not free, yet they will freely; and if to will freely would make them free, they would soon be at large, their chief desire being to have liberty.

The human will is an organized form, which is acted upon from both this and the spiritual world; it is furnished with instructions from this world, and is supplied with impulses from the other.

There is a Providence which supervises the formation of the human mind, not by influencing the will but by regulating and adjusting the influences from spirits, so that the will may be held in a state of liberty in order that man may form his own character freely. Those influences, if not equalized, so that neither good nor evil should prevail, would carry man away like a cork upon a stream, and he would have no power to resist. If the influences from spirits gave man a quality, and none but good ones operated upon him, then he would be, as a consequence, good, and if only evil influences, he would be evil; or if there were more of one than the other present with him, the greater would rule him, and still all the time he would be able to will freely, yet in none of those cases would he possess freewill. We have stated that the rule of good influences would make man good, and the rule of evil influences would make him evil, which is not strictly true; the prevalence of those influences would not make man good, they would lead him to conform to their order, in which case he would be no more than an automaton, because only actuated by them.

The overwhelming of man by influences from spirits would make him neither good nor evil; nothing can characterize him as a man but what he chooses and makes his own by the exercise of his free-will; if he were influenced by either good or evil spirits without his choice, he would act of necessity, or he would be actuated, in which case he would possess neither the good nor the evil; but, on the contrary, the good or the evil would possess him. Having no choice as to the principles that should rule him, he would be at most only an animal, either tame and harmless or wild and ferocious, and although in the human form he would not possess a human mind, he would not live a human life, nor would he be a man.

We have already alluded to the provision by which the will is rendered free, viz., that God by His wisdom and power so adjusts the influences from spirits in the spiritual world, to which man is subject, that neither good nor evil can prevail, and, as a consequence, the will is equipoised between them. That adjustment is the cause of freedom, without which the will could not be free. Both good

and evil influences act upon the will and make their presence and their qualities known, but being equipoised, the will is balanced between them, and is at perfect liberty to choose or refuse either one or the other. Whilst those influences are equipoised, however powerful they may be in themselves, they are powerless, and being rendered equipollent, man is just as free as if he were not subject to them at all; and can such a state, by his own choice, determine what shall be his future character and quality? But let it be observed that although the will is now made free by the influences from good and evil spirits being equipoised, yet those influences are not essential to the existence of free-will. The will might be held in freedom without the existence of opposites, as it was with the first man before opposites existed; but now that good and evil spirits exist, and man is necessarily held in communication with them, his freedom is effected by their influences being neutralized. It matters not what amount of influences may operate upon man, for so long as they are mutually annulled by equalization, they cannot bias the will. The will is therefore free, and can turn itself to either, for in such a state nothing more is required than its own determination. The will cannot choose without objects, the effects of the influence of spirits on the knowledge in the memory as well as external things, are its objects of choice, and both may be made subservient to its determinations. Those influences produce excitements in the will which are perceived by the will itself as impulses either good or evil, according to the quality of the spirits whence they proceed, and being perceived, and their qualities known, they are approved of or disapproved of, and which it shall be that is chosen depends entirely upon the will's own prerogative. To possess a will with its natural property, its power to determine, does not imply that the will is free to choose only between opposite qualities, or that its freedom is effected between good and evil; if it were not equipoised between good and evil, it would still possess the power to will. The wills of all in their final states are exempt from that equipollence which is effected between good and evil, all then having a confirmed, and consequently a fixed state of either good or evil. Originally man's freedom was not effected between good and evil; this must be evident, for then no evil existed; the freedom which is effected by a balancing of good and evil was brought about in consequence of the origin and existence of evil, and in such a freedom exists now only man in this world and in the world of spirits; it was not designed by the Creator, nor does it exist with man in his final

destination. The wills of angels are not equipoised between good and evil, yet they are free, and will as freely as they breathe, and so also did man in his pristine state. The infernals also will, nor can they do otherwise, yet neither are equipoised between good and evil. Hence Swedenborg informs us, that "The equilibrium in which the angels are kept in the heavens, and the spirits in the hells, is not like that which exists in the world of spirits. The angels in the heavens find their equilibrium in the measure of good in which they had been willing to be grounded, or in which they had lived while they were in the world, and consequently in the degree in which they had held evil in aversion, whereas the spirits in hell find their equilibrium in the measure of evil in which it had been their will to be immersed, or in which they had lived while in the world; and thus, consequently, in the degree in which in heart and spirit they had been in opposition to good" (H. and H., 591).

If the freedom of the will depended in every condition upon an equalization of opposites, or of good and evil, and was the result of it, that would imply the necessary existence of evil, and then the angels would be subject to similar annoyance to which they were subject whilst they were men in the natural world; they would also be subject to temptations, and would be equally liable to fall as when in the world, in which case they could not experience that peace and tranquillity, joy and delight, and never-failing confidence in their divine Sustainer and Protector, which in their complex constitute happiness. And, on the other hand, if the infernals were subject to the same internal good influences to which they were subject whilst they were men in the world, then, in addition to the suppression of their desires by external restraints, it would be a source of great grief and torment to them, beside that it would afford the opportunity of acquiring additional evil, and by rejecting the good of becoming more wicked, and therefore of becoming more miserable.

After all arguments have been used and evidence adduced to show and to prove the existence of free-will, it is frequently asked, even by persons from whom we might least expect it, What is it that causes the will, even when equipoised and free, to choose one thing in preference to another? Adding, there must be something to move the will, or how does it will at all? This notion implies that the will is not and cannot be free, and that it cannot will freely, but that when placed in the only condition in which it can choose freely, the very effort and act of choosing is, and must be, the result of another agent.

Although the freedom of the will, effected by the neutralization of opposite forces, is not a state of activity but one of passivity, yet that very state affords the will an opportunity of choosing freely. The will possesses a God-like property, viz., apparent independence or apparent self-existence, by virtue of which it can choose without either restraint or constraint, that is, it can choose freely. Free-will excludes everything that would force, bias, or in any way influence. It would be much more reasonable to ask what caused the will to be free. A further remark or two on this point may not be out of place. The capability of willing is grounded in man's apparent independence. That appearance is the result of life entering man in a degree superior to the plane in which his consciousness exists. Life so entering man, and descending into his conscious degree, is there first made manifest, and where it is first manifested it appears to originate. It is said life enters man, but it may with more propriety be said to be ever present and operative in him; it was present in the beginning of his formation in the womb, and effected that formation, and it has been present continuously ever since, and a moment's cessation would be man's annihilation. Although we have affirmed that life appears to originate in man, yet that affirmation is not strictly accurate, for life does not appear to originate at all, if it did, to whom does it so appear? If to man himself, that would imply that he must have existed previously to that appearance, he being unable otherwise to witness it. If life appeared to originate, that appearance must be secondary in point of time, and existence to him by whom it was perceived, for nothing could appear except to some one already existing. Life does not appear to originate in man, but rather it appears to be an inherent property. If life appeared to originate in man, he could not appear to be self-existent, or if he did it would follow that his life was not essential to his existence, because he must have been existent before he became a recipient of that which appeared to originate in him, or it could not have appeared to him. Apparent self-existence altogether excludes all appearances of the origin of life. Man's life could no more appear to him to originate in him than himself could appear to himself to originate.

In conclusion, we affirm there is not anything to move the will, nor is there anything to cause it to prefer acting in one way rather than in another. The will itself is the subject of the motive, or that which causes choice, the motory power is in itself, not by reception but as an inherent property, by virtue of which it can will equally

freely to go to the right or to the left, to good or to evil, that power being its prerogative. If it were admitted that the will is influenced in its choice by some other power, that would admit that it was not free, and still it would not relieve the questioner of his difficulty, but only remove it a little to the back, it would presently come again with renewed force and increased weight, and ask, What is it that moves that which moves the will to choose one thing or one way rather than another? And so the questioning might go on without end. The will has no cause out of self for choosing one thing in preference to another, to choose is its peculiar capability, and its determination is the exercise of that capability. If the will were influenced or led to choose by any extraneous agent, the action would not be attributable to the will but to that agent, to admit which would only lead to a fruitless inquiry as to what that agent was, and would ultimately conduct to God, as the only cause of both good and evil; this would be a logical result. The will is the origin of its own motive, it is the innermost of man, and therefore we cannot go beyond it. This is the very core of our theme, and with it ends our disquisition on free-will. S. S.

REV. CHAUNCEY GILES.

OUR readers will be glad to hear that Mr. Giles arrived at New York on October 25th, after a pleasant voyage.

We have been permitted to insert the following interesting passages from a letter written to a friend in Manchester :

"NEW YORK, Oct. 26, 1875. "MY DEAR FRIEND,-You see by the date of my letter that I am safely in my own country once more. . . I found it very difficult to get away from England. From the power of attraction, or from some other cause, the steamer could not leave until night had cast her shadows over the earth, and hid the island home of so many dear friends from my view. A fog gathered around us, so that neither I nor the captain could tell which way lay my native country. Did that obscuring veil represent the state of my own mind? But it cleared away, and we steamed slowly from one class of our friends to another. I think the good wishes of my friends must have had some effect upon the wind and waves, for we had a very comfortable voyage, while some steamers which sailed about the same time had severe storms to encounter. Good wishes do help us to buffet the storms of life, if they do not allay the winds and subdue the waves of the sea. I was sick one day, but only one. My mind must have been more active than when I went to England, for then I could not read, but now I could read all day, and I passed several days very pleasantly,