and the rest of the Central American republics lent their military support to Nicaragua in the struggle.

Throughout Central America the Liberals were still in control, and there was now a plan on foot to change this armed alliance against Costa Rica into a constitutional union of the states. Mr. Fish was greatly in favor of this scheme, thinking it would strengthen the American cause against French and English rivals. He therefore urged the matter strongly upon Nicaragua, pointing out to her that the Mosquito question had only come up for discussion after the dissolution of the last Central American confederacy. Mr. C. A. Williamson, the United States Minister in Central America, was also instructed to offer the good offices of his government to put an end to the present conflict, and thus render the proposed union possible. As might have been expected, however, the movement came to nothing. General Barrios, President of Guatemala, attempted to use force in the matter, and this only excited the jealousy of the other states, and caused them to hold aloof. The Conservatives everywhere were opposed to the union, and the internal revolu tions they fomented in several of the states effectually put an end to the whole scheme.

The decision of the Commission had already given Nicaragua, moreover, an undue impression of her own importance, and this feeling was now increased by further flattering advances being made to her by

another French canal projector, M. Blanchet, who had been for some time looking over the ground, and was now anxious to secure a concession. The Conservatives were desirous of coming to terms at once with the French, while the Liberals still remained loyal to their American alliance; but both parties regarded the technical decision in favor of their canal route as a vindication of Nicaragua's political rights as well, and they all looked with confidence to some sort of foreign intervention that should crush out their rival, Costa Rica, and make their country the leading state on the isthmus.

To be the more sure of their technical premises, the Nicaraguan authorities, therefore, called upon Mr. Menocal to continue his surveys along the lower San Juan. While the work was in progress, the Liberal government also despatched a special commissioner, Señor Cardenas, to Washington to learn what terms the United States were willing to make for the immediate construction of the canal under American auspices.

Mr. Fish entered heartily into the plan and soon had the draft of a new treaty drawn up, providing for such necessary changes in the Dickinson-Ayon convention as would render it possible for a company of American capitalists to undertake the work. The wording of this instrument was very diplomatic, and its tone was conciliatory, for Fish was anxious that no objection should be raised by Great Britain and the other maritime powers of Europe to his

American canal project. But in this case the objections came from Nicaragua herself. Señor Cardenas, in short, refused to consider the question at all unless Mr. Fish would consent to pay Nicaragua an indemnity for the bombardment of Greytown. This was, of course, too absurd, for at the time of the bombardment, Greytown itself was both legally and actually beyond the jurisdiction of the Nicaraguan government, and besides, the United States still considered themselves justified in the course they had pursued.

Mr. Fish could not possibly consent to commit his government to any such stultifying conditions, and, as Cardenas would listen to no other terms, the negotiations were very soon broken off, to the immediate and ultimate disadvantage of both parties. Indeed, it seemed impossible for our State Department to make any progress at all in adjusting the diplomatic difficulties of the transit question, and Fish thus met with no more success in the matter than Seward had done before.

Grant certainly did his utmost during his two presidential terms to place the American canal project on a safe and sound basis. From the purely technical point of view the work of his administrations was crowned with success, but politically the question was now in even a worse condition than before. Grant appreciated this full well, for before setting out on his tour around the world, he made a personal appeal to President Hayes, who was now installed as his successor, urging him to leave no

stone unturned in providing for more adequate arrangements in behalf of the American canal.1

1 U. S. Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 683.

U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, Oct. 7, 1871, and June, 1874.

U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc., 194, 47th Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 157 ff.

U. S. H. Ex. Docs., 732-43, 43d Cong., Ist Sess.; 157 and 168, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. ; 59-61, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS.

O

Interest in

NE of the greatest monuments to the Bonaparte Emperors of France is the Suez canal, projected by Napoleon I., and successfully carried out to completion under the auspices of his nephew, Napoleon III. To Ferdinand de Lesseps was given the credit for the technical part of the work, and his fame as an engineer § 124. Ferdinand de suffered no diminution in the minds of the Lesseps's French with the downfall of his political the Canal master. De Lesseps thus stood as the connecting link in France beween the achievements of the Empire and the possibilities of the Republic. Having joined the two seas in the East for the former, it became naturally enough his ruling ambition to unite the two oceans in the West for the latter. A noble work, indeed, but more than one man could accomplish, to cut through the last dykes which still held back the eastern and western advance of the Aryans, and thus allow a smooth flow for the pent up commerce of the West.

Project.

In view of the diplomatic complications attending both the construction and the maintenance of the Suez canal, and in the light of the past and present