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Held, in an action on the policy, undamaged, as collected from the that the assured was bound to several hogsheads, does not exabandon before he could call upon ceed one entire hogshead. In an the underwriters for a total loss, action against the underwriter for the ship not being a wreck, but, a total loss,--Held that the mehowever maimed and damaged, morandum in the policy, free of existing in specie as a ship. Bell

particular average, protected him v. Nixon.

Page 423

from all liability. Hedbergh v. 12. It is the duty of the assured, Pearson

Page 349 not only to communicate to the 15. There is nó fixed rule of law underwriter articles of intelligence with regard to the time, after which may affect his choice, whe which a missing ship shall be rether he will insure at all, and at puted to be lost. It is, in all what premium he will insure; but, cases, a question of presumption likewise, all rumours and reports to be governed by the circumwhich may tend to enhance the stances of the particular case. magnitude of the risk.

If a ship, for which the underThe opinion of underwriters, writers, (when a demand is made whether, upon certain facts being upon the policy,) have paid as for communicated to them, they would a lost ship, should chance to turn have insured or not the particular up, she is to be considered as abanvoyage, cannot be received as evi.

doned, and will belong to the undence. The materiality of the in derwriters. Houstman v. Thorntelligence or rumours, which the ton.

212 assured is charged with having 16. In effecting a policy of insursuppressed, is a question for the

ance, a circumstance of intellijury, under the circumstances of gence, inserted in Lloyd's Lists, the case, and ought not to rest need not be communicated to the upon the opinion of mercantile underwriters, however important

Durrell v. Bederley. 283 it may be to the computation of 13. A policy of insurance is altered the risk; for it is to be presumed by striking out the words in the

within their knowledge, and to body of the policy, which con have been taken into account. tained a warranty to sail at a cer Friere v. Woodhouse.

572 tain time, and inserting a memorandum of an enlarged time in the margin. Some of the underwriters

INSURANCE BROKER, consented to the alteration, but

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. the defendant did not consent. In an action upon this policy, Held, 1. A broker is not entitled to set off that the alteration did not avoid returns of premium, which became the policy. Sed quære. Fairlie due after the death of an underv. Christie.

331 writer, in an action brought against And see Memoranda

679 him by the executors of such un14. Sugars are insured, free of par derwriter. Houston v. Robertticular average. The whole cargo,

88 consisting of 54 hogsheads, is so 2. Where A., at Malaga, directs, by far damaged by sea-water, that letter, his broker in London, the amount of what is safe and to insure 10001. on goods, shipped



on board the Pearl, from Gibraltar to Dublin ; and in the conclusion of his letter adds, “I take the risk on myself from this (Malaga) to Gibraltar Bay, where I shall send my letters on shore.” Held, that the broker was liable to an action for negligence, in not stating in the policy that the goods were loaded at Malaga. Park v. Hammond. Page 80

gistrate without a proper qualifi. cation, no notice of action is necessary under the provisions of the 24th Geo. JI. C. 44. Wright v. Horton.

Page 458 L.


1. An innkeeper who has a licence

to let post-horses, is not bound by the common law to furnish them to a traveller, though he have a chaise and horses at liberty at the time of the application, and though a reasonable price be tendered to him for the hire. Dicas v. Hides.

307 2. If a guest demand, and have ex

clusive possession of a room, for the purpose of a shop or warehouse, he exonerates the landlord from any loss he may sustain in the property which he keeps in that apartment : but if he have not an exclusive possession, the landlord is liable. Curtin v. Pack. wood.


LANDLORD AND TENANT. A custom for the tenant of a farm,

in a particular district, to provide work and labour, tillage, sowing, and all materials for the same, in his away-going year, and for the landlord to make him a reasonable compensation for the same, is valid in law, notwithstanding the farm is held under a written agreement, provided such agreement does not, in express terms, exclude the custom. Senior v. Armitage. Bart.

197 LIBEL. Communications which take place

between the governor of a distant province and his attorneygeneral, are confidential; and if a witness is interrogated as to their substance in a court of justice, he is not bound to answer any questions respecting them.

In an action on a libel to which the general issue is pleaded, and where there is no justification, the defendant

may give in evidence in mitigation of damages, not only that there were rumours and reports, of the same tenor as the libel, previously current, but that the substance of the libellous mat. ters had been published in a newspaper; and he is not required to lay a basis for this evidence, by producing such newspaper at the trial.

The delivery of a pamphlet by the governor of a distant province



1. A person who has qualified for

the office of a justice of peace, and acts as such, must have a clear estate of 100l. per annum, in law, or in equity, for his own

use, in possession. 2. In an action against a person for

the penalty given by the statute 18 Geo. II. c. 20, for acting as a ma

husband. Anderson y. Sinder son.



to his attorney-general, not for any public purpose, but in order that he might peruse it, is such a publication as will make him responsible in an action, if the pama phlet be a libel.

In an action against a governor of a colony by the surveyor general, who held that appointment in the colony, (such office being an office at will,) for suspending him maliciously, and without probable cause, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove express and positive malice. "Wyatt v. Gore.

Page 299


MASTER AND SERVANT. 1. A. and B. are partners in the bu«

siness of public carriers ; by a contract between them, A. finds horses and drivers for certain stages, and B. supplies them for the remaining stages. They are, notwithstanding this division of the concern between them, responsible for the misconduct and neglia gence of their drivers and servants throughout the whole distance. And it is no defence to B., that the servant by whom an injury is committed, was the special servant of A., and hired and paid by A.

alone. Weyland v. Elkins. 227 2. The act of the servant will not

bind the master in actions of tort to the same extent as in actions in contracts. Harding v. Greening, ,

Page 531

1. In an action of trover against the

defendant, for not delivering some wine deposited with her by way of security for an advance of money, Held, that it was not sufficient evidence of a conversion, to shew that her son, who acted as her general agent, refused to give it up ; and that it was necessary to prove, that such agent acted under a special direction, in order to make

the defendant liable. 2. If goods are deposited as a secu

rity for a loan of money, such deposit constitutes something more than the right of lien ; and it is to be inferred that the contract between the parties is, that if the borrower do not repay the advance, the leuder shall be at liberty to reimburse himself by the sale of the deposit. Pothomer V. Dawson.








LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. The admission of the wife, who was

aecustomed to conduct her bus. band's business, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations in an action against the VOL. I.

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Rackstraw v. Imber.

Page 368

ORDER, (Jopges')

1. A patent is void, First, If the

specification omit any ingredient,

which, though not necessary to the

composition of the thing for which

the patent is claimed, is a more
expeditious and beneficial mode of

producing the manufacture; and,

Secondly, If, previous to the pa-

tent being granted, the article has
The defendant cannot make, at the been publicly vended, (though

trial of the cause, any such objec. only four months,) by the patentee
tion to the particulars, which, if

himself. Wood v. Zimmer. 58
made earlier, the plaintiff or the 2. First, Semble, that the patent
court might have rectified. Love. should be a general index to the
lock v. Cheveley. Page 552 specification, and state, in sub-

stance and outline, what is there-

after set out in circumstance and
1. An authority to execute a deed detail in the specification. Second.

must be by deed; and if one part ly, Semble, That if a patept be
ner acknowledge that he gave taken for more of machine than
another partner authority to exe is strictly the inventor's own ad-
cute a deed for him, the presump dition or improvement, it is good.
tion is, that it was a legal autho Hill v. Thompson and Others. 636
rity, which must be under seal and
produced. An acknowledgment PAYMENT OF MONEY INTO
is not sufficient. Steiglitz v. Eg.


2. First, Upon the dissolution of a

partnership, and a mutual state-
ment and settlement of accounts,

there is an implied promise in law,

on the part of him against whom a
balance is found, to pay his co-
partner; and an express promise to

pay is not necessary. Secondly, Vide BELL v. Shaw, 298.
A partnership is commenced by ar-
ticles unsealed, in which is con-

tained an agreement for a co-part-
nership deed. Such partnership

may, at any time, be dissolved by
parol : and, although one partner

refuse to sign the deed, when ten.
dered to him, he is not thereby

precluded from recovering a ba-
sance due to him on the partner-

ship account in an action of as-




1. A.&nd Co. of Liverpool, employ R.

and Co. as their bankers there. R. and Co. keep an account in London with J. & L. But A. and Co. have no account with J. and L. A. and Co. direct their agents in London to pay monies “ to their account,' at the house of J. and L. As A. and Co. had no account of their own with J. and L., but through the medium of R. and Co. of Li. verpool; and, as their agents had been in the habit of paying monies of A. and Co. to the account of R. and Co. at the house of the London bankers of R. and Co. Held, that the direction of A. and Co. to their agents, to pay to their account,” was sufficiently complied with, by a payment made to the account of R. and Co., as the agents had been in the habit of

doing. Breed v. Green. Page 204 2. A broker is a witness to prove a

contract; but in an action brought
against the principal, for negli-
gence and misconduct in the
course of his employment, in the
purchase of certain bales of tobac-
co, the broker who made the con-
tract for him cannot be called to
prove that there waa no negligence
or misconduct in the execution of
it, without a release from the prin-
Gevers v. Mainwaring.

*139 3. A. accepts a bill made payable at

the house of the defendants, which is indorsed to the plaintiffs, who discount it. The bill is presented to the defendants, when due, and dishonoured. Two days afterwards, the money to take up the bill is remitted to the defendants; and they are requested to follow it in whatsoever hands it


be. They tender the money to the plaintiffs, who had sent back the

bill, the day before, to the draw

Meantime, the defendants receive an order from a house, to which the letter inclosing the remittance referred them for ad. vice, to hold the money to the credit of that house, as they had, by the desire of A., the acceptor, advanced him to the amount of the money then, in the defendant's hands for the purpose of taking up the bill. Held, that this was a sufficient countermand of the mo. ney on the part of A., and that the defendants were not liable to an action for money had and received, brought by the plaintiffs, on their again getting back the bill into their possession. Stewart v. Fry:

Page 372 4. A letter written by an agent

(though not known to be such by
the party to whom the letter was
written) speaking of a ship, as his
own ship, is not conclusive against
him in an action on a policy of
insurance, in which the question
of ownership is raised. He may

that he is only an agent, and that others are, in fact, the owners of the vessel. Tullock v. Boyd.


PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. 1. The neglect of the obligee to give

notice to the surety, that the principal had made default, does not discharge such surety ; but if the obligee (without the privity of the surety) enter into an engagement with the obligee, and deprive himself of the power of suing him, whereby the surety is prosecuted from coming into a court of equity for relief, he is then discharged ; but not otherwise. Ormev. Young.

84 2. A bond is given to A., B., and C., by the plaintiff' and defeudant,

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