these types, destroyers now positively taking from five to six years in some instances to complete.

The actual number of battleships ready and building for England, France, Germany and Russia, is as follows, adopting the German rule and striking out every armour-clad which has been in existence over twenty-five years as having no Gefechtswert: England 37 ready and 16 building, France 28 ready and 5 building, Russia 19 ready and 9 building, and Germany 15 ready and 10 building. The figures are most disquieting and show how dubious is our position.

Many of the foreign ships are much smaller than ours, but against this must be set the fact to which I shall shortly advert, that abroad old ships have been in almost every case reconstructed, and in many cases re-armed. Ships armed with muzzle-loaders and with hulls of wood are, of course, struck off the list. We have still more than a score of this class of craft, whose Gefechtswert must be pronounced nil, in our effective list. No Admiralty, however, not even our own, would dare to send such vessels to sea in war. They ought certainly to be grouped as are the German ships of their date and type-the Preussen, Friedrich der Grosse, Kronprinz, and Friedrich Karl-under the heading 'unbattleworthy.'

The fact is often overlooked that a mere qualitative or quantitative equality with the battleships of a hostile combination will not suffice to secure the British Empire. Perhaps the South African War has destroyed the illusion that always and under all circumstances an Englishman is the equal of one, two, or three enemies. We have seen ten Englishmen unsuccessfully chasing one enemy; and somewhat similar conditions may well obtain in the next war at sea; for instance, our battleships, like our armies, will have to act at great distances from their bases, while our cruisers will have to hunt for fleet and elusive commerce-destroyers. Not the least service which Mr. Laird Clowes has rendered to his country in his great naval history is to kill many of the silly legends which had gathered round the past particularly that arch-fiction that we have generally won against great odds. On the contrary he shows that, with the exception of Nelson's battles, most of our great victories have been gained by superiority of numbers.' Nelsons and Napoleons are rare phenomena; next time, indeed, the Nelson may be upon the other side, for all we know. The personal factor is so incalculable and indeterminate, that we cannot rely upon it for one moment. From the nature of our organisation, it is all too probable that when war comes, the right man will not be found at the head of each of our fleets. There have been occasions, and recent occasions, when great fleets of ours have been entrusted to Admirals who, to put it mildly, had not a high reputation for competence.

Are the ships of the right sort, properly armed and in a good condition for war? On this point the remark of a very acute

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British critic is worth recording. 'I have a suspicion,' says this critic, that when our ships are put into battle, it will be found that they are admirable for everything else except fighting. They will have coal and ammunition supply; they will be comfortable; but they will not have enough guns, nor will everything in them have been subordinated to the one great end-destruction of the enemy in battle.'

Of our ships generally it may be said that they carry fewer guns in their displacement than do the warships of foreign Powers, and that they have no advantage in armour protection. The Americans, for instance, on 13,500 tons displacement produce a fighting machine which is in no sense inferior to our Majestics and Formidables of 15,000 tons. Elswick on a displacement of 9,900 tons produces for Japan an armoured cruiser, which, even in the opinion of many of our naval officers, is as good as the British Cressy of 12,000 tons. Nor does it necessarily follow, as is sometimes assumed, that because our ships are heavier, they have points of advantage which must tell in battle. It is quite possible that our hulls are too heavily built, or that weight is put into items which will prove of little importance in the actual combat. Foreign officers, with whom I have talked much, always comment with some surprise upon the relatively light batteries of our ships.

With the design of our most recent battleships there is probably little fault to find, except that the armament is not all that we might expect. But when we go back to our old armourclads or even our middle-aged armourclads, one point is very striking-that next to nothing has been done to bring these ships up to date. Very many, even of our relatively modern battleships, are cumbered with inflammable fittings, wooden cabins, chart houses, bridges and so forth. In view of the lessons of Santiago and the Yalu this wood ought to be removed, but year after year passes and it is allowed to remain. It is said, indeed, on the strength of the Belleisle experiments, that it is not really a danger where there is a good fireservice; but the fact remains that foreign navies, where they have not already eliminated the wood in their old ships, are eliminating it now with all possible despatch. Ship after ship in the French, Russian and German fleets is being reconstructed, and the wood in each case is being removed. Surely this action of other Admiralties suggests that our deductions from a single experiment may have been incorrect. And if so, where shall we be? Let it be remembered that the ten battleships of the Naval Defence Act (Royal Sovereign and Centurion classes) are crammed with wood and have wooden decks, in great part not laid upon steel; and that the nine battleships of the Admiral, Sanspareil and Edinburgh class are just as bad. That makes nineteen nominally modern ships in which this serious defect occurs.

All these nineteen ships need thorough repair and alteration. They are well worth it, though the cost would be high, possibly reaching 4,000,000l. We cannot afford to let our vessels go to ruin or become obsolete; we must copy foreign Powers and see that such vessels are kept in thorough repair. In the French fleet immense sums have been spent on reconstruction, with the result that the older French ships are thoroughly efficient. Our First Lords never allow for this in calculations, nor does the public realise that, as between battleship and battleship of the same date, reconstruction may make all the difference in the world.

As for the muzzleloader-armed ships, of which, to the Admiralty's, shame, there are still no less than twenty-two upon the effective list, the newest of them was laid down about 1876, and therefore, under the sensible German twenty-five years rule, they must be pronounced inefficient, even apart from their armament. They are now so old and so helpless in every respect-as the Belleisle experiment showed that they are not worth the outlay of a penny. Quite characteristically the Admiralty is preparing to waste 10,000l. on reboilering one of these precious craft. They are sound, no doubt, and should not be broken up, but they should be struck off the effective list and placed in our commercial harbours to perform the function of scarecrows and keep off stray raiders in war.

Are the dockyards and naval bases adequate and properly equipped? To this question an unhesitating negative must be returned, so far as our home-yards are concerned. Though immense works have been carried out at our yards, these works have not kept pace with the requirements of a growing navy. At Portsmouth, for example, the vessels docked here increased from 88 to 182 in fifteen years, but within that time the docks have only increased from 13 to 15. The plant, appliances, and machinery are nowhere up-todate, nowhere adequate to the needs of the fleet. Taking Portsmouth, for example, there is still no electric light in the yard; the machinery is much of it twenty or even thirty years out of date; there is a general want of the most modern machine tools. First Lords complain that they cannot get skilled workmen, but they can, with perfect ease, acquire modern machinery. It is simply a question of money. Moreover, all experience proves that it is true economy always to scrap' your old machinery, and to work with the best and newest tools. As it is, the yard is unable at one and the same time to keep existing ships in order and to build new ships rapidly. At this moment there are no less than fifteen destroyers waiting repairs, and all in their present condition inefficient. Year by year arrears are accumulating, and when the day of battle comes, our material will be found in bad order.

At Devonport and Chatham matters are as bad. Devonport has only one jetty alongside which a vessel can ship her heavy equipment.

The narrow entrance of Keyham Basin prevents a modern first-class battleship from being berthed in the basin. At Pembroke things are even worse. The plant of the dockyard when last I saw it, two years ago, evidently dates back some thirty years. When two ships are building, one has to lie out in the stream, with the consequences that the cost of construction is increased and enormous delay incurred, as the workmen and material have to be ferried backward and forward

between the ship and the shore. Yet Pembroke is admirably situated. Strategically, it is as near Brest as is Portsmouth, while it is close to the coal and iron fields of South Wales. It has not one single dock capable of taking a modern battleship or even our modern types of large armoured cruisers. The existing dock there should be enlarged without delay and duplicated.

In the Mediterranean, at Malta and Gibraltar, much is being done. But there is reason to fear that at Gibraltar the new works have not been well planned, while our Admirals on the station want a new fortified base at Alexandria in the Eastern Mediterranean, where we have no accommodation of any kind.

At home either we must have a new dockyard, preferably on the north-east coast, or the present yards must be greatly extended. It should be noted that in Germany immense dockyard extensions are in progress, which, as M. Lockroy remarks in his interesting Lettres sur la Marine Allemande, are to keep pace with the increase of the fleet. Here, as usual, we have German method, German foresight, and German thoroughness. The workshops,' says M. Lockroy, 'are supplied with electrical power and the most modern tools.' Ten thousand men either are at work now, or will shortly be at work, on the new docks, basins, and workshops to be constructed at Kiel. The increase in plant and accommodation is not postponed haphazardwise till the fleet has outgrown the dockyards. But then Germany has a policy which is framed and carried out by experts.

Before passing from material to personnel, the necessity of a new naval programme, spread over several years and similar in all vital respects to the German Navy Act of 1900, must be urged. Such a programme would make provision for ersatzbauten, or 'substitute ships,' built to replace each battleship that has attained an age of twenty-five years, and neubauten, or additional ships,' constituting a numerical addition to the navy. A definite programme tells contractors and makers of armour what to expect and prepare for, and if the money is voted en bloc, to be defrayed by a series of annual payments, with the stipulation that sums not expended one year are to be carried forward to the next, and not returned to the Treasury, there is no risk of savings.' Rapid and economical construction is facilitated. The arguments against such a programme will not bear close inspection.

III. PERSONNEL

There has been no striking change in the personnel of the fleet during the past year. The education and training are much what they were, though an endless correspondence in the press proves that the modern navy is not contented with either. A praiseworthy attempt is being made to provide a new Naval Reserve, which will be mainly composed of long-service seamen. Dockyard employés are also to be enrolled in this reserve, though obviously not one of them can be spared from the dockyards in war. Indeed Portsmouth, Chatham, Devonport, and Pembroke will all want more skilled artisans. Nor can any reserve provided by a long-service system be a large one. To obtain an adequate reserve we must have short service somewhere and in some degree. The objection of naval officers to it is quite intelligible. With the example of the army before them, they may be excused for dreading a lowering of the term of service. It would mean simple disaster were our fleets to be manned in peace or war by weedy striplings and immature youths.

But a reserve and a large reserve we must have. It should not be less in number than 100,000, and it is doubtful if even that would suffice for the requirements of a great war. The Naval Reserve may be expected to yield, with all deductions, about 25,000 men; the new 'Fleet Reserve,' perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 available efficients. Taking the more conservative figure, we have a deficiency of 65,000 men. Now it seems to the writer that short service might be tentatively introduced in the reorganised Reserve Fleet, of which the need has already been pointed out. With six battleships and as many cruisers in commission in this fleet, about 4,000 seamen and stokers would be required. Might not these be raised on a basis of three years' active service, and seventeen years in the reserve? If 2,000 more were kept ashore in the depôts for a thorough preliminary instruction, such as the recruits of the German Navy receive, that would give 6,000 short-service men, or a yearly levy of 2,000. The efficient reserve, all under forty, would number about 30,000. This short-service force should be kept distinct from the rest of the navy, with a separate port-preferably the new dockyard, which, we have seen, is much needed. The ships in which the short-service men embarked would be employed on the home station. If the scheme were tested and proved a failure, it could be droppedthough I should note that German experience shows that very fair seamen can be made, with care on the part of officers, of three-years men. We have seen, too, that the Channel Squadron is at present largely manned by very young seamen, who are, at any rate on paper, considered efficient. No doubt this scheme would introduce complications, but at least it would give a considerable trained