DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT. I. GRAVES v. JOINT BOARD OF SCHOOL INSPECTORS OF BENTON AND GRANT TOWNSHIPS. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 7, 1894.) FRACTIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT-CHANGE OF BOUNDARIES-REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE. The requirement of 2 How. Ann. St. § 5040, that, when boards of school inspectors wish to change the boundaries of a fractional school district, notice, signed by the clerk of each township interested, shall be posted in each of such townships, is jurisdictional, and proof of the posting of such notice must be filed with the clerks before any action is taken. Certiorari, on the petition of Adolphus Graves, to review the action of certain boards of school inspectors of the townships of Benton and Grant in attempting to alter the boundaries of a fractional school district. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner. Frank Shepherd, for petitioner. MCGRATH, C. J. This is certiorari to review the action of certain boards of school inspectors of the townships of Benton and Grant in attempting to alter the boundaries of a fractional school district. The records of the meeting, returned here, do not contain any evidence that proof was made of the posting of the notice of the meeting; and the only notice appearing, if any was posted, was signed by the clerk of Benton township only. The statute requires that, in case of a proposed alteration of fractional district, the notice shall be signed by the clerk of each interested township, and that it shall be posted in each of such townships. 2 How. Ann. St. § 5040. The statutory requirement is jurisdictional, and proof of posting such notice should be filed with the clerk of the board before any action is taken. Coulter v. School Inspectors, 59 Mich. 391, 26 N. W. 649; School Dist. No. 3 v. School Dist. No. 1, 63 Mich. 51, 29 N. W. 489; Fractional School Dist. No. 3 v. School Inspectors of Martin, 63 Mich. 611, 30 N. W. 198; School Dist. v. Metcalf, 93 Mich. 497, 35 N. W., 627. It appears by an amended return that no further proceedings have been taken to carry into effect the action here complained of. The proceedings must be quashed and held for naught, with costs to petitioner. The other justices concurred. II. DERRY v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF EAST SAGINAW. (Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 7, 1894.) DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYE-DAMAGES. Where a contract of employment provides that it may be terminated by the employer on one week's notice, the employé is entitled to only one week's salary as damages on refusal of the former to continue his employment. Error to circuit court, Saginaw county; Robert B. McKnight, Judge. Action by Stephen F. Derry against the board of education of East Saginaw for breach of an employment contract. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed. Charles S. Smith, for appellant. T. E. Tarsney and W. W. Wicker, for appellee. GRANT, J. Plaintiff sued to recover for services as school teacher. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice that the contract sued upon was canceled and terminated before the time when the said plaintiff's services were to begin. Plaintiff was teaching at the time of the execution of the contract, as principal of the ungraded school. At the regular meeting of the board held June 15th it refused to adopt the recommendation of the committee on schools to discontinue the ungraded school, and adopted a resolution appointing plaintiff principal at the same salary as the previous year. June 16th, the secretary of the board, on its behalf, executed a written contract with plaintiff, whereby he agreed "to serve as a teacher in the public schools of the city for the ensuing school year, commencing September 5th, for $700.00." The contract contained the following clause: "Said board reserving to itself the right to change said teacher from one school or grade to another, or to discharge said teacher at any time whenever it may desire to terminate this contract, upon one week's written notice to said teacher by its committee on teachers and text-books." June 29th a special meeting of said board was held to take action upon the resignation of the superintendent of schools, and to consider such other business as might properly come before the board. At this meeting the action of June 15th was reconsidered, and a resolution adopted discontinuing the ungraded school, and also instructing the committee on teachers and school books to give plaintiff the requisite notice that his services were no longer required. July 7th, the committee wrote plaintiff, notifying him that his contract would terminate July 16th. At the time this notice was mailed he was out of town, and did not receive it until in August or the 1st of September. He, however, was informed of the action of the board June 30th. At the opening of the schools in September he presented himself for work under the contract, and was refused employment. He secured other employment in May following. The court directed a verdict for three months' salary. The defendant denies the authority of the secretary to make the contract. This objection comes too late, as the plea admitted its execution. Several objections are made to the validity of the action of the board in rescinding the contract. We deem it unnecessary to mention them. The board refused him employment at the opening of the school. This was equivalent to notice, and entitled him to recover for only one week's salary. Fisher v. Monroe (Com. Pl.) 21 N. Y. Supp. 995; Peverly v. Poole, 19 Abb. N. C. 271; Hartley v. Harman, 3 Perry & D. 567. Judgment reversed, and entered in this court for the plaintiff in accordance with this opinion. The defendant will recover costs. HOOKER, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred. III. RIGHT OF WOMEN TO VOTE AT SCHOOL ELECTIONS IN CITIES OF THE FOURTH CLASS. (Attorney General of Michigan.) The Hon. Washington Gardner Secretary of State, Lansing, Mich. : MY DEAR SIR-Yours of a recent date received. You ask, "Can women now vote at regular annual elections of school trustees, held in this State, who live in cities incorporated under the provision of act No. 215 of the public acts of 1ʊ5, being “An act to provide for the incorporation of cities of the fourth class." Owing to the importance of this question, and especially from the announcement that has been made public that, owing to somebody's mistake, women residing in these cities were, as the law now reads, unintentionally deprived of the privilege which they have long enjoyed, I have given very careful attention to this matter to determine what, in fact, the law is on the subject. As the result of this examination, I am clearly of the opinion that no such result has been reached, and that the women who are duly qualified, under the general school law, can continue to vote and hold office in exactly the same manner as they did before the adoption of the act in question. The words which have been regarded as sufficient to disfranchise women are found in section 4, of chapter 32, on page 489 of said act, and they are as follows: "Every person shall be entitled to vote at such election who is a qualified voter of the State, and qualified by the laws of the State to vote at any election for school officers." These words standing alone and read without reference to the intent of the legislature, as gathered from the entire act, are, I confess, somewhat ambiguous, and might lead to the conclusion that women were, in fact, disfranchised. But it is a fundamental principle in the construction of statutes, that the intention embodied and embraced in the statute is the vital thing-the very essence of the law. And, while it is true that, where the words are clear, certain and unambiguous, so that the legislative intent is perfectly clear, there is no room for construction; it is always equally true that if from a view of the whole law or from other laws in pari materia the evident intention is different from the literal import of the terms employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that the intention must prevail. That, in fact, is the will of the legislature. With this foundation principle in view, we are prepared to address ourselves to the consideration of the sentence above quoted, and inquire what do the words really mean? As has been well said, in determining what a particular provision, clause, or word means, we must proceed as we would with any other composition-construe it with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. The whole and every part must be considered; and always the general intent should be kept in view in determining the scope and meaning of any part. This survey and comparison are necessary to ascertain the purpose of the act and to make all the parts harmonious. They are to be brought into accord, if practicable, and thus, if possible, give a sensible and intelligent effect to each in furtherance of the general design. The words and meaning in one part of an act often lead to and furnish the explanation of the sense of another. And if the comparison of one clause with the rest of the statute makes a certain proposition clear and undoubted, the act must be construed accordingly, so as to make it one consistent whole. And if, after all, as unfortunately it is often the case, this cannot be done, then, that construction that produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency is that which must prevail. The intention of the whole act controls the interpretation of any of its parts. And I have no hesitancy whatever in saying that the legislative intent, as gathered from the entire act, is perfectly clear, that is that women were to be allowed to vote at school meetings in the future as they had in the past. In other words, that there was no intention on the part of the legislature to disfranchise women. In the first place, there is not a word, either in the act itself or in its title, that indicates the legislature intended to repeal act No. 164 of the public acts of 1881, which conferred upon women of certain classes the right to vote at annual school elections. But, on the contrary, this act was under consideration during the session of the legislature last winter, and section 17 of chapter 2 of said act, which gives this power to women, was amended, in certain particulars, but in no way as it affects the right of women to vote; which has been judiciously determined to be constitutional (see Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1), and which privilege they have enjoyed for more than thirteen years. In other words, the legislature, instead of repealing the law granting this privilege to women, reconsidered it and readopted it, and declared that that which had been should continue to be the law of this State. This being the case, it is absurd that the legislature should immediately thereafter turn about and deny to women who happen to live in certain named cities the privilege which they freely gave to all other women of the State. The anomaly of a woman twenty-one years of age who is a citizen of the State and owning property assessed for school taxes, or who is the mother of children included in the school census, being permitted to vote in one city, and another woman possessing the same qualifications being denied this privilege because she happened to live in a city of the fourth class, which includes all cities not exceeding 10,000 population according to the last preceding federal or State census, is one which cannot be tolerated, unless the intention of the legislature to create this anomaly was absolutely certain. But I am glad to say that it is perfectly clear that the legislature had no such intention. Again, that it is perfectly clear that the legislature intended to give women the privilege of voting at these school elections is found in this, that a careful distinction is made in pointing out who shall be qualified electors at elections held in the city other than for school purposes. On page four of said act it is expressly stated that "only those shall be electors" therein "who have the qualifications prescribed in the constitution of this State." And throughout the entire act, whenever the subject of elections is considered, the word "electors" is in this sense used. But, when we come to chapter 32 of the act, which is entirely taken up with the one subject, "education," we find that the wording is entirely different; i. e., that instead of men and men only being electors, in this chapter, the language is used with reference to the fact that both men and women are entitled to vote at school elections; and that there should be no doubt about this, the legislature used the words in question and now under consideration. They had said before that only men should vote, but when it comes to school elections they say "Every person shall be entitled to vote at such elections who are qualified by the laws of the State to vote at any election for school officers." The preceding clause, "who is a qualified voter of the city" may have been used for this purpose; that whereas, under the general school law "a residence of three months next preceding any school meeting" was required, that this would not be required of voters living in the cities of the fourth class; but that it will be sufficient if he or she shall have resided in the ward or election district where he offers to vote for twenty days next preceding the general election." And, in my opinion, this was the purpose for which these words were used. But, be that as it may, applying the rule that that construction which produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency should prevail, I have no hesitancy in saying that women who possess the qualifications named in the general school law shall continue in the future as in the past, to enjoy the privilege which they have enjoyed for a long time; viz., to vote at all school meetings. And from what I have said, it follows that being qualified electors of the school district, they are eligible to hold the office of trustee of said district, as the only condition precedent to the holding of such office is that such trustee shall be an elector. Yours truly, FRED A. MAYNARD. IV. HAMMOND v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF MUSKEGON. (Supreme Court of Michigan, June 30.) COLLECTION OF INSTITUTE FEES. Circuit Court of Muskegon County,Frederick J. Russell, Judge. Action by Deputy Supt. Jason E. Hammond against board of education of city of Muskegon for refusal to collect institute fees. There was a judgment for defendant and plaintiff brings error. Reversed. This is a case to test the constitutionality of Section 5187, Howell's Annotated Statutes, commonly known as the "teacher's institute law." Section 5187 reads as follows: "That all boards of officers authorized by law to examine applicants for certificates of qualification as teachers, shall collect, at the time of examination, from each male applicant for a certificate, an annual fee of one dollar, and from each female applicant for a certificate, an annual fee of fifty cents; and the director and secretary of any school board that shall employ any teacher who has not paid the fee herein before provided, shall collect, at the time of making contract, from each male teacher so employed, an annual fee of one dollar, and from each female teacher so employed, an annual fee of fifty cents. All persons paying a fee as required by this section, shall be given a receipt for the same, and no person shall be required to pay said fee more than once in any school year." Other sections of the law provide that the money derived from these fees shall be expended toward defraying the expenses of holding county teachers' institutes. The school officers of the city of Muskegon have for several years refused to collect these fees. The relator petitioned the circuit court for Muskegon county, asking that the respondents be compelled by mandamus to collect these fees. The circuit court refused to make the order, and the proceeding is brought here by certiorari. It is urged by respondent that section 5187 is defective, incomplete, and ineffectual. We do not think so. The language is simple and easy to be understood. If it is the duty of the board to collect, it would follow naturally that it is the duty of the teacher to pay the fee as a condition of receiving the examination or employment, as the case may be. It ought not to be difficult for the board of education to say to an applicant for a license to teach, or to an applicant for a teacher's position, that the applicant must comply with the law before the examination proceeds or the contract is made. It is also urged that the law violates the provisions of Section 1, article 14, of the constitution, because the fees are specific taxes and must be applied according to the provisions of the section just cited. It is urged that the fees are not uniform, and for that reason the statute is unconstitutional. We think none of these positions well taken. The principles involved are so ably discussed by Justice Cooley, in Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 412, that it is not necessary to continue the discussion here. See State v. French, 41 Pac. Rep. 1078. The writ of mandamus should issue as prayed for by the relator, but without. costs. Long, J., did not sit. J. B. MOORE, C. B. GRANT, |