Elements of the philosophy of the human mind - Dugald Stewart - Google Books

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CONTENTS.

OF REASON, OR THE UNDERSTANDING, PROPERLY SO CALLED;

AND THE VARIOUS FACULTIES AND OPERATIONS MORE IMMEDI-

ATELY CONNECTED WITH IT

Preliminary Observations on the Vagueness and Ambiguity of

the common Philosophical Language relative to this part of

or Constitution,-Reason and Reasoning,-Understanding,-

Intellect,-Judgment, &c.

Of the Fundamental Laws of Human Belief; or the Primary Ele-

ments of Human Reason.

SECT. I.-Of Mathematical Axioms

2. Continuation of the same Subject

II. Of certain Laws of Belief, inseparably connected

with the Exercise of Consciousness, Memory, Per-

ception, and Reasoning

III. Continuation of the Subject.-Critical Remarks on

some late Controversies to which it has given rise.

-Of the Appeals which Dr. Reid and some other

Modern Writers have made, in their Philosophical

Discussions, to Common Sense, as a Criterion of

Of Reasoning and of Deductive Evidence.

1. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction be-

tween the Powers of Intuition and of Reasoning

2. Conclusions obtained by a process of Deduction

often mistaken for Intuitive Judgments

b

II.-Of General Reasoning

1. Illustrations of some Remarks formerly stated in

treating of Abstraction

2. Continuation of the Subject.-Of Language con-

sidered as an Instrument of Thought

3. Continuation of the Subject.-Visionary Theories

of some Logicians, occasioned by their inattention

to the Essential Distinction between Mathematics

and other Sciences

4. Continuation of the Subject.-Peculiar and super-

eminent Advantages possessed by Mathematicians,

in consequence of their definite Phraseology

III.-Of Mathematical Demonstration

1. Of the circumstance on which Demonstrative Evi-

dence essentially depends

2. Continuation of the Subject.-How far it is true

that all Mathematical Evidence is resolvable into

Identical Propositions

3. Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of the

Mechanical Philosophy, not to be confounded with

that which is properly called Demonstrative or

Mathematical.-Opposite Error of some late Wri-

IV. Of our Reasoning concerning Probable or Contin-

1. Narrow Field of Demonstrative Evidence.-Of

Demonstrative Evidence, when combined with that

of Sense, as in Practical Geometry; and with those

of Sense and of Induction, as in the Mechanical

Philosophy.-Remarks on a Fundamental Law of

Belief, involved in all our Reasonings concerning

Contingent Truths

2. Continuation of the Subject.-Of that Permanence

or Stability in the Order of Nature, which is pre-

supposed in our Reasonings concerning Contingent

3. Continuation of the Subject.-General Remarks

on the Difference between the Evidence of Experi-

ence, and that of Analogy

4. Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of Testi-

mony tacitly recognised as a ground of Belief, in

our most certain Conclusions concerning Contin-

gent Truths. Difference between the logical and

the popular meaning of the word Probability

Of the Aristotelian Logic.

SECT. I. Of the Demonstrations of the Syllogistic Rules given

by Aristotle and his Commentators

II.-General Reflections on the Aim of the Aristotelian

Logic, and on the Intellectual Habits which the

Study of it has a tendency to form.-That the im-

provement of the power of Reasoning ought to be

regarded as only a Secondary Object in the Culture

of the Understanding

III.-In what respects the Study of the Aristotelian Logic

may be useful to Disputants.-A general acquaint-

ance with it justly regarded as an essential accom-

plishment to those who are liberally educated.—

Doubts suggested by some late Writers, concerning

Aristotle's claims to the invention of the Syllogistic

Of the Method of Inquiry pointed out in the Experimental or Induc-

SECT. I.-Mistakes of the Ancients concerning the proper ob-

ject of Philosophy.-Ideas of Bacon on the same

Subject.-Inductive Reasoning.-Analysis and Syn-

thesis. Essential difference between Legitimate

and Hypothetical Theories

II. Continuation of the Subject.-The Induction of

Aristotle compared with that of Bacon

III. Of the Import of the words Analysis and Synthesis

in the Language of Modern Philosophy

1. Preliminary Observations on the Analysis and Syn-

thesis of the Greek Geometricians

2. Critical Remarks on the vague Use, among Mod-

ern Writers, of the Terms Analysis and Synthesis

IV. The Consideration of the Inductive Logic resumed

1. Additional Remarks on the distinction between

Experience and Analogy.-Of the grounds afforded

by the latter for Scientific Inference and Conjecture

2. Use and Abuse of Hypotheses in Philosophical

Inquiries. Difference between Gratuitous Hypoth-

eses, and those which are supported by presump-

tions suggested by Analogy.-Indirect Evidence

which a Hypothesis may derive from its agreement

with the Phenomena.-Cautions against extending

some of these Conclusions to the Philosophy of the

ELEMENTS

t

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

PART SECOND.

OF REASON, OR THE UNDERSTANDING PROPERLY SO CALLED; AND THE VARIOUS FACULTIES AND OPERATIONS MORE IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED WITH IT.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE VAGUENESS AND AMBIGUITY OF THE COMMON PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE RELATIVE TO THIS PART OF OUR CONSTITUTION,―REASON AND REASONING,-UNDERSTANDING,—

INTELLECT,-JUDGMENT, &c.

THE power of Reason, of which I am now to treat, is unquestionably the most important by far, of those which are comprehended under the general title of Intellectual. It is on the right use of this power, that our success in the pursuit both of knowledge and of happiness depends; and it is by the exclusive possession of it that Man is distinguished, in the most essential respects, from the lower animals. It is, indeed, from their subserviency to its operations, that the other faculties, which have been hitherto under our consideration, derive their chief value.

In proportion to the peculiar importance of this subject are its extent and its difficulty ;-both of them such as to lay me under a necessity, now that I am to enter on the discussion, to contract, in various instances, those designs in which I was accustomed to indulge myself, when I looked forward to it from a distance. The execution of them at present, even if I were more competent to the task, appears to me, on a closer examination,

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