town in the early hours of the morning of the 19th, to the joy of the inhabitants. A few hours later the main body of the regiment, having started from Dannhauser about midnight, arrived in Newcastle, and camped on the north side of the town by the Laing's Nek Road.

Here a much-needed rest was given to the horses through the remainder of the day, and at 3.30 on the next morning the advance was resumed, the mounted men pushing right up to O'Neill's Farm, at the very foot of Laing's Nek, and drawing fire from Boers on Majuba and the surrounding hills. The Chestnut Battery came into action again, and it became clear that the Laing's Nek position was, as had been anticipated, held in force.

Lord Dundonald fell back in the evening of the 20th to the drift of the Ingogo, bivouacking on the north bank of the river amongst the trees, and here a halt of more than a fortnight was made to enable the engineers to repair the mutilated railway. The famous hill of Inkwelo and the notorious Ingogo Heights were occupied by the Natal Volunteers and the Infantry; and the broken ground surrounding the camp was watched by a chain of outposts supplied by the mounted brigade. On the east a line of picquets watched the Buffalo River from the 'reversing station' by the Ingogo up to Kotze's Drift, and on the west another line of posts, stationed along the high ground overlooking Cronje's Farm, watched the Spitzkop Road and the range around Botha's Pass.

On the 28th of May the Boers opened shell fire on the advanced posts around Inkwelo from Laing's Nek and Pogwana, and the 4th brigade of Infantry was moved up in support from Ingogo Heights to a ridge south-east of Inkwelo. The naval guns were also moved up to Inkwelo.

On the 29th of May the mounted brigade was temporarily split up, the South African Light Horse being detached to accompany General Hildyard's division, which was engaged in making a diversion in the direction of Utrecht, so as to deceive the enemy as to the real intentions of General Buller. Meanwhile a bombardment was maintained by the guns of Inkwelo on Pogwana and Majuba.

On the 2nd of June Hans Botha descended Laing's Nek under a flag of truce, asking for an interview with General Buller, and an armistice was arranged for three days, to allow the enemy an opportunity of consulting with their President as to making terms. That their professions were genuine may be doubted; but the delay was of no disadvantage to the English, for it enabled General Hildyard's diversion to develop and the railway line to be repaired.

Three days later the armistice ended, and the result of their deliberations was announced by the Boers opening fire on the camp with daybreak of the 6th of June from their big gun on Pogwana at a range of over 11,000 yards. Meanwhile two long-range guns,

VOL. XLIX-No. 288

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which had been in position on Ingogo Heights, were dragged up on to Van Wyk's Hill, establishing a cross-fire with the guns of Inkwelo on Botha's Pass and Spitzkop, and for the next two days a general bombardment was kept up on the entire Boer position from Botha's Pass to Pogwana.

Early on the 8th of June the 'T.M.I.,' with Lord Dundonald and the Chestnut Battery, left camp to take part in the general attack on Botha's Pass. Their duty was to extend and to guard the right flank. Pushing on to the lower slopes of the Drakensberg, and seeing all clear, and then hurrying upwards and still upwards, the mounted men found themselves at length on the very summit of the range. To their left the long line of the Infantry was plodding below them up the slopes near Spitzkop, under cover of artillery fire from Van Wyk. From afar on their right and away on their left the big guns from Inkwelo and Van Wyk were pouring a cross-fire on to the Boer trenches on Botha's Pass. In front of them the ground sloped gradually downwards into the Free State; behind and far below them lay Natal and the maze of blood-soaked hills around Ladysmith.

A sharp rifle fire was opened on the dismounted T.M.I.' from the further edge of the range, some 1,000 yards away, and a 'pompom' quickly came into action upon them. Behind, the Colt guns of the South African Light Horse were being pushed by hand up the steep slopes, and behind again the chestnut horses of 'A' battery were struggling up the great hillside.

Fifteen minutes after the Mounted Infantry had seized the hill, their allies, Captain Dodsworth's Colts, and later two of Major Burrows' horse-guns, had with even more than their usual alacrity been forced up on to the summit, and, in spite of the accurate 'pompom' shells, were busily pouring fire on to the enemy's trenches; and now the mounted infantry had leisure to see the effect of the move which they had made. By seizing the hills north of Spitzkop they had not merely secured the right flank of the force, they had prolonged General Buller's front so that they were in a position to enfilade the Boer trenches which had been made to block the Botha's Pass Road. They now found themselves the hinge of the general movement, and soon, under influence of the continuous rifle, machinegun and artillery fire, they had the inexpressible satisfaction of seeing the enemy running back in crowds from their trenches, to shelter behind the lofty hill of Inkwelowane. As the Boers came out of their cover each man of the 'T.M.I.' rose to his knees and poured in fire as fast as he could fill his rifle; while on their left the Infantry, steadily advancing on a broad front, emerged on the top of Botha's Pass. And thus within the shadow of Majuba the Army of Natal at last crossed into the enemy's country on the 8th of June. It is interesting to recapitulate the dispositions of the General

which led to this second success. By the seizing of Van Wyk's Hill and of Inkwelo he had secured his first advantage, for he had established a cross-fire on Botha's Pass. His feint with General Hildyard's division on Utrecht had been entirely successful, in that it had deceived the enemy and drawn away a part of his force; and his rapid advance on a broad front had done much to neutralise the great disadvantage of being again compelled to strike from ground nearly 2,000 feet below the enemy's position.

The General's dispositions deserved not only the success which they achieved, but a greater measure of public commendation than that which befell them.

He had turned the impregnable Laing's Nek-that insurmountable obstacle against which prophets of evil had foretold that he would shatter his men and only one more position (of much less strength) remained for him to overcome before Volksrust and Standerton should lie at his feet.

L. OPPENHEIM.

SHAM VERSUS REAL HOME DEFENCE

SOME little time ago a brother officer whom by chance I met, spoke to me as follows: 'Have you read Dr. Conan Doyle's "Lessons of the War," as given in his book The Great Boer War? I have had lately to go a great deal about England in connection with ambulance work, and I assure you that from what I have heard said, Dr. Conan Doyle's views will take on very strongly with the better tradesmen class. You scriveners should at once set to work and deal with that particular part of the book.'

Up to this time Dr. Conan Doyle had been known only as a brilliant novelist who had also been present in South Africa during the campaign. In the last chapter of his book, however, he propounds and vigorously advocates for the land Home Defence of Great Britain a military scheme of a very novel character.

Only a few days ago another officer wrote to me from the far north of Scotland to the following effect: 'Conan Doyle's theories ( are producing a great effect on public opinion among the civilians I meet up here. Could you not from your knowledge of military history-from, say, the Peninsular War, the beginning of the American Civil War, from Bourbaki's experiences, from the failure of all the Turkish attacks in '76-77, from the American Volunteers in Cuba, and from other instances-expose the weakness and the dangers of his scheme?'

I am quite aware that my two friends greatly overrate the value of any expression of my own opinions on this matter, but nevertheless I will avail myself of the kind courtesy of the editor of The Nineteenth Century and After in allowing me space for some remarks on 'Home Defence,' and more especially because I believe that even among the readers of this Review, the thoroughly welleducated classes, these curious doctrines put forward by Dr. Conan Doyle are not viewed with disapproval.

In dealing with this matter, the first thing to be done is to state what Dr. Conan Doyle's scheme is, and I will endeavour by quotations from the book to explain it fully and impartially. At page 513 we read:

With modern weapons every brave man with a rifle is a formidable soldier, and there is no longer the need for a hard training and a rigid discipline which existed when men fought in platoons and performed complicated evolutions upon the field of battle.

At page 514:

One of the most certain lessons of the war, as regards ourselves, is once for all to reduce the bugbear of an invasion of Great Britain to an absurdity. With a moderate efficiency with the rifle the able-bodied population of this country could without its fleet and without its professional soldiers defy the united forces of Europe.

The Doctor, in the course of a short controversy between him and myself in the Times, stated that the last quoted sentence was 'certainly expressed too loosely,' and he continued :

I did not mean to assert that if unlimited invaders were permitted to land under their own conditions we could beat them off, but I meant that, given the actual conditions, the temporary loss of command of the sea or the absence of most of our regular army would not be fatal to us if we had a million men accustomed to the use of the rifle in the island. This I still think.

I am quite willing to accept the modification, because the principle of the scheme, whether for good or bad, remains the same ; so I will proceed with the quotations.

At page 514:

A country of hedgerows would with modern weapons be the most terrible entanglement into which an army could wander. The advantage of the defence over the attack, and of the stationary force against the one which has to move, is so enormous, and has been so frequently proved by the Boers against ourselves, as well as by ourselves against the Boers, that the invasion of Kent or Sussex, always a desperate operation, has now become an impossible one.

While we can depend for the defence of our own shores upon some developed system of militia and volunteers, we can release for the service of the Empire almost all the professional soldiers.

At page 516:

There is only one thing which wins a modern battle, and that is straight shooting.

At page 529:

I should increase the total number of armed men upon whom we can call by a liberal encouragement of volunteering and such an extension of the Militia Act as would give us at least a million men for home defence, setting free the whole of the highly trained soldiers for the work of the Empire. These volunteers and militia should not be plagued by drill beyond the very simplest requirements, but their shooting should be sedulously encouraged, and every hunt in the kingdom should furnish its commando of mounted infantry. The present yeomanry should also be trained as mounted infantry. With these troops, the household infantry and cavalry, and a good proportion of highly disciplined artillery, the country would be left in absolute security.

In the January number of the Cornhill Magazine is an article written by Dr. Conan Doyle as a contribution to the discussion which has been evoked by his book, and in it he gives us a little more