that nature to the United States, or that fecret emiffaries may be employed to delude and deceive: In order to extinguish ill-founded hopes, to fruftrate infidious attempts, and to manifeft to the whole world the purity of the intentions, and the fixed unalterable determination of the United States,

Refolved unanimously, That Congrefs are fincerely defirous of an honourable and permanent peace: that as the only means of obtaining it, they will inviolably adhere to the treaty of alliance with his Moft Chriftian Majesty, and conclude neither a separate peace nor truce with Great Britain; that they will profecute the war with vigour until, by the bleffing of God on the united arms, a peace fhall be happily accomplished; by which, the full and abfolute fovereignty and independence of thefe United States having been duly affured, their rights and interefts, as well as thofe of their allies, fhall be effectually provided for and fecured.

That Congrefs will not enter into the difcuffion of any overtures for pacification, but in confidence and in concert with his Moft Chriftian Majefty.

That to guard against the fecret artifices and machinations of the enemy, it be, and hereby is recommended to the refpective States, to be vigilant and active in detecting and feizing all British emiffaries and fpies, that they may be brought to condign punifhment: that it be enjoined on all officers of departments charged with perfons coming from the enemy under the protection of flags of truce, to take fpecial care

tles of Brandywine and GermanTown, and of fending you the plans, with that of Philadelphia and its environs, within five leagues, to enable you to judge of the fituation of General Howe. I hope you have received them. Till now General Howe has not taken the two forts on the river, which hinder veffels coming up to the city, and deprive him of all communication with them, but by the little paffage which I have marked on the map, and from which we can cafily cut him off this winter, when we have received a reinforcement of victorious

troops

troops from the north. We rec kon on ftriking a ftroke on the other fide of Schuylkil. There are already troops in the Jerseys on the left-hand bank of the Delaware. On this plan, General Howe will be obliged to remain in Philadelphia, and run a great risk of dying by hunger; but, in truth, we do not hope for fo much. He will furely take the forts, if he attacks them well, and then he will have a communication with his fleet. You fee, Monfeigneur, that for people that have been beat twice, we are in no very bad pofture; we owe this to the Englifh having but little cavalry, fo that they were incapable of purfuing their victory: we owe it yet more to the woods and obftacles of every fort, with which this country is defended.

In the mean time it is natural enough, after the experience of this campaign, to afk this question, Will the Americans fucceed in making themselves free or not? In France, without doubt, they can only judge by what is paft; they will hold the affirmative. As for us, who have been witnesses of the whole, it is another affair. To make short of the matter, it is not the good conduct of the Americans that enabled them to make a campaign on the whole fufficiently fortunate. It is the fault of the English. It was an enormous fault of the British government to require General Burgoyne to traverse more than 200 leagues of a country replete with difficulties, almoft defert, and of confequence, very useless to take, and that only to join Generals Howe and Clinton in the middle of the country, This project might appear very VOL. XXV.

magnificent in the cabinet of London; but to those who know the country it was highly defective.

This judgment on my part is not after the event. You may remember, perhaps, Monfeigneur, that I was in very good humour with the English for oppofing to us only ten thousand men here, and that I greatly hoped General Burgoyne would not arrive here till the field could no longer be kept; that his army would be half deftroyed by hunger, mifery, and detertion, together with daily loffes fuffered from our militia, fcattered through the woods, who fighting thus in a manner peculiar to themselves, the event has been more happy than I could have even hoped.

If the English, instead of making fo many diverfions, which have been all too much at the expence of the principal action, had oppofed General Washington with twenty thousand men, I do not very well know what would have become of us. As for us, in doubling our army, we should have nearly redoubled his force, and we fhould have nearly tripled our own embarraffinent. Thus much for the plan of this campaign,

If we examine next the conduct of General Howe, we fhall-fee that he has not done even what he had in his power to do. As I had the honour to write to you after the battle of Brandywine, "If the English had followed up their advantages that day, Washington's army would have been fpoken of no more." Since that time, likewife, General Howe has, in all his operations, exhibited fuch flownefs and timidity, as on every turn to prove the object of my aftonish[U]

ment,

ment.

Having then a reference only to the number of troops, I think I may affert, if the English can have here thirty thousand effective troops, they must reduce this country.

A fecond thing which must haften this reduction, and even of itfelf nearly effect it, is the want of warlike flores. They want almoft every thing. Another object is, they are in want of both linen and woollen cloths, leather, cordage, falt, fpirituous liquors, fugars, &c. Thefe laft articles are more important than at first might be imagined. Before the war, the Americans, though defpifing luxury, had in abundance every thing that is neceffary to an eafy and agreeable life. To have no great matters to do; to pass the greatest part of their time in fmoking or drinking fpirituous liquors or tea, was the taste of thefe countries. It is then very little with their inclinations that they find themfelves transformed at a ftroke into a warlike people, and reduced to the neceflity of leading a hard and frugal life. So much do they in general deteft the war, that it is eafy to fee, if their wants are but increased to a certain point, they would prefer the yoke of the Englifh to a liberty which cofts them the comforts of life.

This language aftonifhes you, Monfeigneur; but in truth, fuch

It is neceffary therefore for France, if the wishes to support this revolution, to furnish the people with every neceffary, nor fuffer them to fuftain any confiderable want. It will cost France a great fum, even fome millions; but he will be amply repaid by the annihilation of the marine power of England, which, having no longer any colonies, can in a little time have no marine. Commerce will of confequence país over to France, which can in that cafe have no rival among the pow ers of Europe.

Some perfons have pretended that France has no intereft in feeing the English colonies form a free flate, and that we might thereby run the hazard of lofing our own colonies; but whoever knows this country, fees that it will be fome ages before they could fend forth a fquadron to make conquefts, and long before that the jealoufies which one province entertains of another (the appearances of which are already ditcernible) will have divided them into different states, none of which will be to be feared. I may be afked, whether France had not better make a treaty with the United States, and fend twelve or fifteen thousand men hither, to effect more readilythis revolution? This would be the most effectual method