His circular letter had, he thought, sufficiently intimated his general intentions, and so, on November 19, 1881, Blaine addressed a long despatch to Mr. Lowell, our minister in London, outlining his case under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This treaty, he began, was agreed upon some thirty years before under exceptional circumstances which were temporary in character and which now no longer exist. Each government then claimed certain rights in Central America, and both were anxious to see a transitway constructed at once. The United States did not possess sufficient capital at that time to undertake the work alone, and therefore the desire for British funds greatly influenced the convention. But all this has changed, Blaine continued, and the United States, having since developed their interests along the Pacific coast so enormously, now have new duties to perform with which the Clayton-Bulwer treaty interferes. The idea of this treaty was to place the two signatory powers on a plane of equality, but its present operation, Blaine maintained, would practically concede "to Great Britain the control of whatever canal may be constructed"; for "the treaty binds the United States not to use its military force in any precautionary measure, while it leaves the naval power of Great Britain perfectly free and unrestrained." In order to equalize matters on this basis it would therefore be necessary to prohibit war vessels of Great Britain from passing through the canal ; for, our Secretary argued, "if no American soldier is to be quartered on the isthmus to protect the rights of his country in the interoceanic canal, surely by the fair logic of neutrality, no war vessel of Great Britain should be permitted to appear in the waters that control either entrance to the canal." Inasmuch as England has fortified and now holds all "the strategic points that control the route to India," it is therefore no more unreasonable, Blaine maintained, "for the United States to demand a share in these fortifications, or to demand their absolute neutralization, than for England to make the same demand in perpetuity from the United States with respect to the transit across the American continent." As Eng. land thus guards the route to her colonies, so the United States only desire to guard their route to a section of their own territory comprising, Blaine said, "nearly 800,000 square miles,―larger in extent than the German Empire and the four Latin countries of Europe combined,-" and inhabited not by people of alien races, as was the case with India, but by citizens "of our own blood and kindred,-bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh.” In the event of a hostile movement against the Pacific states, the United States cannot therefore, permit themselves to be bound by a treaty which gives "the same right through the canal to a warship bent on an errand of destruction, that is reserved to its navy sailing for the defence of the coast and protection of the citizens." "A mere agreement of neutrality on paper between the great powers of Europe," Blaine feared, "might prove ineffectual to preserve the canal in time of hostilities." "The first sound of a cannon in a general European war would," he said, "in all probability, annul the treaty of neutrality, and the strategic position of the canal commanding both oceans might be held by the first naval power that could seize it," and this would be a fatal blow to the domestic commerce of the United States. Other nations were already gaining supremacy in Central America, he added, and unless the treaty of 1850 were modified in some way, both Great Britain and the United States must stand by helpless, while some other power stepped in and directed the canal. Already, Blaine pointed out, France is standing sponsor for the Panama canal, and under the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the United States were not able to assert their plain rights acquired from Colombia in 1848. From these and other considerations of a like nature, Blaine was finally able to conclude that the American isthmus should be placed "under the control of that government least likely to be engaged in war, and able, in any and every event, to enforce the guardianship which she shall assume. For protection to her own interests, therefore, the United States, in the first instance, asserts her right to control the isthmus transit; and secondly, she offers, by such control, that absolute neutralization of the canal as respects European powers, which can in no other be certainly attained and lastingly assured." Having thus in a somewhat peremptory fashion laid down the deliberate opinion of his government, Mr. Blaine rounded off his despatch with the hope way that Great Britain would at least consent to a friendly modification of the disagreeable treaty in harmony with the American demands. This could hardly be expected, however, for Blaine seemed to forget that during all these years Great Britain had been advancing toward the west as well as toward the east, and that it was equally imperative upon her to fortify and guard her western as well as her eastern trade route. Everything that Blaine had to say was true enough as an expression of our national policy, but if we felt so strongly in the matter, why had we not acted more in accord ance with our convictions? As a matter of fact, Buchanan had long ago closed our case, and Blaine's argument being entirely theoretical and ex parte showed no good grounds on which it could be reopened. Granville's Reply to Letter. Blaine was quite right in his original supposition that Great Britain would take exception to his circular letter on the Monroe doctrine as ap plied to the canal. Lord Granville was then Foreign Secretary, and his reply, dated November 10, 1881, crossed Blaine's special despatch on the way. His Lordship expressed some surprise at the nature of the circular letter of the State Department of the United States, and more especially in its application to the British government. He was glad, he said, to learn that Mr. Blaine had no intention of initiating a discussion on the question of the joint guaranty of the isthmus, and he only wished to call attention to the fact that "the position of Great Britain and the United States with reference to the canal, irrespective of the magnitude of the commercial relations of the former power with countries to and from which, if completed, it will form the highway, is determined by the engagements entered into by them, respectively, in the convention monly known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty"; and, Lord Granville curtly concluded, "Her Majesty's government rely with confidence upon the observance of all the engagements of that treaty." com § 149. Blaine's Historical Objections. But the British Foreign Office was mistaken, for not only the Secretary of State, but also both Houses of Congress were eager to reopen the old contest with England over the control of the American isthmus. On the receipt of Lord Granville's note at the hands of the British minister, Blaine was forced to recognize that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty must henceforth act as an estoppel to any further theoretical discussion of American rights. Still unappalled by the inherent weakness of his case, he thereupon set bravely to work to break down the bar by the force of certain "historical objections," which he despatched in a second note to Mr. Lowell on November 29th. With great care Mr. Blaine went over all the diplomatic correspondence that passed between the two governments during the years that had elapsed between 1850 and 1859, quoting very largely and commenting sharply by the way. From the diplo matic history thus recorded, Blaine was finally able to conclude that "the engagements of the treaty were misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly |