$77. The Seizure of

Tigre Island.

Having gained actual possession of the Atlantic outlet of the canal, the British had already begun to apply themselves to securing control over the Pacific port as well, foreseeing, with their characteristic keenness, that the power which dominated both termini of the proposed route would always have the final word to say in the transit question. Napoleon's route formed the basis of the then calculations, and this, it will be remembered, had its western outlet in the Gulf of Fonseca. Thus, though the actual terminus of the canal was to be in Nicaraguan territory, Honduras would still control the port and therefore the canal's real outlet on the Pacific. The islands in the Gulf of Fonseca, became, in consequence, of the utmost strategic importance in the present struggle for the control of the route, as they occupied a position on the Pacific shore similar to that held by Greytown on the Atlantic.

The British proceeded against these islands in an indirect way at first, by pressing an old claim for debt against Honduras for damages said to be due to Her Majesty's subjects. Thus, while Squier was treating with Nicaragua, British war-ships took their position off Truxillo and threatened the town with their guns, while Chatfield kept pressing the Honduras government for immediate satisfaction of the English claim.

Hearing news of this coercion, and foreseeing its probable outcome, Mr. Squier hurried north after concluding his negotiations with Nicaragua, and,

entirely on his own authority, began to treat with the Honduras government himself, hoping to secure American rights there as well, and thus, if possible, head off the English on this occasion. The Honduras authorities were only too glad to accept this solution of their difficult position, and on September 28, 1849, a treaty was concluded, granting to the United States valuable stretches of land for naval stations on Tigre island in the Gulf of Fonseca, and for fortifications along the shores of the bay. By a protocol the island of Tigre itself was furthermore ceded to the United States for eighteen months pending the ratification of the original treaty. Thus the two rivals were for the moment placed on equal terms. terms. Great Britain held the Atlantic outlet of the canal, while the United States were secure in their control over the Pacific port. The advantage was, indeed, slightly in our favor, for we also held an exclusive right of way through the interior.

When Chatfield heard of this treaty and its all-important protocol, he left the capital and proceeded at once to the Pacific. The fleet then sailed away from Truxillo, after firing a parting shot on the town, and orders were hastily sent to the Pacific squadron to meet Chatfield at the Gulf of Fonseca. Acting in conjunction with this naval force, Chatfield at once seized upon Tigre island for debt, in the name of the Crown, and hoisted the British flag there on October 16th. Squier forthwith notified Mr. Chatfield that he had unlawfully taken posses

sion of land belonging to the United States, and then ordered the British to evacuate the island. This Chatfield flatly refused to do, whereupon Squier gave him six days more of grace, and said that any further occupation of the island after that date would be regarded by his government as an act of aggression to be dealt with accordingly.

Matters were in this interesting state, when Mr. Clayton's diplomacy interfered, and the whole transit question was taken out of the hands of the belligerent agents in Central America, and amicably adjusted in Washington.'

'Brit. and For. State Papers, loc. cit., Vol. XL., p. 953, Docs. 14-17. House Journal, U. S., 31st. Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1739–1801.

U. S. Sen. Doc., No. 43, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1-26.

U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 27, 32d Cong., 2d Sess.

U. S. Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 156.

CLAY

THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY.

HE doings of British and American agents on the isthmus naturally stimulated diplomatic activity between the two govern ments. While advancing each in its own way toward the Pacific, Great Britain and the United 878. Mr. States had, at the same time, been laying Clayton's the train for a fresh quarrel, and the unCourse. official publication of the Hise treaty finally

touched off the fuse.

According to this convention, the United States undertook to guarantee Nicaragua's paramount right of sovereignty from sea to sea; but by the terms of the Loch treaty with Nicaragua, the entire eastern coast, including the outlet of the San Juan, was, to all intents and purposes, a British possession. By Hise's act, therefore, the whole question was brought to an issue; involving England's rights of encroachment in America, which we had up to this persistently denied, on the one hand, and our own Monroe doctrine, which we had promised to uphold, on the other.

Instead of preparing for the inevitable explo sion, Taylor directed all the energies of his feeble.

administration to extinguishing the train that Hise had so recklessly fired. This enthusiast was recalled, as we know, and Squier sent out in his place, with strict and more guarded instructions. The fact was, the Whigs had no majority in the Senate and Taylor thus found himself on the horns of an awkward dilemma. If he backed down now, the anti-administration press was sure to accuse him of pusillanimity in the face of British aggression; and yet he dared not risk an open conflict with England with only a minority support in Congress.

Clayton thought he saw an outlet from the diffi culty by coming to an immediate agreement with Great Britain on the basis of mutual aid and cooperation in the transit problem. Fearing popular enthusiasm, on the one side, and senatorial obstruction, on the other, Clayton resolved, however, to keep his plan a secret until everything had been satisfactorily arranged. He therefore frankly explained to the British minister, Mr. Crampton, the dilemma the administration found itself in, and asked him to lend his assistance in helping them out of the difficulty, on a basis agreeable to both parties. In proof of his good intentions, Clayton offered to abandon the Hise treaty unequivocally, and to co-operate with Her Majesty's minister in securing treaties from Nicaragua that should accord exclusive rights to neither power; provided that Great Britain, on her part, would "consent to make arrangements with regard to the Mosquito claim as would prevent its being an obstacle to the design in question."