will of course continue to deny the logic of European tradition in the matter and insist upon American control.

But in so doing they will once more come into direct conflict with the British imperial system. Thus the future struggle over the canal route must continue to remain an integral part of the larger contest over the American continent, and until the broader issue is settled, no permanent decision can be looked for in the narrower question thus involved. International neutralization may carry on the face of it a somewhat more disinterested air than the claim of exclusive American control; but, as a matter of fact, the demands of both parties are purely selfish in character, and, in consequence, diametrically opposed.

Question.

If, then, in this controversy over the canal route, no permanent agreement may be looked for between the two governments concerned, on account § 184. Arbiof the inherent contradiction of their re- tration and spective national policies; the question im- the Transit mediately arises whether the dispute may not be referred to some third party for decision. Arbitration is, in fact, now being suggested as the future alternative for war between England and the United States, and it may be that the transit question will likewise admit of this manner of adjustment. The argument is, indeed, plausible, and humanity strongly supports the main premise; but what should be, is still not always possible, and both the principle of international arbitration and its ap

plicability to the present case should first be tested before hasty conclusions are drawn.

Arbitration, in the first place, presupposes two disputing units of about equal strength, and then an impartial umpire to decide the question. But the American Monroe doctrine is by no means so well established in the world as is the British imperial system, and the United States could, consequently, scarcely expect Great Britain to meet them on equal terms in the matter; for, under an impartial decision, they would be gaining too much and she too little, in such an event. If, however, the present disparity of the claims were to be taken into account, we, in our turn, would naturally hesitate to risk our illestablished rights in an open court under such unequal conditions. But even conceding the eligibility of the parties, there still remains the selection of an impartial umpire to decide the question, and in a matter of this kind, involving British imperial unity on the one hand, and the American Monroe doctrine. on the other, the choice would, indeed, prove a diffi cult one. We might select honest and capable men from our country, and England might choose honest and capable men from hers; but, as honest men and patriots they must, one and all, necessarily have inherited a national bias. And, at all events, the deciding vote would still have to rest with a foreigner. From what country then could he be chosen? England, on her side, would probably insist upon a European; but then we levelled our Monroe doctrine square in the face of all Europe and failed to

give notice to non-combatants that they might avoid the issue if they would. We could, therefore, hardly expect any European arbiter to appreciate the justice of our present claims; and we would, accordingly, in all probability, refuse to submit any Monroe doctrine question to his decision. And so, conversely, if given free choice in the matter, we would naturally decide upon an American arbiter; but England, in turn, would doubtless object to this selection on the ground of the inherited bias of such an umpire in favor of the Pan-American ideal. In default of a European or an American, the two contestants might then have to resort to an Asiatic arbiter. Such a choice would, indeed, prove acceptable enough to us, as our vital interests do not lie in this direction; but Great Britain has an Eastern question also on her hands, and, considering its present unsettled state, she could scarcely consent to allow the two issues to become confused in this way, as she would thus be risking her rights on both sides of the globe at the same time.

But without pressing the point any further, and supposing for the sake of argument, all the minor conditions of international arbitration to be fulfilled between the Anglo-American rivals, there still remains the crucial question, as to whether a contro versy of this character, involving British imperial unity on the one hand, and the American Monroe doctrine on the other, after all admits of such manner of adjustment. The issues at stake are certainly vital, and it is still open to serious doubt whether

modern governments will ever consent to submit questions of national integrity to a third party for decision, any more than individuals nowadays refer matters of self-defense to the courts. Such at least has never been the case in the past, and it is difficult to detect any such tendencies in the present international relations between England and the United States.

In the matter of the Geneva award we did, it is true, refer our case to an international tribunal; but at that particular time, it must be remembered, we were more than England's match, with our military and naval forces still on a war footing. Besides, this was, at most, but a question of damages, and, even then, we only consented to submit to arbitration under conditions, thus reserving our natural right of self-defense. The Behring sea tribunal is a later instance of Anglo-American arbitration, but here again the questions submitted were vital to neither party, and the conclusions thus far reached are, moreover, of too doubtful a character to carry much weight as a precedent.

From the evidence at hand we would, therefore, be inclined to conclude that arbitration is only applicable to the Anglo-American controversy under serious limitations and with important reservations; or, to put it differently, as a method for adjusting disputes of secondary importance, involving neither the integrity of the British Empire, nor the principles of our own Monroe doctrine. But unfortu nately the question of the political control of the

canal route, being part and parcel of the larger con test over the American continent, is vital to each of the two great powers of the West and of secondary importance to neither. We must, therefore, prefer to maintain a skeptical attitude toward the efficacy of arbitration in the transit question, at least so long as the internatioual claims of the United States continue to remain unrecognized.

S. 185.

Conclusion.

Having cast our Monroe doctrine gauntlet at Europe's feet, to be taken up quite naturally by England, nothing apparently remains for us, therefore, but to accept the issue and continue to compete with our British rival for supremacy along the course of the westerly route, and for future prestige in the New World bordering on the Pacific. We should, therefore, carefully define our present diplomatic position, and at the same time take practical steps to emphasize our demands.

And first of all, our Monroe doctrine, itself, needs re-rating, in accordance with the changes that have since been wrought in the international relations of the world. Thinking to mitigate in some degree the inclusive nature of our claims in America, we prom ised in return never to interfere in the international affairs of Europe. But the affairs of Europe are nowadays, as we know, the affairs of Asia and Africa as well, and the periphery of our promises must, therefore, be considerably extended if the proviso is still to hold good. And such an expansion. of our assurances would, indeed, involve no appreci