will really have at his disposal the full body of 30,000 mounted troops for which he has asked. By-and-by the nation will want to know the true reason for the failure of the War Office to furnish these reinforcements at an earlier date. The only explanation which is now offered is the thrice-familiar plea of miscalculation. Ministers declare that when they announced to the country last September that the war was virtually over they really believed that this was the case, and were in no sense prepared for the recrudescence of the conflict under the auspices of Botha and De Wet. Thus another is to be added to the long list of the blunders into which the Government has fallen with regard to South Africa.

Popular feeling in this country not merely takes account of these administrative mistakes, but of some special features of the struggle during its latest phases. Of these the most important is the treatment which Commandant De Wet accorded to the peace envoys who visited his camp. Upon this subject we have had a hot controversy at home. It is unfortunately not a controversy that can really be settled in the light of the information that we at present possess. That De Wet behaved with great barbarity in shooting men after flogging them is generally admitted. But the question of whether he went beyond the usages of civilised warfare in treating the peace envoys as spies is not a question that can be decided until we know the exact mission of these men and the manner in which they sought to discharge it. The ardent pro-Boer has not waited to ascertain his facts before pronouncing judgment. He decides summarily that the envoys were tampering with the loyalty of De Wet's soldiers, and that they only met the fate which would have overtaken them if, in similar circumstances, they had fallen into the hands of Wellington in the Peninsula. More reasonable persons will wait for the full evidence before deciding either for or against De Wet on this very grave charge.

But whether De Wet were or were not technically justified in putting a summary end to the efforts of the peace envoys, one point is clear. That is, that whilst he is inspired by this fierce determination to suppress every movement in favour of peace, there is very little prospect of being able to secure his attention to peace overtures by whomsoever they may be made. This country is naturally and properly impatient at the continuance of the war. It longs for its conclusion and would welcome any steps by which that conclusion could be reached with honour and safety. But the majority of Englishmen of both parties are convinced that no greater evil could befall us than a peace which left the main question at issue unsolved. It has pleased some representative Little Englanders to find fault with a phrase used by Sir Henry Fowler in a speech at Wolverhampton, when he said that we must fight to the finish.' These gentlemen seem to think that an unfinished fight would be a satisfactory end to a

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struggle in which two rival races have been competing for the mastery. One wonders what would have been the history of the United States during the last thirty years if the Civil War had not been fought to the finish. We are told, however, that it is the bounden duty of the Government to open negotiations with the Boers still in the field, and that we have no right to allow ourselves to be deterred even by De Wet's truculent dealings with the peace envoys. Probably most would agree that this is sound advice, provided there were any hope that a basis for negotiations could be arrived at. Unfortunately, however, De Wet's manner of repelling the advances of the messengers of peace is not the only obstacle to successful negotiation with him. Like Mr. Kruger in his placid retirement at the Hague, he has adopted as his own the formula of absolute independence' for the Boer States. We, on the other hand, are committed to the directly opposite formula of complete annexation. It is too late now to recede from this condition, which, it must be remembered, has received the sanction of the leading men of both political parties in this country. Within the limits of this condition the feeling of Englishmen—a feeling which it is clear is shared by members of the Governmentis in favour of granting the widest possible range of liberty to the people of the Boer States, as well as to the other peoples of South Africa. But the English flag must continue to fly at Pretoria and Bloemfontein, and no question of any interference by an outside Power with our sovereignty must be admitted within the range of possibility. This is the irreducible minimum of the demands which England makes. If she secures it she will have fought to the finish, and will have won the victory. To many sympathisers with the Boers, both in this country and in South Africa, to many who are opposed to the policy of the Government in its past dealings with the Transvaal, and who regard Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy as a miracle of misconception and mismanagement, these terms seem to be not only fair and reasonable but essential to the future peace. But is De Wet prepared to negotiate on this basis? Apparently not; for he still clings to his formula of 'absolute independence.' This is the reason which leads so many who long for the termination of a bloody and exhausting war to feel that there is still no road to a settlement save that which the Army can make for us.

The speeches by the leaders of the two Houses at the opening of the Session, with one exception, hardly reached the level of the occasion. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman made a strong effort, and he had the satisfaction of achieving a distinct success, for he pleased all classes among his own followers, whilst he displeased his opponents. Lord Kimberley had the dubious satisfaction of affording at least as much gratification to the Ministerialists as to the Liberals. Mr. Balfour was in his best debating-class style, and replied to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman without answering him. Lord Salisbury,

it is to be feared, disappointed everybody, his friends as well as his opponents. His complaint of the 'impatience' of Lord Kimberley at the slow progress of the war certainly came with a bad grace from a Minister who had more than once pledged himself to the statement that the war was practically over. But that which caused most dissatisfaction in the Prime Minister's speech was the want of a firm grasp of the situation as a whole which it betrayed, and the disposition it manifested to regard the war as a mere episode in our historysomething to be forgotten as soon as may be. It is difficult to believe that Ministers as a whole can share the views of their chief on this subject. If we are to go to sleep again as soon as the actual struggle in South Africa is at an end, we shall be sleeping unto death. Even the man in the street can now realise the fact that this war must of necessity be one of the turning-points in the nation's history. It has imposed the severest strain upon our defensive forces, and for the moment has completely disorganised our military system. We have narrowly escaped disasters that would have fatally compromised our prestige in the eyes of the world, and we have incurred an expenditure which must form for years to come a serious addition to the national liabilities. What would happen at this moment if, by any evil chance, we were to find ourselves involved in war with some great European Power, no one knows, though we may well shudder at the bare possibility of such an event. The one compensation for all that we have suffered in the past eighteen months lies in the fact that we have learned, in the hard school of experience, more than one lesson of vital importance to us as a people. We have been taught, for example, that our military system is at present hopelessly defective, and that it allows neither the courage of the soldier nor the capacity of the commander the fair play to which they are entitled. Yet Lord Salisbury speaks as if no lesson had been taught, no moral gathered, from the great events of the past eighteen months. We are to muddle on with the war, bringing it to an end somehow, and at some time not yet indicated, and then we are to forget it! It is not strange that those who feel most strongly the grave character of the risks we have run of late stand amazed in presence of this attitude on the part of the chief Minister of the Crown. Louder complaints were heard after Lord Salisbury's speech from his own supporters than from the members of the Opposition.

Of the general prospects of the Session there is little to be said. A widely spread conviction prevails that it is destined to be a stormy one. The chief foundation for this belief is the fact that the Irish members have returned to the House with a fighting policy and in a fighting mood. They have come back unexpectedly strong, and united upon one point at least. Mr. John Redmond's amendment to the Address calling for an immediate measure of compulsory land

purchase in Ireland was seconded by Mr. T. W. Russell, until a few months ago a member of the present Government and a strenuous opponent of Home Rule. Ireland, as was made clear both by the debate and the subsequent division, is practically united in support of this demand, and Ministers in consequence find themselves confronted by the 'squalid sphynx' of the Irish Question in its most formidable character. The failure of all the attempts of the last twenty years to grapple with the agrarian problem is admitted by everybody. The men of Ulster have now combined with the Nationalists of the South and West in presenting that problem once more to Parliament and in demanding its solution. The Irish members have thus found a policy upon which they can unite, and they are not likely to be deterred from pressing it upon us by any reluctance to disturb the repose of the Government. If the Session of 1901 is to be one of Irish obstruction persistent and resolute, like that once carried out by Mr. Parnell and Mr. Biggar, then, no matter whether anyone gains, the Government is bound to lose. Its programme of work as set forth in the King's Speech is not only modest but uninteresting. The nation will hardly become wildly excited over such topics as the constitution of the Court of Appeal or the law of literary copyright. Ministers seem to have been resolved to make their programme as colourless as possible. They have not only passed over the temperance question, about which an important section of their followers, as the debate on the Address proves, feels strongly, but have even shelved that housing of the poor question upon which the King in his excellent speech to the members of the London County Council laid so much stress. But it is a mistake for a Government, and especially for a Government with a huge but not yet fully disciplined majority behind it, to imagine that safety is to be found in a colourless and uninteresting programme. It is precisely when Ministers are engaged in bringing forward humdrum measures of secondary importance that the independent member gets the best chance of distinguishing himself. It is at such times, too, that organised obstruction is most irritating and most effective. There are many reasons therefore for the belief that despite the meagre programme of the Government the Session may be a stormy one. The Budget itself will provide many opportunities for a running Parliamentary fight which may prove as serious as the guerilla warfare in South Africa. It is not surprising, remembering all this, that rumours are current to the effect that Ministers, despite their triumph at the General Election, have entered upon the first regular Session of the new Parliament in a mood which is by no means that of cheerful anticipation.

Lord Salisbury twitted Lord Kimberley in his speech on the state of the Opposition. The facts of the case no doubt entitled him to do so. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the divisions

in the Liberal ranks which have already lasted so long must necessarily last much longer. Those who are acquainted with the currents of opinion in the Opposition know that there is a growing impatience with regard to the action of the extreme men of both wings of the party. The attempt to make Liberalism identical with the advocacy of the Boer cause has signally failed, and, though it may be renewed, it is not in the least likely to succeed. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's speech on the Address met with the approval of the great majority of all sections of the party, and the withdrawal of the amendment by means of which Mr. Lloyd George sought to commit the Opposition to an active policy in favour of the Boers was in itself proof of the fact that his fellow Liberals refused to support his views. It would be idle to pretend that the old differences are healed, or that the great chasm which divides the extreme men on either side has been bridged. But the Liberal centres, both right and left, have been making their influence felt since the Session began, and, as a consequence, the Opposition has gained both in strength and cohesion. The feeling among Liberals as to the blunders which Ministers have committed in connection with the war is of itself strong enough to bring about a large measure of unity. Individual Liberals may differ upon all other conceivable questions, and yet agree with one another in the belief that Ministers have committed almost every imaginable blunder in their manner of conducting the South African campaign.

Everybody knows, however, that this opinion of the way in which the Government has conducted the war is not confined to members of the Opposition. The Conservatives may be faithful to the ties of party, and yet full of unconcealed indignation at the want of foresight which Ministers have shown all through the shifting phases of the contest. One of the incidents of the month has been the publication of two huge volumes of despatches dealing with the whole course of the war down to the time when Lord Roberts returned to this country from South Africa. These despatches have done nothing to vindicate the Government from the charges which have been so constantly urged against it ever since the first days of the investment of Ladysmith. Taken in conjunction with the feeble speech of the Prime Minister at the opening of the Session, they have brought home to all of us, without regard to the divisions of party, the need for a strenuous effort to reform the evils which afflict our military system and to 'put the Empire on a business footing.' If their own followers begin to despair of getting the necessary reforms from the members of the present Government, that is exclusively the fault of the latter. The position taken up by not a few Ministers, including the Prime Minister himself, with regard to the immediate future, is eminently unsafe from the party point of view. Their belief that they may act as they please because they have to deal with nothing more than a