tices and doctrines, then will men and women cleave to the church as of old. If not, then the world as a whole will continue to drift away from the church.

Sometimes a man comes to state his case to a lawyer. He tells what, in his conception, would be a clear case of exoneration. But if permitted to make his statement in open court it would be

the only evidence necessary to convict him. I have sought nothing except the words of Mr. Johnston to make out a case against him. I believe I have convicted him by his own words. There are many questionable practices of the Roman Catholic church that he did not discuss. I leave them until he does take them up. With this I am done.

uses of that word in the United States today, would be a marvelous literary production, were it not an impossibility.

Partisan democracy, as everybody knows, is that combination of principles, laws, and policies advocated by the Democratic Party. But the combination may change with the weather. Moreover, Progressive Democrats intepret it one way and Tory Reactionaries another, to say nothing of the various other brands of Democrats (Ltd). It appears to be mainly a matter of individual interpretation.

But non-partisan democracy is a different proposition. It is a combination of principles which have ever throbbed in the pulse beats of the common people. It means a system of government, no matter when or where instituted, in which the will of the majority is first definitely and accurately ascertained and then impartially and absolutely enforced.

The one may be democracy in name only; the other is democracy in substance. We might as well observe, too, that while a rose called by another name may smell as sweet, a skunk called by another name emits no de

the skunk of misrepresentation gains nothing.

This spring of 1911 found eight, and only eight; genuinely democratic states in the Union. Strange as it may seem, these eight democratic states do not constitute the "Solid Democratic South." Not half of them are found there. These states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. The fact which makes them democratic is that in each of their several constitutions are provisions for direct legislation, provisions for first accurately ascertaining the will of a majority of the people and then enacting that will into law. These provisions are known as the initiative and referendum.

Unfortunately for direct legislation, the two words used to designate the two principles involved are the ungodly high-sounding Latin derivatives, initiative and referendum. It is said that Missouri's first constitutional amendment on the subject was lost by a few thousand votes because the mountaineers in that state were too busy with their feuds to learn the full import of these words before election day, and voted against the amendment, fearing

"this here initiative and referendum" might impair their right to slay each other or otherwise abbreviate their primeval pleasures. When the amendment was submitted to the people a second time, however, its terms were more clearly understood; and the amendment, as a result, was ratified by a majority of over thirty thousand votes.

The term initiative may be defined as the power the people reserve in themselves to propose laws and amendments to the constitution; that is, to take the initial, or first, steps in the matter, when, and only when, their socalled representatives fail to initiate in the legislative assembly any particular law desired by the people. It can never cause the enactment of a single law so long as the representatives really represent, really enact the will of the majority; but whenever representatives fail to so act, this reserved power saves the day to the people. The adoption of the initiative is like substituting a double-barrelled gun for the single barrel; while the two loads are always there, the second barrel need not be used until the first fails to serve the desired purpose.

The term referendum may be defined as the power the people reserve to approve or reject at the polls, when they desire to do so, any enactment of the legislative assembly, whether it was initiated by popular petition or by bill in the legislature. It can not possibly change the effect of the vote of a single member of the legislative assembly if that vote is actually representative of the will of a majority of the people who participated in his election. The referendum is like the farmer's gun behind the door, not in constant use, but always loaded and ready for use on the first prowling "varmint" that invades the plantation.

The two principles together-the initiative and the referendum-constitute direct legislation, and insure, as nearly as any system can, the enact

ment of all laws desired by a majority of the people and the enactment of no law opposed by a majority.

As one illustration of the need and the workings of direct legislation, take the proposition against free railroad passes for public officials. Probably ninety per cent. of the people of Georgia think that the judge who tries a railroad case and the legislator who regulates the rights of the railroads with the people should not do so with free railroad passes in their pockets. Certainly a big majority of the people of Georgia would vote for a law prohibiting railroads from issuing such passes. Yet the state has no such law. Bills to this effect have often been introduced in the General Assembly; but have failed of passage with the same regularity that they have been introduced. Finally, the Railroad Commission adopted a rule against such passes, which rule the Commission can change or abolish at pleasure. The people want the law; but, under Georgia's system of indirect, or representative, legislation, they are powerless to get it. Under a system of direct legislation, such as is suggested in the Appendix hereto, the people would not be petitioning the assembly to enact the law; and if the assembly failed to do it, the proposed law would have to be submitted to a referendum vote of all the people. If a majority of the people then voted for the measure, it would become law, in spite of the misrepresentative votes which so-called representatives had cast against it in the assembly. In other words, the people, through direct legislation, would have maintained representative government. It might be added that the legislative record of the past half century, both state and national, is dotted with similar examples of misrepresentation that could be similarly set aside.

In defining the terms initiative and referendum I have in mind a constitution whose provisions for direct legis

lation are substantially as those in the appendix to this article. This appendix is proposed as a model amendment to the constitutions of those states which have not yet provided for direct legislation. It was prepared after a careful study of all the constitutions that provide for the initiative and referendum in any form, as well as after a careful study of the strongest arguments of the strongest opponents of the democratic principles involved. Such an amendment does not destroy the representative system, but perfects it. Under the provisions of this amendment, the representatives have a vote on every law before the people have one, and no vote of any representative can ever be set aside if it is actually representative of the will of a majority of the people who participated in his election. If his vote is misrepresentative, it ought to be set aside; in fact, it must be set aside if representative government is to be maintained in anything but name.

The earliest example of the initiative in the constitutional history of America is found in Georgia's constitution of 1777-written before the ink was dry on the Declaration of Independence. Today, the beneficiaries of special legislation, the lovers of the lobby, the secret caucus, etc., tell us that the initiative is "a new theory," "an unsafe experiment," "populism," "demagoguery," and various other horrid and horrible things. Yet it is clear that the "demagogues" of Georgia who signed the Declaration of Independence, who marched with Washington and whipped the hated Briton from our shores, wrote the initiative large into Georgia's first constitution, wrote it there in a most extreme form, leav ing the legislature with absolutely no power to initiate an amendment to that constitution. Here is the language of that provision as it appears in Georgia's constitution of 1777:

"Art. LXIII. No alteration shall be made in this constitution, without peti

tions from a majority of the counties, and the petition from each county to be signed by a majority of voters in each county within the state; at which time the assembly shall order a convention to be called for that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made, according to the petitions preferred to the assembly by a majority of the counties as aforesaid."

'Let it be remembered that there is only one principle involved in the intiative, and that is the right of the people to propose a law or an amendment to the constitution. The rest is mere machinery to facilitate the process, mere details of the various methods by which the people may act. The principle of the initiative can not be more clearly or emphatically stated than in Georgia's constitution of 1777; but experience has developed greatly improved machinery in all those states which uphold the principle today. See the appendix referred to above or the constitution of any of the eight democratic states mentioned.

The Revolutionary patriots of Georgia may have been harsh in so emphatically providing for the initiative with reference to constitutional amendments. They reserved all power in the matter. Their descendants have lost all power in the matter. Their descendants have no power even in proposing statutory law. A system of direct legislation would preserve the power both of the General Assembly and of the people to propose law; but would let it belong exclusively to neither. It would not thereby lessen the value of representatives as the agents of the people, but it would effectively prevent these agents from ever becoming the masters of the people. Under an exclusively representative system, there is absolutely no check on legislative officers but a meager constitution. The people must take what is handed them; they can take nothing else.

Nor is there any new principle in

volved in the referendum. The early constitutions of practically every state in the Union were submitted to a referendum vote of all the people and did not become of force until ratified by a majority. Moreover, Delaware is the only state in the Union today whose constitution can be amended without a

referendum vote on the proposed amendment. The principle of the referendum is, therefore, as universal today as is the law of divorce; for one state in the Union-South Carolina-grants no divorce to conjugal misfits, as one state in the Union-Delaware-grants no voice to her people in the making and unmaking of constitutions. If there is anything new about the referendum, it is in its application to statutory law occasionally as well as to fundamental law always.

The opponents of direct legislation may be divided into three classes: (1) the uninformed, (2) the misinformed, and (3) the ruling few and their agents. As to the first and second classes, they need nothing but an accurate knowledge of the facts. But the third class has simply got to be whipped out of control by ballots as the Britons were whipped out of America by guns, or else they will retain control. Whenever the question of popular rule comes up, they, with their paid attorneys and subsidized newspapers, seek first to ridicule the idea and laugh it out of countenance; they next call it harsh and horrible names, "demagoguery," "populism," "mobrule," and various other vile epithets; then their vivid imaginations are brought to play and they prophesy every conceivable calamity as a result of its adoption. They get satirical, enthusiastic, and frantic. They fear the country will go to the dogs if their secret influence is lost and their power in promoting legislation is reduced to that of an honest man. Their lamentations are calculated to mislead many of the very victims on whom they prey.

As to the professional lobbyist, whenever and wherever direct legislation is suggested, he is aroused; if he is a great lobbyist, he is greatly aroused. For in state after state he has seen the Third House, or lobby, on which his bread and butter depends, disappear in the wake of the referendum. His job is at stake, and he knows it. The interests that employ him do it because of his skill in secretly promoting certain laws which bring the interests more money than they have paid him. When a corporation hires a lobbyist, it is not for love, but for dividends. And the interests are never foolish enough to buy a legislative act which they are sure of losing on referendum vote, which they are sure of losing before it returns them a dividend.

To state all the arguments in favor of direct legislation, even briefly, would be to write a book.

I am not, however, among those who think direct legislation a panacea for all the governmental ills that man is heir to. On the contrary, I know that no radical reform can ever be enacted through a referendum vote until a majority of the whole people are first educated to a standard of desiring it. And God knows this is a slow enough process! It is far more conservative than a purely representative system. It has been demonstrated to a moral and mathematical certainty in those states that have direct legislation that the people check far more wild-cat legislation than they attempt to effect.

One thing direct legislation does do is to put life and substance into some of the beautiful but hollow declarations of present state constitutions. For instance, the first provision of Georgia's present constitution is as follows:

"All government, of right, originates with the people, and is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole. Public officers are the trustees and servants of

That beautiful theory appears in practically every state constitution of this country, appears in the form of a declaration or statement; but only the eight democratic states named above have constitutional provisions that give it life and effect; without the initiative, the referendum, and the right of recall, it is "as sounding brass and tinkling cymbal." It is words, words, words; with these provisions for enforcing it, it becomes a reality.

In fixing Georgia's legislative power, the constitution in paragraph 1 of section 1 of article 3, provides:

"The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a general assembly, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives.'

And paragraph 22 of section 7 of the same article, provides:

"The General Assembly shall have power to make all laws and ordinances consistent with this Constitution, and not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, which they shall deem necessary and proper for the welfare of the state."

This is all of Georgia's constitution that tends to fix the legislative power of the state. Yet, in this respect, it is not unlike those other states now existing under an antiquated system of in direct legislation. It is good to note, however, that the legislatures of a dozen of these antiquated states are this year either proposing constitutional amendments providing for direct legislation, or else are at least composed in the majority of members elected on a platform advocating direct legislation.

I hope I may yet live to see the Appendix to this article, or something substantially similar, substituted in Georgia's constitution in lieu of Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Article 3, set out above. As to Paragraph 22, set out above, it is amply taken care of in

will this year be introduced in the General Assembly of Georgia, by one of the brainiest members of that body, proposing an amendment to the state constitution as here suggested. If you are a Georgian and favor it, write your representative and state senator to support it; then see them in person and ask them to support it; then telegraph them in Atlanta, while the session is on, to actively support it. If they don't do it, remember them religiously when they are candidates again. Beyond this power to request, a common citizen of Georgia is as powerless to effect legislation as is a common citizen of Turkey or Russia. But he can make the request and can remember whether or not it was heeded.

APPENDIX.

Paragraph 1. Legislative power, where vested. All the legislative power of this state not reserved by the people shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives; but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to this Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the action of the General Assembly in regard thereto; and they also reserve power, at their option, to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of any act or measure passed by the General Assembly, provided: That the legislative powers herein reserved by the people shall not be construed to deny to any member of the General Assembly the right to introduce any measure in that body, nor to deny to that body the power to pass the same subject to such referendum petitions as may be filed against it under the reserved powers of the people.

Par. 2. The initiative-Number of petitioners necessary-Contents of petition. The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. And not more