the theory as applicable to him in his last rapid strides in physical and intellectual endowments. He thinks that these later powers do not proportionally increase his chances of life. Certain is it, that not till man has laid aside every struggle, both those of war and of commerce, and consents to give and to receive in kindness and with equality of advantage, can the world accept anything like the population which belongs to it. War and commercial oppression are agencies that have hitherto worked, and will continue to work, barbarism.

A final objection, which virtually underlies several of those already made, is, that the theory of Darwin rests back, in final analysis, on fortuitous forces. We have said nothing of the religious bearings of his view, important as they are, and fundamental as they are in our own mind. We have wished rather to discuss the subject on the grounds on which it rests with its advocates, and with perhaps the majority of persons. We make this point, therefore, not on religious but scientific reasons. Accident is no solution of a question; it is as unscientific as it is irreligious. The first postulate of Darwin is slight, perpetual variations in all directions. He does not, indeed, exclude the influences of the environment, neither does he regard it as the sole and sufficient cause of fitting varieties. This is rather characteristic of the early theory of development, sometimes designated as that of Lamark, and whose insufficiency is now generally conceded. For these incipient changes, on which development hinges, Darwin has no reason to render, nor does he assign them any law. It is rather a principle with him that they are lawless. This is a weak position from every point of view. It leads us by laborious reasoning to forces that act without reason, without purpose, without bent. If this first position is sound, why make any inquiry farther. Let chance complete what chance has begun. Why strive to gratify the mind with reasons, since, at the very conclusion of the whole matter, it is satisfied without reasons, with forces that act accidentally as regards the end in view? Or, if our previous inquiries are sound, and we are wise in tracing causes, how can we stop with a supposition that cuts short the entire process of thought, leaving

it with no attachment; that brings a blunt arrest without why or wherefore?

Answer may be made that this premise is rather the statement of a fact than an hypothesis, and that as such we must accept it, whatever its advantages or disadvantages. It will be said, observation shows that every species does present endless minor varieties, and this is what our theory states rather than assumes.

The difficulty now becomes subtile, since there is, undeniably, a superficial force to this explanation. It is, indeed, true that the principle of life is affected by the conditions under which it works, and as these are of infinite variety, its products are correspondingly varied, and seem, therefore, to furnish points of attachment to many lines of development. Moreover, when these conditions are themselves varied by man, in directions in which they are especially influential, and the results reached are enlarged by careful selection, new, permanent, organic varieties do appear. These facts do not, however, seem to us sufficiently broad to cover the postulate of Darwin, and start him safely on his way. No two waves that follow each other on the ocean are exactly alike, but the endlessly diversified conditions under which they arise, strip of significancy their slight modifications, and render the formation of a class of waves impossible. If such a decided variety were to appear, and to maintain itself, we should seek for it a specific, uniform cause, differentiating this particular result from the general results before witnessed. So, if a decided organic change takes place in any species, it indicates a specific cause, and, in the absence of any sufficient external reason, it shows proofs of a decided, definite variation of the life principle, to be referred for solution to the plan, purpose, power to which that principle itself finds reference. If a distinct result like this be passed by unheeded, unexplained, then let us at once abandon the idea of cause and effect, and with it all reasoning. If any effects can be so reached as to be dismissed contemptuously from our theory, certainly they are not those effects out of which we propose to make the entire animal kingdom. Nor are we any more at liberty to reach a decided, definite change by slight, successive modi

fications, giving these no explanation, than by a single transformation. The incipient tendency to orderly change must in each case be recognized, since it is the fruit of forces determined from within in the form of their action.

This statement of the case, besides meeting the irrefutable, undeniable claims of the mind everywhere for causes, we believe better covers the facts before us. For the most part, the waves of life come and go, under fitful causes that mutually displace each other in their effects, and leave the species unaltered. Rarely, as in the Ancon sheep, a decided, organic change is indicated, finding explanation in a new, unknown force, which, under favoring circumstances, propagates itself and establishes a permanent variety. We do not meet with incipient varieties everywhere in nature, in all stages of growth, coming and expiring, in one, two, four generations, but that variety which, due to transient forces, obliterates itself as rapidly as it is established; and an occasional change of so decided a character as to indicate a permanent modification of the organic principle. We may, indeed, attribute to the accidental conditions of the environment-accidental in reference to continuous development-those varieties which are due to influences either impeding or favoring the vital forces, but hardly those which indicate a distinct modification and growth of these forces. These must be referred in the' outset, and in every step of development, to a relatively independent and self-sufficient impulse, bent on a form and kind of growth normal to it. This is illustrated in the limitation to one sex of given characteristics. If such a restriction exists, it is easy for the breeder to avail himself of it; if it does not exist, there is no example of its establishment.

If this view be correct, even under a development theory, the harmony and order of the final result would be at once explained as due to the same wisdom that in each form of life presides over its modifications, and weaves them in as a part of the complete fabric. As accidental, variable changes-that is, changes due to foreign, external causes-are constantly mingled with those which arise in connection with the organic principle itself, it is easy to assign the same character to them all. But the very fact that the distinctions of the first class

mutually compensate and obliterate each other, while those of the second sustain and confirm each other, indicates a hidden difference in the agencies at work. We have now a uniform character in the waves that follow one the other, disclosing some fixed conditions of the sands and rocks beneath.

The theory of Darwin, with a modification which would allow it to rest ultimately back on rational causes, not chance effects, may well stand as an hypothesis that has explained many obscure facts, and greatly quickened inquiry; one that promises much more service and waits further confirmation. If the successive steps of organic progress are recognized as designed in character, definite in direction, and often decided in degree,—like that of the spike-horn deer of the Adirondacs, the disposition which now exists to make them so limited and unessential as to become accidental modifications, that may be pushed out of sight and left unexplained, will disappear, and the animal kingdom will grow up through distinct yet dependent changes, that will leave its ultimate reference to a rational source unaltered. The gains of science will be secured without its losses. We are not disposed to underrate or reject the interpretations which the theory of development seems to bring; neither are we, by an unqualified acceptance of it, in the form presented by Darwin, prepared to put in jeopardy the entire plan and purpose of creation. These certainly can be rescued, are, by sober thought, rescued, while yielding to the modifying influences of the facts which Darwin so fully and so skilfully urges. The theory of development is quite another thing, if we recognize the presence of decided, predetermined steps in passing from one form of life to another, from what it is if these are resolved universally into slight and accidental transitions. The first view can stand by us to advantage everywhere in our study of nature, finding acceptance and rejection as the especial phenomena under consideration allow.

In development, as it is now presented, natural and sexual selection are pressed to and beyond their utmost, in order that, as blind forces, they may take the place of an intelligent agent.

Darwin, in closing his "Descent of Man," remarks: “I am aware that the conclusions arrived at in this work will be

denounced by some as highly irreligious; but he who thus denounces them is bound to show why it is more irreligious to explain the origin of man as a distinct species by descent from some lower form, through the laws of variation and natural selection, than to explain the birth of the individual through the laws of ordinary reproduction."

There is either great simplicity or some want of candor in this passage. The religious bearing of a theory can not be doubtful that sedulously refers all results, far and near, to second causes, with slight recognition of a personal source in their origin, and none of a personal plan in their development. Such a theory certainly has been, and certainly will be, used by atheistic thinkers for atheistic ends.

ART. II. REMINISCENCES OF JAMES P. WILSON, D.D., AND REV. ALBERT BARNES.

By RICHARD W. DICKINSON, D.D., New York.

ALTHOUGH I have been repeatedly asked to embody my reminiscences of Dr. Wilson and Mr. Barnes, yet I have always been reluctant to essay a task which would necessarily involve allusion to myself; but as it is now thought by several of my clerical friends that something of the kind is due from me, both out of respect to the memory of Dr. Wilson, and regard for the church to which I ministered for a season just before the late Albert Barnes was called to its pastorate, I will narrate such particulars as are still fresh in my memory, and which it has often been my pleasure to recall, while retracing the way in which the Lord has led me ;-though more than forty years have elapsed since I bade fare well to the venerable father with whose closing ministry it was my privilege to be associated, and tendered the hand of Christian fellowship to him who, so providentially for the interests of the church, became his successor.

In the fall of 1828, the Session of the First Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, needing a supply for their pulpit, in consequence of the protracted debility of their revered pastor,