from one kind of being to another whose nature is essentially different. And this indeed I take to be a fruitful source of error both in metaphysics and divinity.

Now, the object upon, which we first exercise the reasoning faculty, is matter: its impulses, motions, &c. and our language is framed accordingly, and becomes frequently figurative when applied to other substances, and our reasoning at the same time analogical. And, the reasoning by which philosophical necessity is proved, is in a great measure analogous to that made use of concerning impulse and motion;*

The necessarian asserts that the soul cannot act or think until it be first acted upon, and likewise that the intensity, &c. of its action is exactly proportioned to the cause that produced it. [Any variation in the manner or direc tion of its thinking or acting, he accounts for in the same manner.]

The natural philosopher asserts, that matter cannot move, or act upon other matter, till it be first acted upon, and that the intensity, &c. of its action is exactly propor

and, as matter, and the thinking principle in man are (perhaps) essentially different, is

tioned to the cause that produced it. [Likewise, that any variation in its direction or manner of acting must be accounted for in the same way.] From this view of matter, the philosopher looks upon it as entirely inert; and must not the necessarian, for reasons equally strong, come to the same conclusion concerning the soul, or thinking principle in man? And, if this be granted, I imagine it will be allowed by all sides to have no higher origin than any other part of the animal machine. Hence, I think, it will easily appear, that a necessarian, by pursuing this principle, must likewise be a materialist. But should this difficulty be got over, or rather be looked upon as none at all, there still remains one behind, even upon this supposition, which to me, at least, appears unanswerable.

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For should the necessarian be asked why he will not allow that the soul can act or think till it first be acted upon, perhaps he may answer, that he cannot conceive it to be possible; as a better reason, I believe, will not easily be found. But may not his opponent make use of the same argument against the doctrine of materialism, upon which that of necessity seems to be founded? For, he may safely affirm that he cannot conceive how any particular arrangement or modification of the inert particles of matter can make the compound capable of perception. Hence, where arguments equally strong oppose each other, nothing can be proved.

there not from what has just gone before, a strong presumption that the proof may not be altogether to be depended upon? If the foregoing reasoning be of any weight, the conclusion to be drawn from thence must be quite obvious. For, from the supposition of the above-mentioned principle being true, the arguments by which this truth is proved, are found to be fallacious; that is, the arguing analogically from one substance to another whose nature is essentially different, cannot be justified.

It will easily be perceived, I do not give this in the demonstrative stile, but only suggest, where it appears probable to me an error may lie concealed. It is a subject which would bear to be considerably enlarged upon, but to give a hint for further consideration was all I designed.

The arguments in favour of necessity drawn from the Divine Prescience, come now to be examined.

Events which are foreseen by us, must be certain and determined in every circumstance in which they are foreseen. This is quite evident; indeed it is only expressing the same thing different ways. The remark will likewise hold true with respect to every other being, how much soever superior to man, who looks upon time and place; upon past, present, and future, in the same light that we do; that is, to all intelligences whose faculties are the same in kind, however superior to each other in degree, and consequently whose essence is the same. But can we draw the same conclusion with the same certainty concerning the foreknowledge of that Being whose essence is entirely different from ours? I have before endeavoured to prove the fallaciousness of this kind of reasoning. Taking it for granted that necessity obtains with regard to man, from thence ascending to the Deity, an absurdity was found in the conclusion. In this case if it be allowed, that every thing fore-known by man is certainly fixed

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and determined, from thence ascending to the Deity, is there not room to expect that an equal or similar absurdity will be found in the conclusion? - For, if there be an error, it arises from the same cause in each case; that is, from applying the same kind of arguments to finite and infinite, or to beings whose essences are entirely different. But, if the same cause operate in each case, it must have the same effect.

From what has gone before, I think it may be inferred, that the two principles or sources from which the doctrine of necessity is proved (viz. the infallible operation of motives in the manner the necessarian understands it, and the Divine Prescience) cannot both be true. For either we must or we must not be allowed to carry our arguments from the human to the Divine Nature. In the first case we have found a gross absurdity to be the consequence of taking this doctrine for granted; therefore, by the first axiom it must be false, as proved by the operation of motives. But in the