-He did not; on the contrary, I rather collected that he expressed no dissatisfaction at it.

Mr. Lawrence was what you call a loyal man, and all his immediate relations were strong Protestants?—I stated that a relation of Mr. Lawrence's stated upon the table, when he was examined as a witness, that Mr. Lawrence was a loyal man; and he defined his loyalty to be strong Protestantism; I think it right to add, that I am not perfectly sure about the last.

Do you think there were loyal men, and strong Protestants, on the jury?—I am sure there were very strong Protestants, and therefore very loyal men, according to a certain, but very im-1 proper and offensive definition of the word.

How do you account for it, that those feelings of loyalty and of strong Protestantism, did not operate with the jury to induce them to take part with Mr. Lawrence, he being a loyal man and a Protestant?I think that the anxiety to support the magistrate, superseded every other consideration.

Then, has not the anxiety to support the magistrate in a disturbed district, overpowered that community of feeling which existed between a jury and a suffering Protestant ?—I do not think that the fact of Mr. Lawrence being a strong Protestant had any effect upon the jury, because no political feeling was the origin of the contest between them; the jury were perfectly impartial, as far as religion was immediately concerned, between the parties, as they were both Protestants. The ground on which I rest my opinion that this case illustrates the imperfect administration of justice, is the simple fact, that Mr. Dempster was allowed to continue in the exercise of magisterial functions.

In this case, there was no opportunity of challenging the jury, it being a civil case; was there?-There were no challenges; there would have been grounds of challenge if the parties had been related, and other grounds unnecessary to be mentioned.

There was no ground of peremptory challenge, without cause assigned ?—No.

Could there have been a verdict in favour of Mr. Lawrence, if Mr. Dempster could have proved, by the Dublin Gazette, that he was authorised, in point of strict law, to exercise this power under the Insurrection Act?-That would have been a mere matter of pleading; if the Gazette had been produced, the objection that the action ought to have been an action on the case, and not an action of trespass (which it was) would, I think have been good; but even if the Gazette had been produced, and the action had been on the case, and not trespass, damages ought to have been recovered.

Might not the jury have taken that omission into their con

1

sideration, when they awarded the damages; might they not have argued, here would have been no damages, provided Mr. Dempster could have produced the Dublin Gazette?-I am sure the jury did not take that into their account, for the Judge drew their attention to the points they were to consider, and that was not included.

This case was tried by the Chief Justice?—It was.

Did you ever hear that there was a communication between the government of Ireland and the Chief Justice, as to the propriety of removing Mr. Dempster from the commission of the peace?-I read in one of the papers, that Mr. Peel made that observation in the House of Commons, but I had never heard it before; I conceived that Mr. Peel might have referred to Lord Norbury, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, who expressed an opinion favourable to Mr. Dempster.

Supposing a communication was actually made by the Irish government to Lord Chief Justice Bushe, of the court of King's Bench, with respect to the propriety of removing Mr. Dempster from the commission of the peace, and that the Chief Justice having tried the case, gave it as his opinion that there was not sufficient ground for the Lord Chancellor of Ireland to exercise his authority, and to remove Mr. Dempster; in that case, would not you think the Lord Chancellor was justified in abstaining from the exercise of such a power?-I must, in candour say, notwithstanding the high respect I entertain, and something stronger than respect, towards the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, who is a very distinguished person, that I should not conceive that even his authority ought to supersede the effect which the powerful facts ought to have produced upon the mind of the Lord Chancellor.

As a general principle, do you not think that it would be unsafe in the Lord Chancellor to exercise his authority in contra= diction to the opinion of the judge who had had the whole merits of the case disclosed to him in evidence?--I do not, where the facts are clearly established, independently of the authority of the judges. The Judge takes notes of the case; he states the facts in those notes; if he submits his notes, and thereby submits the facts to the consideration of Chancellor, I think the Lord Chancellor is just as competent to judge as he is; and I do not think that any Judge who superintends the trial of a case, is at all more competent to form a décision respecting the propriety of removing a magistrate, than any other person.

Do you think a judge, who reads the minutes of evidence in a case, is quite as competent to form an opinion of the precise merits of that case as the judge who tries it, supposing of course

each to be equally gifted, and each equally impartial?—I think, upon a given state of facts, the judge who tries the case, and any other judge, are equally competent to decide; and I think it very possible also, that a judge even of the very highest faculties and the purest judicial integrity, may have particular views respecting the propriety of sustaining magistrates, in entertaining which, he may labour under a very great and pernicious

mistake.

Can you undertake to say, from your recollection of the words used by Mr. Dempster, and the general tenor of that language, that the attack by Mr. Lawrence on Mr. Dempster was purely personal, and had no reference whatever either to politics or to the existing disturbances in the country, or to any thing at all connected with Mr. Dempster's magisterial capacity?—I am perfectly certain of it, because the dispute arose from a servant of the brother, I think, of Mr. Lawrence, refusing to let a horse belonging to Mr. Dempster, into a field attached to a barrack. That was the origin of the whole dispute.

Have the goodness to state whether it is the practice in Ireland, to enforce the Insurrection Act upon respectable persons?-It certainly is not; and the only instance in which I recollect, that a person belonging to the class of gentlemen was arrested under the Insurrection Act, was another instance in which that very Mr. Dempster was the committing magistrate; it was the case of Mr. Gleeson, a repectable professional man, an attorney, who was committed by the orders of Mr. Dempster, for being out of his house at night, in the town of Nenagh.

In point of fact, the same communication and intercourse subsists between parties not suspected of violating the law in a district proclaimed under the Insurrection Act, as before?—I think the same sort of intercourse subsists between persons of the better class.

Was that case of Gleeson ever made the subject of a trial?—It never was made the subject of trial; an action was brought, but the statute that requires the service of notice upon a magistrate, was not complied with; that was the reason, and none other, why the action was not brought to trial; I myself had a brief in the action, and on that account I am acquainted with the facts. Can you state the date of that occurrence?—I cannot exactly

state it.

Had a year intervened?-I think it was in the year 1823.

Can you state what circumstances of life Mr. Lawrence was in ?-Mr. Lawrence is a person of very respectable family, I believe; however, that his circumstances are now, and were then, extremely impoverished, I believe that his respectability, which perhaps will appear singular in Ireland, has sustained some dimi

nution in consequence of his being considered addicted to quarrelling, and his having been reputed a duellist.

Is he considered in society, on a footing with Mr. Dempster? I believe he would be considered in society on a footing with Mr. Dempster.

You do not impute to the jury that they were influenced by religious feelings?--I am sure that they were not influenced by religious feelings; they were influenced by what I conceive to be an undue anxiety to support magistrates through (to use a vulgar phrase) thick and thin.

By what you call an aristocratic sentiment ?-Yes; by that which, when it comes into its operation, with reference to the lower orders, is tainted with religious feeling; perhaps without the persons swayed by it being perfectly conscious of the origin of the motive by which they are governed.

You state that in point of circumstances, Mr. Dempster and Mr. Lawrence were very much on a footing?—Yes; when I say that, I think that the spirit of aristocratic domination is connected with religious domination; I do not apply the observation so much to this particular case, as to the general effect of the system of religious distinction on the whole class of the people.

In this particular case, you neither impute a religious feeling, nor an aristocratic sentiment, to the jury?-I think that the disposition to support magistrates improperly, arises from an aristocratic sentiment; from a desire to keep down and trample upon the lower orders.

Do not you think the jury might have naturally taken into consideration the very great provocation Mr. Dempster had received, that might have deprived him for a moment of the exercise of his sound intellect?-I not only know that they did, but that they ought, and that the Chief Justice directed them to do so; but I think that 751. was not by any means a proper reparation for an imprisonment of three days, and where the Insurrection Act was converted into an instrument of personal vengeance.

Had Mr. Dempster any property separate from his wife's?— I am not aware.

How long had Mr. Dempster been in the commission of the peace?-I do not know.

Is this the only instance in which you call into question the conduct of Mr. Dempster as a magistrate?—I have just mentioned the case of Mr. Gleeson, who was arrested by Mr. Dempster for being out of his house in the town, an hour after sunset. Mr. Gleeson is an attorney in considerable practice; is he not? -No, he is not in considerable practice.

What amount of damages should you yourself have thought

sufficient, in the case of Mr. Lawrence ?-I should have thought that, under the circumstances, 300l. would have been a proper verdict.

What were the damages laid at?-The damages were laid, I believe, at 2000/., but that is no test; it is a matter of caprice with the professional man who draws the declaration. I think it right in fairness to add, that though I mentioned that Mr. Dempster had married a lady with 7007. a year, I believe the estate o that lady is encumbered, though that fact was not brought to the attention of the jury; that circumstance I know from my own personal knowledge.

Have you not expressed an opinion, that public men in Ireland are influenced by undue partialities in administering justice and favour towards Roman Catholics?-I do not think that I said public men; I will say this, that I believe the judges of the land are free from any impure motives connected with religion; but I am convinced that sheriffs, who must be Protestants; that magistrates, a majority of whom are Protestants, and who are strongly swayed by political feelings; that jurors, who are selected by Protestant sheriffs, and especially the jurors of the city of Dublin, are governed by impure motives; and if it be not out of order to mention it, I have the authority of Mr. Edmund Burke for saying, that it is impossible that the law should be administered purely, while the law remains what it is, and continues to be administered by Protestant sheriffs, magistrates and jurors. He says so in his letter, written in the year 1782, to an Irish his words are, ،، The peer; Catholics are excluded from all that is beneficial, and exposed to all that is mischievous, in a trial by jury. This was manifestly within my own observation."

The question refers to the duties of chief secretary of Ireland, for instance?—I am sure that no person, who would hold so high an office, could be swayed in a case of personal wrong, and where merely the rights of two individuals concerned, unconnected with religion, were by any improper motives; but I certainly do think, that public men in Ireland, and I think it is but human nature, are swayed by an anxiety to support the members of that party, by whom they are themselves supported.

Do you recollect making a statement of this nature, that when Mr. Peel was chief secretary for Ireland, a claim was preferred to him, on the part of a man in humble life, a fisherman in the county of Waterford, who had been instrumental by the greatest activity and courage, in saving the lives of several soldiers who were shipwrecked, that an application was made by Mr. M'Dougal, who stated this case to Mr. Peel, and stated his knowledge of the truth of the statement which he made, and applied for some mark of favour from the government towards that meritorious individual;