least gone far enough to show that Europe had no idea of allowing the United States to guarantee the neutrality of the route single-handed. Great Britain was definitely opposed to such an exclusive American protectorate, and she would easily be able to enlist the other European powers in an international syndicate for the purpose. Now it mattered not whether the canal were cut through Panama or Nicaragua; in either event it must, in Arthur's mind, form practically a part of our southern coast line, and hence should be kept under our control. Thus there seemed to the President but one solution of this difficult and perplexing problem, and this was to give over the Panama canal to French enterprise and European control, and at the same time to maintain the political prestige of the United States by the construction of a canal of our own across Nicaragua farther north. The American transit route must in this case be bought outright and paid for by the United States government, and the canal be built under its exclusive auspices. This northerly waterway would then mark our national frontier on the south, and what we owned, Arthur argued, we could certainly control and defend, according to the ordinary laws of property. This was simply cutting the knots of our diplomatic tangle, it is true, but Arthur justified his policy by insisting that the control of the canal was a political necessity involving our national union and pros perity, and that if it were not secured, we must surely disintegrate as a nation.

Before any practical steps could be taken in this governmental canal project, some some diplomatic arrangement had first to be made with Nicaragua, more comprehensive in its terms than the still existing Dickinson-Ayon treaty. This duty fell of course upon Mr. Frelinghuysen, and as a result of his predecessor's diplomacy towards the Central American states, the task was not as difficult as it might have been.

Nicaragua, indeed, was only too glad to grasp again the helping hand of the United States in the midst of her fresh difficulties. According to the decision of the Emperor of Austria Great Britain was once more supreme on her eastern sea-board. Costa Rica was still claiming the canal route as her proper boundary, and instead of a peaceful confederacy, President Barrios of Guatemala was now trying his hand at a forcible union of the states, in spite of the earnest protests of Nicaragua, Honduras, and San Salvador, and their appeals to the United States for aid.

Surrounded thus by foreign and domestic difficulties, Nicaragua then sent a special commissioner, Señor Joachim Zavala, at the request of Secretary Frelinghuysen, to treat with the United States government directly in regard to the canal. Freling huysen had already outlined his plans and the Nicaraguan envoy this time readily agreed to the proposals. A convention, known as the Freling huysen-Zavala treaty, was accordingly drawn up without delay and submitted to the Senates of both

countries for approval, early in December, 1884. Therein it was definitely provided that the United States government should itself undertake to construct, operate, and maintain its exclusive control over the canal through Nicaragua. To this end Nicaragua was to accord our government an exclusive right of way across her territory from sea to sea, and also grant to the United States a fee-simple title to a strip of land two and one half miles broad all along the route. In return the United States undertook to guarantee and protect in its integrity Nicaragua's lawful territory, and furthermore to loan to her government the sum of $4,000,000 to be expended in public improvements. Upon its completion the canal was to belong to Nicaragua and the United States jointly, the former to receive one third and the latter two thirds of the net revenues therefrom. This was of course nothing short of a protectorate over all Nicaragua, but then such a protectorate was thought to be necessary, inasmuch as the United States were to own the canal route themselves, and had therefore to be in a position to defend their own property.

Having thus cleared the political ground, it was now necessary to provide for the economic and technical details of the canal project. Upon the failure of Grant and Ward, and after the canal company's concession had expired in September, there were no longer any domestic obstacles in the way of the President's plans. Following instructions from the Executive, Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler, on December 15, 1884, therefore, ordered Mr.

Menocal to proceed at once to Nicaragua and locate the route, detailing Lieutenant R. E. Peary and Ensign W. I. Chambers to assist him in the work.

While negotiating for the Provisional Canal Society's concession in 1880, Menocal had completed a re-survey of the western section of the route, and decided to run the canal line from Lake Nicaragua to Brito on the Pacific, along the Lajas route, instead of along the Rio Medio, as Lull had previously recommended.' There was no immediate necessity, therefore, of going over this section of the route again, so Menocal and his party confined their pres ent surveys for the government to an examination of the canal line along the Rio San Juan, and to a hydrographic study of the still unsatisfactory harbor at Greytown. The work was completed on April 25, 1885, and in the following November a very com prehensive report was handed in to the Secretary of the Navy, to await the action of the Senate on the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty.2

By this time the activity of the Panama Canal Company, both in Paris and on the isthmus, had reached an unprecedented pitch. It was an § 157. The activity devoted, however, not so much to Collapse of the actual prosecution of the work as to the feeding and nest-feathering of new broods. of vultures.

the Panama

Canal Project.

1 Cf., ante, § 120, p. 327. The only difficulty Lull had found in the Medio route consisted in the proper diversion of the waters of the Rio Grande. Menocal seemed to think this was quite possible, and therefore chose the Lajas route, as its summit was lower.

U. S. Ex. Doc., 99, 49th Cong., 1st Session.

New York Tribune, December 18, 1884.

Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua," loc. cit, p. 12, and Appendix No. 5.

With what funds there were left out of the first instalments of the stock after paying for the preliminary expenses, a force of some three hundred Europeans was sent out from Paris in October, 1881, to clear the line and arrange for the necessary plant. It was soon found that instead of the 100,000,000 cubic yards of excavation that de Lesseps had been figuring on, the canal as planned would require an excavation of at least 176,000,000 cubic yards. Little was thought of this change, however, and in 1882 actual operations were commenced on the canal itself at different points along the line. The work was not undertaken by the original contractors, MM. Couvreux and Her sent, however, for they had followed the prudent example of the Türr-Wyse syndicate and retired from the enterprise with a large indemnity,-but by a score of companies whose bids were higher but whose promises, at least, were equally brilliant.

But the work of excavation did not progress with the despatch that was expected. The climate was found to be deadly, and at the very outset a large number of the unacclimated European laborers and two or three of the company's most competent engineers succumbed. This raised wages considerably and introduced a spirit of recklessness and lack of responsibility in the continuation of the work. Con

1 White mechanics had now to be paid $5 a day, skilled black laborers $2.50 a day, and unskilled black laborers $1.75 a day. The company was pledged to furnish the contractors with requisite labor. High commissions were paid to agents to keep up the supply, but still more labor was required, and the contractors, not having enough hands, could shift the responsibility for unfulfilled contracts on the shoulders of the company.