1816.

TOWNSEND

and Others,

v.

INGLIS.

Best and Bosanquet, serjeants, for the defendants, made two points:-1. It is admitted that Reed and Co. have not been paid for these skins; the broker alone has received the money, who was known to the plaintiffs to be acting as an agent. The contract disclosed the name of the principals; the plaintiffs, therefore, should have gone to them; they acted incautiously in giving the bill to the broker without the express consent of the principals. Where the agent acts as a principal, the purchaser who deals with him is safe in paying him; but, where he is a known agent, if the purchaser make the payment personally and expressly to the broker, whose authority extends only to sale, and not to receive payment, he acts at his own risk.-2. Mr. Inglis, the treasurer of the Dock Company, is entitled to an acquittal: at the time of the formal demand of the goods, they had been delivered out to the order of Reed and Co. near four months. They had never been entered in the name of the plaintiffs in the dock books; the sale as between the plaintiffs and Reed and Co., might be complete, but the Dock Company had not, by any act of their own, attorned to the transfer: they had not, therefore, been guilty of a conversion.

Lens, serjeant, contrà.-With respect to the first question, it is in evidence that Reed and Co. had authorized the broker to draw bills and receive payments in many instances. He had made him his agent with this large authority, and must incur the risk of the credit he gave him. With regard to the second objection; the Dock Company, by

TRINITY TERM, 56 GEORGE III.

the delivery of skins, in September 1815, to the order of Reed, Irvine, and Co., which skins, by the contract of sale and payment, were at that time the property of the plaintiffs, had been guilty of a conversion. They are bound to a knowledge of the rights of the parties whose property they have in their custody, and assume to dispose of..

GIBBS, C. J.-The defendants contend that, as the plaintiffs have paid the broker, and not them, they are entitled to the skins. The plaintiffs rest their case upon this ground; that, in paying the broker, howeyer unusual that practice may be, they have paid an agent who was acting in a course of dealing established between himself and the defendants, and whose authority extended to draw bills in his own name, and to receive payment. I think there is evidence for the Jury to collect that Taylor and Co. had this authority from their principals. I am likewise of opinion that the treasurer of the Dock Company is not answerable. Though the skins were the property of the plaintiffs from the completion of the bargain, the Company had made no transfer, and had no notice of their possessory title, when they delivered the skins to Reed and Co. in September. Mr. Inglis, therefore, is entitled to a verdict.

The Jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs against Reed, Irvine, and Co.; and acquitted the treasurer, Mr. Inglis.

VOL. I.

1816.

281

TOWNSEND and Others,

INGLIS and Others.

1816.

TOWNSEND and Others

v.

INGLIS and Others.

Lens and Vaughan, serjeants, and Marryatt, for the plaintiffs.

Best and Bosanquet, serjeants, for the defend

ants.

See the London Dock Act, 39 and 40 G. 3. c. 47. s. 151. See likewise, Favene v. Bennett, 11 East 36. Pickering T. Busk, 15 East 38. Shipley

v. Kymer, 1 Maule and Selw. 484. Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East 400.; and Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757.

1816.

DURRELL and Another v. BEDERLEY.

THIS

THIS was an action on a policy of insurance on the ship Hazard, which had letters of marque as a privateer, from the 6th of March to the 6th of May inclusive, during the cruize against the enemies of Great Britain, in sea and port, &c. with the usual terms. The policy had been effected by Mr. Willis, the broker; and bore date the 24th of March. The ship was fitted out in Jersey she sailed on her cruise on Sunday, the 6th of March, at noon; and at five o'clock the next morning she was captured by two French frigates and a sloop of war, about twelve leagues from Jersey, and carried into St. Malocs.

insure at all,

and at what

premium he

will insure;
but, likewise,
all rumours
and reports

which
tend to

enhance the
magnitude of
the risk.
2 The opi-
nion of under-

writers, whe-
tancer
being commu-

It was in evidence, that on the 8th and 9th of March, there were reports in Jersey, which gained considerable credit, that some French frigates were about the coast; and that a capture had them, they been made on the 7th; that on the latter day

The

a ship's binnacle had been afloat at sea, on which
was a compass of a particular description.
order of insurance, which was sent by the plaintiffs
to the broker, bore date the 16th of March; up to
which time, from the sailing of the ship on the 6th,
these reports continued to prevail, and were uncon-
tradicted. The plaintiffs' letter was not received by
the broker till the 24th of March, on which day

nicated to

would have in

sured or not the particular voyage, can

not be receiv dence. The

ed as evi

materiality of the intelli mours, which

gence or ru.

the assured is

charged with pressed, is a question for

having sup

the Jury, under the cir

eumstances of the case, and ought not to rest upon the opinion of mercantile men.

1816.

DURRELL

the insurance was effected. The letter was a naked order to insure the ship, and was silent and Another as to all of the reports which prevailed, and as to all the circumstances which had occurred since BEDERLEY. the Hazard sailed.

v.

Best, serjeant, for the defendant, contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover: they have suppressed most important intelligence, which they ought in good faith to have communicated to the underwriters. If these rumours had been stated at Lloyd's, would any man have underwritten this vessel upon any terms? They have insured mala fide they have thrown a risk upon the defendant, which, upon a fair disclosure of all the circumstances, he would not have undertaken. He relied upon Lynch v. Hamilton, 3 Taunt. 37. and the cases there cited.

Lens, serjeant, contrà.-There is a distinction between rumours and actual intelligence. There is no case which goes the length of stating, that rumours are to be communicated to the underwriters. The case of Lynch v. Hamilton was widely different there actual intelligence had been received and stuck up at Lloyd's; but mere reports, which may be founded or unfounded, which have nothing precise or defined, need not be communicated. He admitted that it was a question for the Jury, whether the rumours which prevailed between the 6th and 16th of March were of such a description that the plaintiffs were bound in fairness to communicate them.