provident persons would act with regard to their own property, occasion, in other words, general prudence and expediency, should require it. With regard to the second point, I am of opinion that the tenant for life can only recover such an amount of damages as is commensurate with the injury done to the life estate. The tenant in tail, or in fee, may have an action on this covenant, and recover for the injury done to his reversionary interest. This is my impression; but the point is new, and I will reserve it. The Jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs. Lens, and Pell, serjeants, and Chilty, for plaintiffs. Best, Vaughan, and Copley, serjeants, for defendants. 1817. EVELYN and v. RADDISH and Others. A reversioner, as well as the party in possession, may bring an action for an injury done to the value of the inheritance. Thus, in an action for erecting a wall, whereby the plaintiff's lights were obstructed, the declaration contained two counts. In the second, the plaintiff counted as the reversioner; and after verdict, it was moved in arrest of judgment, that the action did not lie by the reversioner, being only an injury to the person in posses sion; to which it was answer- 1817. EVELYN and WIFE v. RADDISH and Others. 209, it was held that both lessor and lessee should sue in respect of trees injured by a stranger; each claiming his distinct compensation according to the measure of the injury done to his particular interest; the lessor for the body of the tree, and the lessee for the shade and fruit. So may a copyholder, and the lord, 3 Lev. 131. So, if a stranger subvert land leased at will, the lessee may bring trespass against him, and have damages for the profits; and the lessor may have another action of trespass, and recover damages for the destruction of the land, 2 Roll. Abr. 551. But as the injury consists of two parts, an injury to a temporary right in the lessee, and to the permanent freehold of the lessor, the damages must be assessed with reference to the extent of their several interests: the lessee cannot claim what is due to the lessor, nor the lessor for the temporary interruption of the enjoyment of the lessee. For where different persons have distinct rights in any subject matter, the compensation must be to each in proportion to the injury he has received. One of them cannot demand that part of the compensation which belongs to the other; nor can the satisfaction made to one be a bar to an action brought by the other, 3 Lev. 209. But see Attersol v. Stevens. J. T. demised land to the plaintiff, at an annual rent, for twentyone years, with liberty to dig half an acre of brick earth annually the lessee covenanted that he would not dig more ; or, if he did, that he would pay an increased rent of 375%. per half acre, being after the same rate that the whole brick earth was sold for. A stranger dug and took away brick earth; the lessee recovered against him the full value of it. It was held that he was entitled to retain the whole damages, 1 Taunt. 183. 1817. TH BROADWATER V. BLOT. neg A person who takes in horses to agist, The does not, like an innkeeper, the insure their safety; he is answerable only in case of HIS was an action on the case against the defendant to recover damages for his ligence in losing a horse of the plaintiff. defendant was a farmer, and had received plaintiff's horse to agist at a stated price. It appeared that the horse had strayed out of the de- negligence. fendant's field, and was lost. At the time that the horse was missed, several of the defendant's horses had likewise strayed, aud had been pounded. The latter were recovered, but the plaintiff's horse was finally lost. The defendant had used considerable diligence to advertise it; and had offered to contribute a moiety of the plaintiff's expences in printing and posting hand-bills to obtain intelligence of the horse. The plaintiff gave some evidence of the bad condition of the fences on the defendant's farm; and likewise of general negligence in leaving open the gates of his fields, &c. It did not appear, however, that the loss of the horse was occasioned by the defect of the fences, or that he had strayed through the gates at the time that the witnesses spoke to their being open. Best, serjeant, for the defendant, contended, that, in order to make out a case to entitle the plaintiff to recover the value of his horse in this action, he must shew direct and positive negli gence; either an insufficiency of fences by reason of which the horse strayed, or that the defendant permitted the gates to be open for an unreasonable length of time in the field where the horse depastured. A farmer, who took in horses to agist, was not like an innkeeper, or a carrier. It is true, he received a reward; but he did not warrant the safety of the horses. It was necessary to prove circumstances of negligence, either in the particular act itself by which the horse escaped, or to give evidence of gross negligence generally. Supposing the gate of the field had been set open wantonly, and that the horse had then escaped,-would the defendant have been liable? GIBBS, C. J.-All the defendant is obliged to observe is reasonable care. He does not insure; and is not answerable for the wantonness or mischief of others. If the horse had been taken from his premises, or had been lost by accidents which he could not guard against, he would not be responsible. I admit that particular negligence must be proved, by occasion of which the horse was lost, or gross general negligence, to which the loss may be ascribed, in ignorance of the special circumstance which occasioned it. If there were a want of due care and diligence generally, the defendant will be liable. The question is, were the defendant's fences in an improper state at the time the horse was taken in to agist? Did he apply such a degree of care and diligence to the custody of the horse as the plaintiff, who entrusted the |