1815. PEARCE where she was found to have sustained so much damage that it became necessary to sell her. and Others The plaintiffs claimed a total loss. v. COWIE. Best, serjeant, and Richardson, for defendant. -The voyage is illegal by the Navigation Act. A ship of this description, the master and crew of which are foreigners, cannot bring any such commodities from a Spanish settlement in South America. The plaintiffs will rely on the 43 G. 3. c. 153. s. 13.; but that act only authorizes them to import into Great Britain all sorts of wool. The act proceeds to give a liberty to import into Ireland "all sorts of barilla, &c., and wool and cotton wool." There is therefore an obvious distinction made by the Legislature; the bulk of this ship's cargo was cotton wool, and not the wool which the act permits to be imported into Great Britain. Wool, standing alone, means wool from the back of the sheep, and not cotton wool. The Solicitor General, for plaintiffs.-The Act says "all sorts of wool," which includes cotton wool. The word wool, in respect to Ireland, is not used in the same meaning as in respect to England. The term wool, it is contended, applies to the animal: that may be, as regards Ireland; but "all sorts of wool," includes both animal wool, as well as cotton wool. The 55 G. 3. c. 8. continues the act of the 43d, and is an exposition of it. It makes it lawful to import into Great Britain all sorts of wool, and cotton wool. Its intent is to continue the privileges of the 43d, and not to give new privileges. It cannot be said 1815. PEARCE to be a continuing act, if it gives new powers. The 55th recites the 43d, and shews, that in the former act cotton wool was virtually included in and Others the term wool. It is therefore an explanation of the 43d. GIBBS, C. J.-Cotton wool is not included in the term wool in the act of the 43d of the King. Wool is produced from the animal; cotton wool grows from the ground: when applied to wool, it means unmanufactured wool. An irresistible argument is furnished by the two branches of the act as respects Ireland and England. Why should cotton wool be specifically mentioned in the clause to import into Ireland? It would have been included in "all sorts of wool." The legislature evidently meant to distinguish. The 55th, I think, clearly shews that cotton wool was not comprehended in the words "all sorts of wool" used in the 43d. v. COWIE. Plaintiffs nonsuited. The Solicitor General, Lens, serjeant, and Scarlet, for the plaintiffs. Best, serjeant, and Richardson for the defendant. [Attornies, Windle, and Crowder and Co.] The illegality in the present case arose out of the system of the navigation laws; a sys tem to be referred generally to In an action of covenant upon a char MARSH V. PEDDER and Others. COVENANT WOVENANT on a Charter-party.—The plaintiff was the owner, and the defendants freightfreight, it is no ers of the Rover; the voyage was from London to ter-party for defence that the plaintiff received part of the freight in money from the defendants' agent abroad, and the residue in Antwerp, and the freight and primage 410l. The declaration averred a delivery of the goods at Antwerp, and alleged a breach in the non-payment of the freight. There were several pleas: the substance of them was-That one Joseph Osey, to whom the captain, (who was the plaintiff,) was directed to apply at Antants) drawn by werp for the freight, &c. paid plaintiff 1517. 13s. 6d. upon, and ac- part of the 4107.; and, for the residue, gave his cepted by, cer- bill of exchange, drawn on Baker, Mant, and a bill (without the privity of the defend the agent tain merchants at London; was after wards disho noured upon and which bill Page, in London, payable at sixty days' date to plaintiff's order, for 2581. 6s. 6d. ; which bill was duly accepted; and that plaintiff received the of the drawer 1517. 13s. 6d., and the said bill of exchange, in acceptors. full payment and satisfaction. The plaintiff replied to these pleas, that he did not take the bill the insolvency and But the de fendants are still bound to pay the freight in satisfaction, but as a security only, and that, by owing to the plaintiff'; and reason of the insolvency of Osey, the drawer, such bill is not and Baker and Co., the acceptors, he was un to be deemed payment, though defendants were not informed of the transaction until after the failure of the parties to it. 1815. MARSH v. able to procure payment of it. It appeared, that defendants had given the plaintiff a letter to Osey, at Antwerp, directing him to pay for the entire freight 410l. and to give them the earliest intelligence of the vessel's arrival. The plaintiff had and Others. been before chartered by the defendants; had been addressed to Osey, and received payment from him. The defendants likewise sent the following letter to Osey:-" Mr. Joseph Osey,-According to the manifest, you will receive for our account 459l. 9s. 11d. The balance we shall be obliged by your remitting to us, less your charges." On the arrival of the vessel, Osey paid in discharge of the freight 1517. 13s. 6d., and gave a bill of exchange for 2581. 6s. 6d., the residue of the freight, drawn by his agent, to the order of Marsh, upon Baker, Mant, and Page, London. This bill was accepted by plaintiff without any stipulation. On the 1st of May, Osey remitted defendants 721. and claimed a deduction, from some monies of defendants in his hands, of 410l. as paid to plaintiff for their use. The bill was regularly accepted by Baker and Co. in London, and became due in the latter end of June. In the mean time Osey, and Baker and Co. became insolvent, and the bill not being paid, plaintiff applied to the defendants for the residue of the freight. The Solicitor General, and Campbell, for the plaintiff, relied on Tapley v. Martens, 8 T. R. 451. and Everett v. Collins, 2 Camp. 515. 1 1815. MARSH ย. Best, serjeant, and Scarlett, for the defendants. It appears by the charter-party, that the freight was to be paid at Antwerp, and not in London. PEDDER It also appears that there was a sum of money and Others. in Osey's hands, the balance of which, after payments which he was directed to make, he was to remit to the defendants. The plaintiff takes the bill without communication with the defendants. He thus got a new security upon another person. No captain, who is to receive his freight at Antwerp, having taken a bill drawn upon a third person (which is the material distinction) can, on any contingency, resort to the freighters, who authorized him to receive the money for the freight at the port of delivery. If the plaintiff had told Osey that he took the bill as security only, that would have reserved his right against the defendants; but if he mention nothing about security, he takes it as payment. Tapley v. Martens does not apply. This is no bill of exchange drawn on defendants here. No intimation is given to defendants that the plaintiff had got the bill, till Osey failed. Plaintiff must take the consequence upon himself if he will receive a bill drawn on a perfect stranger. If a bill had been given, and not accepted, it would not have done; but, by interposing a third person, a new security is given. If, upon simple contract, a bill of the party had been given and dishonoured, it would have been no payment; but the security of a third person might be pleaded as accord and satisfaction. If a person be the principal in a bond, and the obligee takes a bank-note in discharge of the bond, and |