sistories (or sessions.)* This certainly is an important fact and it is one of special significance when considered in connection with that other fact already noticed, namely, that, the practice of Scotch Presbyterians was at first the same as that of those on the Continent, and that it continued the same for

many years.

Remembering these things, we incline to the opinion that our present custom is a departure from the proper law of the tribes of our Calvinistic Israel. The fact, moreover, that the Reformed churches on the Continent are not State churches, while the Scotch Church was long a State establishment, and even yet it is partly so, indicates that influences from without rather than from within have caused the change. When, also, we call to mind that, till within the last fifty years, nothing in the statute law of our church conflicted with the plan of term-service, while the fundamental principles of our constitution-government representative of the people, and government for the best advancement of the Lord's workappear to favor the plan, nothing seems necessary to complete our argument. The proof that the idea of term-service in the session agrees with the essential nature and historical development of Presbyterian polity is, to us, convincing and satisfactory.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

Having already passed the limits of a moderate length, which we proposed for our essay, we shall defer further discussion of this subject till a future time. But we trust that enough has now been said to vindicate those who advocate the adoption of this new plan-which yet is an old one-from any charge of reckless innovation. Our present effort has been exclusively directed to the support of the general principle of term-service in the Session. Whether this principle should be applied as an imperative or as a permissive law of the church-of what length terms of service should be—and in what way the standing of existing elders might or should be affected by the introduction of the new rule-are questions of importance which we can not now consider. The rule of the

* We are indebted, for the above statement, to a learned Professor of Church History connected with the Reformed (Dutch) Church of the U. S.

Reformed (Dutch) church is that "elders shall be chosen to serve two years, except when chosen to fill a vacancy;" and in that church one-half the consistory is elected every year. Thus the law of term-service is imperative, and the term is fixed at two years. We think that with us the permissive rule would be preferable. We know some of our churches which elect elders to serve for three years; that is, they elect one-third of the session annually. Others have biennial elections, at which one-third of the session are chosen to serve six years. Nor would it appear to us an improper compromise between the present system and that proposed to be rendered lawful, should a church, while adopting the rule of term-service, nevertheless apply it only to future elections, and request already existing elders to remain permanently members of its session. That also is an excellent law of the Reformed Church which makes an elder eligible for representative service in any of the higher courts, even though he may not be a member of the existing consistory. Then, along with term-service, we might, and we should, institute the Great or the Grand Session, corresponding with the Great Consistory of the Dutch Church. Of this Session all who had ever been elected elders by the congregation should be members. The possession by a church of a considerable body of prudent and experienced elders, who might assemble at the call of the session or of the pastor, for consultation and advice on important questions of general interest, would be a most excellent addition to our present system. What pastor or bench of elders in any large church, has not often felt the need of such an assembly-larger than the ordinary session, and also more likely to deliberate well than a congregational meeting would be? That want would be supplied with us, as it is among our Reformed brethren, by "the congregation of elders."

Such topics, however, as these, merit extended consideration; and a full discussion of them by the officers and members of our Church will naturally follow, if the general principle of term-service be accepted as agreeable with the teachings of Presbyterianism, Inspiration, and Expediency.

ART. V. THE JUDICIAL TRIAL OF JESUS.

By Rev. E. P. ROGERS, D.D., New York.

In the year 1492, Ferdinand the Catholic, a most intolerant prince, expelled a number of Jewish families from Spain. A descendant of one of these families, Joseph Salvador, published at Paris a learned work entitled, "A History of the Institutions of Moses, and the Hebrew people." In one chapter he treats of "the administration of justice among the Hebrews," and adds an account of "the trial and condemnation of Jesus." In this chapter he expresses the opinion that the trial, considered merely as a legal proceeding, was perfectly conformable to Jewish law.

M. Dupin, an eminent French lawyer, reviewed this part of Dr. Salvador's book, and denied the correctness of his statement. His work shows great skill and learning. It was first published in the " Gazette de Tribunaux," and afterwards in a separate volume. We propose in this paper to give a brief resume of his argument.

The case, as presented by the Jewish writer, is this: Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph of Bethlehem, a Jewish citizen, on arriving at man's estate, set up a claim that he was divine, and insisted upon it. This was in direct violation of one of the most solemn and inexorable statutes of the Jewish Code that against blasphemy. For this crime, he was tried, condemned, and executed according to law.

The French reviewer takes issue with the Jewish Doctor, on this point. He denies emphatically, that, even upon Jewish principles, Jesus was fairly tried, and lawfully condemned. Claiming for our Lord only that he was a Jewish citizen, he maintains that his trial and sentence, so far from being conformable to the laws of the nation, were a flagrant violation of them, and that the whole case was an instance of the illegal and malicious persecution of an innocent man, resulting in a wanton and unparalleled judicial murder. His position is really that taken by St. Peter, in his famous Pentecostal sermon, so far as the trial of Jesus was concerned: "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of

God, ye have taken, and, with wicked hands, have crucified and slain." (Acts ii. 23.)

A careful examination of the legislation of the Hebrews, teaches that no system of jurisprudence which the world has ever known, displays such extraordinary care to protect the liberty and rights of the citizen. The basis of the Mosaic system, was the unity of the people. They were everything; and everything in the system was done for them. In no nation was there more freedom of speech or action, and all modern systems of jurisprudence and government have made little appreciable advance beyond the Mosaic code, in securing and maintaining the liberties of the people.

In criminal cases, the accused was entitled to a public trial, and to perfect freedom of defense. No man could be convicted on the testimony of a single witness. There must be at least two, who were cognizant of the facts, and whose veracity could not be impeached. The judges were obliged to sift the evidence most carefully, and if a witness was found to have sworn falsely he was liable to the same penalty to which the accused was exposed. The examination of the witnesses, and all that passed between the prosecutor and the accused, was in open court, and before the people; and when a man was condemned to death, the witnesses, whose evidence convicted him, were required to inflict the first blows. This tended to ensure great caution in the giving of testimony. It was to this that our Lord alluded in the case of the woman taken in adultery, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." (John viii. 7.)

The mode of proceeding in criminal trials, was this: The accused person was legally arrested by the proper officers, and brought into court. The papers in the case were read, and the witnesses were called. Each received a solemn charge from the president of the court, declaring the penalty for false swearing, and then gave his testimony. The confession of an accused person was not allowed to decide a case, in the absence of two other witnesses. It was a standing rule in the Jewish courts, that no man was to be allowed to prejudice his own case. After the evidence, which was required to be direct, was given, those judges who were not convinced

of the guilt of the accused, stated their opinion and its ground. Then, they who believed him guilty, did the same. Then the accused had liberty to speak, or to be heard by counsel; and what was said in his behalf commanded the most impartial attention. The case was then summed up by the presiding judge, and the spectators were dismissed. The votes of the judges, of whom there were twenty-three, were then taken. Eleven votes sufficed for acquittal, but thirteen were required for conviction. If any of the judges stated that they could not give a verdict, two more elders were added, and if necessary two more, until sixty-two were assembled, making a grand council. If a majority of these were for acquittal, the prisoner was instantly discharged. If he was convicted, the sentence was postponed to the third day. During this interval, the judges were forbidden to take up any other case. They were required to abstain from excessive eating, and from the use of liquors, and everything which might affect the clear and healthy action of the mind. On the morning of the third day, they came into court. Each judge was then called on to repeat his decision of the case. If any one who had previously voted for conviction, said: "I change my opinion, and acquit the accused," he was recorded as for acquittal. But no judge who had first voted to acquit, was allowed to change his vote. If now a majority condemned, the convict was taken to the place of execution, attended by two magistrates, but the judges all remained on the bench. At the door of the judgment-hall, an officer was stationed with a flag in his hand. A second officer on horseback followed the prisoner, and at short intervals looked back to the judgment-hall. If, in the mean time, any person should come to the judges and declare that he had additional evidence to offer in behalf of the prisoner, the officer at the door of the judgment-hall waved his flag, and the prisoner was brought back. Even if the prisoner himself declared to the attendant magistrates, that he remembered something which he had not stated to the judges, they brought him back, and he had this privilege five times. If none of these things occurred, the procession advanced at a slow pace toward the place of execution. A herald went before, who, in a loud voice, made