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1815.

GREGG and
Another

v.

SCOTT.

was to relieve the blockade: it did not, like other licenses, adopt the Jonge Grief as a British vessel for the time. In consequence of that license, which carries no evidence on the face of it that it is granted to a vessel owned by a Dutchman, the enemy seize the ship; they have the value by capture; and an alien enemy, the owner, claims likewise the value from the underwriters. The council thought the license granted to a neutral; and the license is only consistent, by being a license to this ship, provided she were a neutral.

Vaughan and Taddy, for the plaintiffs.—This was in effect a license to the vessel to return to Holland in ballast. It is clear that she had brought a cargo from Holland with a sufficient license; and she is here with the knowledge of Government. It is objected that it may be a license to protect enemy's property. Government might use the ship for that purpose, and extend the protection to property of any description. This is not a license for goods, but specifically to the ship; to a Dutch ship, and to a Dutch captain. It would be a fraud in Government to allow an enemy to import goods into this country, and not to permit the vessel to return in ballast. The King may grant such a license; and it is evident that the vessel was only returning in ballast after depositing her cargo in this country. They cited Hagerdorn v. Reid, 1 Maule and Selw. 567.

GIBBS, C. J.-I think this license was not sufficient to cover enemy's property: we were at war with Holland. The Order of Council of 1809 had

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prohibited all vessels from sailing to any port within
that district to which this vessel was bound.
license was necessary. The King, receding from
his belligerent rights, might grant a license to an
alien enemy, and legalize the voyage; he might
grant a license to the ship to proceed to the prohi-
bited ports. The question is, whether the license
protects the ship, being an enemy's property. If
the object of this license were to protect an ene-
my's ship, and I could see this ship to be an enemy's
property, it is sufficient. But if it be to protect
her from the Order of Council, it is not sufficient.
I can look only to the license: the petition we have
not. In Hagedorn v. Reid the license was to im-
port a cargo, though the insurance was on the
ship; the license in that case included all flags,
though the King's enemies, except a French flag. If
I found that this was a license to brokers and neutral
merchants to export a cargo to Holland in any
vessel but a French vessel, I should say it extended
to a Dutch vessel. Looking only to this license,
which is granted for this ship to go back to Hol-
land in ballast, and this being an insurance on the
ship, I do not know how it can protect her as
enemy's property. I cannot collect from the li-
cense a privilege to the persons who obtained it,
to be interested in a ship belonging to an alien
enemy. It is apparent that the object of this
license was to remove the disability occasioned by
the Order of Council.

1815.

GREGG and
Another

v.

SCOTT.

Plaintiffs nonsuited.

1815.

GREGG and
Another

v.

SCOTT.

Vaughan and Taddy, for plaintiffs.

The Solicitor General and Spankie, for the defendant.

[Attornies, Pearce and Son.—Crowder and Lavie.]

Although the state of Europe, in which the late extensive system of licenses originated, has passed away, most probably never to return; yet, as in some future war, a condition of things may arise, requiring a partial application of the same system, it may not be useless to explain the principles, and to refer to the leading decisions, upon which the practice of granting and interpreting licenses was controlled and regulated.

The navigation laws, and more especially the celebrated act of 12 Chas. 2. c. 18. (the basis of our commercial system,) being the statutes of the realm, could not of course be dispensed with by the prerogative of the crown. But it has been found necessary on many occasions to have recourse to parliament to suspend their operation in time of war. Various acts therefore were passed, to alter or qualify them according to the new condition of things which was produced.

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By these acts, a special power is given to the King in Council to modify or dispense with such provisions as might be found expedient in particular conjunctures. Under some of these statutes, licenses were directed to be granted by an Order in Council, &c.: under others, the Secretaries of State, by an authority under the King's sign manual, and in pursuance of an Order of Council specially authorizing the grant, were empowered to act in the place of the sovereign. The principal acts were, the 43 G. 3. c. 153. s. 15., 45 G. 3. c. 34., 46 G. 3. c. 111., 47 G. 3. c. 27., 48 G. 3. c. 37., 48 G. 3. c. 126., 49 G. 3. c. 25., 49 G. 3. c. 60. As the authority to grant these. licenses was derived from the whole legislature, the power under them was consequently restricted to the letter and reasonable intendment of the several acts, and could not be extended farther than the statutes themselves permitted.

Independently of this power of bestowing licenses, by which the restrictions of the navigation law were dispensed with, the Crown, by its prerogative, already possessed a power of granting privileges and dispensations, by which it receded from its own rights in a state of war. Upon these conjoint legal powers, therefore, viz. the licenses by statute, which was an enlargement of the powers of the Crown by acts of parliament, and the licenses by prerogative, which were of inherent right, was built a system sufficiently large to accommodate itself to Europe under the Milan and Berlin decrees. Being granted for commercial purposes, they were not deemed to be strictissimi juris: they were not construed so tenaciously as the grants of the Crown in ordinary to the subject. Their object was to disembarrass commerce from the restrictions which the enemy had thrown upon it. The Crown, in these licenses, gave nothing but a more extensive liberty of trade and commerce; of importation and exportation. It no way diminished its own stock, whilst it consulted the interest of the revenue. Hence it became, though not indeed in the first instance, a practice of the Courts

of Admiralty, and likewise of the Courts of common law (in which such licenses came incidentally under their cognizance in questions of policies of insurance, freight, &c.) to interpret them liberally and largely, and with none of that jealous apprehension of the subject taking more than the Crown intended to give, by which royal grants had been fettered and controlled at common law.

It would be a want of due professional feeling, now that the subject presents itself, not to join the humble testimony of the writer of this note (with the concurrent praise of all) to the profound and accurate learning of Sir William Scott, who, in the administration of this law, has shewn how the most liberal equity can be reconciled with the requisite certainty of law. He is in fact the author of the whole learning of the law relating to the system of licenses. And if it be considered how suddenly and unexpectedly the circumstances arose, it must be matter of reasonable admiration, and of the most unqua lified praise, that a connected set of principles, so consistent with law, and the practice of the Courts, was as immediately invented to meet and embrace them. It must remind the

1815.

GREGG and Another

V.

SCOTT.

1815.

GREGG and Another

v.

SCOTT.

common lawyer of the celebrated fiction of uses, so ingeniously invented and introduced by the clergy to evade the statutes of mortmain. The law of licensing, a term and title already known to the Admiralty Courts, was thus extended to comprehend a new and unexpected state of things. A certain nature, suitable principles, and rules, were given to it; and most ingeniously, and at the same time most learnedly, they were made to accommodate themselves to all the cases which could occur. The limits of a note will only enable us to give a summary of the leading cases which have been decided upon this subject.

We have already observed, that the King, who is the arbiter of foreign commerce, may regulate it, except he be restrained by statutes; but he cannot change the law of the land, or the law of nations, by general and unlimited regulations.

He may give an enemy liberty to import; he may place a whole district, though the. member of a hostile country, in a state of amity; he may exempt any individual from the operation of war. 1 Acton, 313.

But a license to an enemy to import goods must be ex

press, for an enemy will not be protected by a general license. 1 Acton, 313.

In all cases, however, in which the King grants a license, he may also qualify it, in which case the parties seeking to protect themselves under it must conform to its regulations. 1 East, 475.

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In the case of the Cosmopo lite, 4 Rob. 11. Sir William Scott says, a license is a high act of sovereignty: they are necessarily stricti juris, and must not be carried farther than the intention of the great authority which grants them may be supposed to extend. I do not say that they are to be construed with pedantic accuracy, or that every small deviation shall vitiate the fair effect of them."

Again that learned Judge observes, "the shipper obtains a license, which is a thing stricti juris, to be obtained by a fair and candid representation, and to be fairly pursued." 4 Rob. 96.

In this case, the Cosmopolite, Sir William Scott, proceeds to lay down certain rules for the obtaining and construction of licenses, which are most fit to be attended to. "Two circumstances," he says, " are required to give due effect to a license: 1st, that the intention

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