I fees for each admission is a question of law. shall leave it to the Jury to say what will be a reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for the admissions, if entitled to make out separate admissions to each estate. And it will remain on my note to state to the Court for their opinion, whether the plaintiff be entitled to distinct and entire fees for each admission. The Jury found 20l. a reasonable compensation to the plaintiff, if entitled to make out separate admissions; but if entitled to charge separate fees for each admission, they found a verdict, with 107. damages for the plaintiff. Best, serjeant, and Bowen, for plaintiff. Lens and Bosanquet, serjeants, for defendant. [Attornies, Redit and Williams.] In the ensuing Michaelmas Term this case was moved on behalf of the plaintiff, and a rule Nisi obtained. The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court:-That the plaintiff was not entitled to distinct and entire fees on each ad- 1815. EVEREST v. GLYN. 1815. June 15. After action brought, the defendant pays the plain tiff the debt and costs in TH HOLLAND V. JOURDINE. THIS was an action to recover the amount of an attorney's bill; plea the general issue. The defendant's counsel admitted the bill to be due, and the cause, and the defence was, a receipt given by the defendant takes a receipt after action brought for the debt and costs in the for the same. The plaintiff nevertheless proceeds in the action, and the defendant neral issue. The receipt is no defence un cause. Onslow, serjeant, for the plaintiff, contended, pleads the ge- that it was not evidence under the general issue; the receipt having been given after action brought. The mode of taking advantage of such payment must be, by an application to the Court, or a special plea. der this plea, and plaintiff is entitled to no minal damages. Best, serjeant, for the defendant, admitted that payment after action brought could not be given in evidence under the general issue; but, in the present case, the debt and costs are included in the receipt which the defendant gives. GIBBS, C. J.-It is no answer to the action under the general issue. The defendant might have applied to the Court. The Court of King's Bench have suffered what has passed between suing out of the writ and filing the declaration to be given in evidence without pleading it. But the payment of debt and costs, which arises after action brought, should be introduced by plea. The plaintiff, however, can only claim nominal damages. The cause was afterwards referred. Onslow, serjeant, and Manley, for the plaintiff. Best, serjeant, for the defendant. [Attornies, Holland and Guy.] 1815. HOLLAND v. JOURDINE. If after action brought, and before declaration, the defendant offers to pay debt and costs, and the plaintiff refuses to receive it, the Court will permit the defendant to pay into Court the debt and the costs up to the time of his offer only. And the plaintiff will be compelled to pay the costs of the application, and all costs in the action subsequent to the offer. Zeevin v. Cowell. 2 W. P. Taunt. 203. In the same manner, if after action brought, and before money can regularly be paid into Court, a tender is made of a sum for damages, with costs up to that time, and refused, the Court will, on mo tion, permit that sum to be paid into Court, and struck out of the declaration, and will order all subsequent costs to be paid by the plaintiff, although the plaintiff goes for other causes of action than those on which the sum is tendered. Roberts v. Lambert. 2 W. P. Taunt. 283. HORSEFALL V. MATHER. June 15. THIS was an action of assumpsit brought Tenant at will is not li against the defendant, who had been tenant able to general repairs; he is bound to use the premises from year to year to the plaintiff, for dilapidations and injury to the premises recently in his accu- in a husbandpation! The declaration stated, that in consi- like manner, but no farther. 1815. HORSEFALL v. deration that the defendant had become and was tenant to the plaintiff of a certain messuage, &c. he undertook to keep the same in good and tenantMATHER. able repair; to uphold and support, and to deliver up the same to the plaintiff at the expiration of his term, in the condition in which he received it. It appeared that the defendant had occupied the house about three years at a rack rent. It was in good repair when he entered it; but, upon quitting possession, he had in some degree damaged the ceiling, the walls, and other parts of the house, by removing the shelves and fixtures, and had not left the house in a good tenantable condition. The plaintiff had been put to some small expence in refitting it for the occupation of a new tenant. The plaintiff gave no other evidence than the occupation of the premises by the defendant. Lens, serjeant, for the plaintiff, contended, that there was a general assumpsit in law, founded in the relation of landlord and tenant, that the latter should keep the premises in tenantable condition; and that this obligation attached upon a tenant from year to year, or a tenant at will. He relied upon Ferguson v. Black. 2 Esp. N. P. 590. Best, serjeant, contrà. The declaration states the implied assumpsit in terms too large. This is an extensive obligation, which, in the absence of a specific contract, does not result from the relation of landlord and tenant. An implied promise to conduct himself as a good tenant is very different from an implied promise to keep premises in repair, to uphold and maintain them, and to surrender them, at the expiration of the tenancy, in that condition. GIBBS, C. J.—I am of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. He has laid his ground too broadly. The defendant is answerable to some extent, but not to the extent stated in the declaration. Can it be contended that a tenant at will is answerable if premises are burned down-would he be bound to rebuild if they became ruinous by any other accident? And yet, if bound to repair generally, he might be called upon to this extent. He is bound to use the premises in a husbandlike manner; the law implies this duty and no more. I am sure it has always been holden that a tenant from year to year is not liable to general repairs. Plaintiff nonsuited. Lens, serjeant, and Stanley, for plaintiff. Best, serjeant, for defendant. [Attornies, Geldard and Wells.] 1815. HORSEFALL ย. MATHER, The Lord Chief Justice cited a MS. case, on the Western Circuit, in which Mr. Justice Buller had expressed the same opinion. The mere relation of land lord and tenant is a sufficient |