we should not only have enough military force to protect our own shores, but that we should be in a position to put an adequate force in the field, complete in every respect, in any part of the world and at short notice, without denuding ourselves of security at home. Not only have we no warrant for expecting anything at the close of the present war except a marked reaction which will seriously diminish the flow of recruits, but we should be imbecile if we founded our calculations upon anything else. Redde mihi, Vare, legiones! will assuredly be the sigh of the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief in a few years, unless in the meantime some provision can be devised to render the Army a more attractive form of employment.

Is it impossible to make any provision towards ensuring the success of Mr. Brodrick's magnificent scheme? There is abundant material. As we have seen lately, the right spirit is latent in that material, and blazes up on occasion; can nothing be done towards maintaining and utilising a steady flame? Can it be said that we have ever made a serious attempt to attract or direct young men into the ranks of the Army? And is it beyond the ingenuity of man to divert into a permanent channel some part at least of that fluctuating volume of casual labour and chronic loafing which hangs upon the flanks of the great industrial army?

I am bold enough to ask consideration of certain proposals which have been submitted to me by an officer at present serving at the front. Captain Maitland was invalided home last year; he spent his sick leave in formulating certain propositions, which, on his being ordered out again to rejoin his regiment, he handed to me to bring under the attention of the proper authorities. I hope it may be understood most distinctly that whatever merit the scheme may be found ultimately to contain will reflect no credit whatever upon the writer of this paper, although he has great faith in its efficacy towards solving a very obscure problem.

I must confess that I am under the disadvantage of not having been able to obtain the advice of the highest professional authority on recruiting. When Captain Maitland left his papers in my hands I wrote, after examining them, to the Inspector-General of Recruiting at the War Office, requesting an interview. He replied that Captain Maitland had already explained the outlines of his scheme to him; that 'the idea was not altogether new '; that he (the Inspector-General) did not consider the scheme a workable one, and declined to make an appointment with me.

Now I know the value of time too well to be in the habit of wasting that of other people. I had hoped that upwards of twenty years in Parliament and six years in a public Department might have served as warrant that such was not my intention. But General Borrett evidently thought otherwise. Perhaps he was seized with the hopelessness of expecting any valuable suggestion on military matters from a mere civilian, forgetting, possibly, that it is among civilians alone that recruiting must be carried on. Be that as it may, I am conscious of the disadvantage of placing Captain Maitland's proposals before the public without having any criticism or opinion upon them from the Inspector-General except that they are unworkable. That was the verdict pronounced by his critics upon Jourdan when he laid his scheme of conscription before the French Assembly, yet what a mighty engine of offence and defence it was to prove in years to come!

Captain Maitland's proposals briefly are as follows. There shall be established in the various regimental districts, and under control of the district commandants, training schools for the reception of lads of fifteen or sixteen. That is the critical period in the youth of the working classes; the statutory school age has been passed, and a very large percentage of lads drift out into the world, acquire the habit of loafing, and too often go to swell the ranks of Hooliganism. Such of these lads as can be persuaded to enter the district training schools-King Edward's Schools, as Captain Maitland suggests they shall be called-will be instructed there for two years in athletics, riding, cycling, elementary drill, musketry, scouting, and signalling. Military history may also be taught, and habits of discipline and cleanliness will be acquired. Then, after two years' training, the lads will be drafted either into the district regiment of infantry, or into such other branch of the Service as they may have set their hearts upon. They will enter their battalions not as the raw article, with everything to be drummed into it, but mentally and physically prepared to learn the duties of soldiers, of which they have already mastered the rudiments.

The advantages of such preparation will be best appreciated by those who understand what a strain recruit drill throws upon the resources of a battalion. It is not likely that anybody will seriously