e of his ices IN MEMORIAM: GEORGE CANNING 189 Corunna. It is not, however, with Canning as a man of letters, but with Canning, the statesman and diplomatist, that this article is mainly concerned. Not until the last few years have Canning's achievefas ments in the sphere of diplomacy received due recogni ends tion at the hands of a historian of the front rank, and Yet none of these works were the product of firstrate historical criticism; they could not therefore do full justice to the statesmanship of Canning. Still less could it be done in the numerous short biographies which have from time to time appeared. We have had, therefore, to wait until the publication (1925) of Mr Temperley's 'The Foreign Policy of Canning' and Prof. Webster's companion volume on the 'Foreign Policy of Castlereagh' before we were in a position to form a critical estimate of Canning's great achievement in the * A full list (compiled from information kindly supplied to the author by Sir John Murray) of Canning's contributions to the 'Quarterly Review' and a brief analysis of each, will be found in the Appendix to the present writer's 'George Canning and His Times' (John Murray), 1907. domain of diplomacy. With these two volumes it seems How proper to associate Prof. Alison Phillips's 'Confederation is of Europe,' which contains a brilliant study of the diplomatic history of the period between Castlereagh's accession to the Foreign Office and Canning's death. With these three works before us it should be possible to assign to Canning the historical place which he is destined permanently to fill. me What will that place be? One legend, curiously persistent throughout the greater part of the 19th century, may now surely be for ever dissipated. I refer to the idea sedulously circulated by the Whig historians that Canning's accession to the Foreign Office in 1822 was marked by a complete reversal of the policy of Castlereagh, and that in consequence the course of English diplomacy underwent at that moment a violent deviation. That Canning and Castlereagh, though alike devoted disciples of Pitt, were personal rivals is true; that Canning gravely underrated the abilities of Castlereagh is probable; that Castlereagh should (for reasons already indicated) have mistrusted the character of Canning was perhaps inevitable; it is, moreover, undeniable that Canning's tone was more masterful, if his grasp was little firmer than Castlereagh's; but as regards the main lines of British diplomacy there was no real divergence or distinction between them. These lines, thanks to the painstaking researches of the historians just mentioned, it is now possible, despite the intricacies of the period, to trace. re ver afc End The situation which after 1815 confronted Castlereagh and Canning was in many respects parallel with that which has confronted English statesmen since 1918. But two earlier episodes in Canning's career must not be ignored. The first is the bombardment of Copenhagen and the seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807. It was in that year that Canning first became responsible for the conduct of Foreign affairs. The moment was critical. The naval campaign of 1805, culminating in the victory of Trafalgar, had left England supreme at sea. Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena had made it clear that Napoleon was master of the Continent. But those victories had brought him little nearer to the achievement of his supreme object, the conquest of England. TolHow was that object to be attained? The Treaty of CCilsit supplies the answer. Russia should be cajoled into in alliance with the 'new Charlemagne'; Prussia should lade despoiled; Great Britain should be brought to her knees by the annihilation of her foreign trade. The course of the negotiations at Tilsit is still wrapped in obscurity, nor can we yet be certain how the elaborate precautions adopted by the arch-conspirators for secrecy were defeated, nor by whose agency Canning obtained information as to what had passed between Napoleon and the Tsar Alexander. The two Emperors met on a raft moored in the middle of the Niemen, and met, as they imagined, alone. According to one story, first revealed by Lord Malmesbury,* Canning's information came through the Duke of Portland from the Prince of Wales, who in turn derived it from Portugal. Stapleton states definitely† that an individual was concealed behind a curtain [on the raft] and was a secret witness of that most curious conversation,' and as definitely adds that it was on this information that Canning acted. Who was the individual? Was it Sir Robert Wilson, as some say, or Mackenzie, or as others suggest, the Tsar's Scottish physician, Dr Wylie? Or Talleyrand? The so-called Memoirs' of Fouché testify to Napoleon's own belief that Talleyrand was the betrayer of his secrets, and some recent critics have taken the same view. But at the time of the interview at Tilsit Talleyrand was at Königsberg, fifty-five miles distant from Tilsit. How could Talleyrand, even though willing to betray his master, reveal a secret which he did not know? Dr Holland Rose, a scrupulously careful scholar, has re-examined the available evidence with meticulous attention, and his conclusion is that, though the source of Canning's information is still uncertain, and though the information itself was neither precise nor direct nor decisive, Canning did possess a large amount of indirect and circumstantial evidence, the items of which were weak when considered separately, but of great cumulative force. Nor can the broad facts be disputed. No neutrality was henceforward to be permitted by Napoleon. Continental States which were not *Diaries,' IV. 391-9. + 'George Canning and His Times,' p. 125. We 188 with him must be against him. The navies of ' neutrals' were to be absorbed into the navy of France. The first a victim of the new policy was to be Denmark. Canning, apprised of this fact, acted with extraordinary promptitude. A powerful British squadron was dispatched to Copenhagen. Denmark was required to deposit its fleet with England; and, on its refusal, Copenhagen was bombarded and the fleet seized. The ethics of the episode are admittedly questionable, but the strategical and political results were beyond dispute: the Tilsit conspiracy was foiled. Foiled in northern waters, Napoleon turned to the Tagus and the Peninsula. Canning immediately apprehended the significance of the new move, and perceived the opportunity which it offered to Great Britain. The opportunity was seized, and not only was effective support afforded to Portugal, but every encouragement was given to the Spanish patriots to persevere in their resistance to Napoleon. Pitt had long ago asserted that only a war of peoples could save Europe, and, just before his death, had predicted that 'this war would begin in Spain.' Canning, quick to realise that the moment for the fulfilment of his master's prediction had come, declared, with emphasis, that any nation which would oppose France, 'the common enemy of all nations,' 'becomes instantly our essential ally.' Between the policy of the Foreign Office and that of the War Office there was, however, then as often, considerable divergence. The Convention of Cintra and Moore's retreat on Corunna filled Canning with despair, and followed as they were by the expedition to Walcheren, well conceived but disastrously executed, largely con tributed to the breach between Canning and Castlereagh, which culminated in the duel between the two colleagues, and the retirement of both from the Ministry. The duel, the events which led up to it and its sequel were in the last degree unfortunate. Nationally, the moment was intensely critical; personally, the reputation of Canning for straight dealing was tarnished, and not until after Castlereagh's death, more than twelve years later, was Canning restored to his rightful place in the counsels of the King. The slur upon Canning's personal honour was not in fact deserved. 'I know positively,' so Lord Wellesley wrote to Charles Bagot, that Canning never s of: entertained the idea of concealment from Lord Castlereagh; and I know also that Canning thought that the whole had been communicated to Lord Castlereagh.' The fact, however, remains that it was not communicated, and that for nearly six months Castlereagh was permitted to sit in the Cabinet side by side with a colleague who had formally intimated to the Prime Minister, the Duke of Portland, that unless Castlereagh was removed from the War Office he must himself resign the Foreign Office. Portland's timidity and procrastination were primarily responsible for the disaster that ensued, but that Castlereagh and his friends should, in ignorance of the true facts of the case, have been moved to indignation by the 'treachery' of a colleague is wholly intelligible. were, None the less, the result was deplorable. For twelve of the best years of his life Canning's brilliant talents if not wholly lost to the country, very inadequately employed, and though Castlereagh's reputation as a diplomatist now stands as high as that of any statesman of the century, it remains a matter for keen regret that Canning had no part in the European settlement of 1815 and could exert but little influence upon domestic or foreign politics during the seven critical years which followed Waterloo. It must in fairness be recalled that Canning's prolonged exclusion from office was due entirely to his own exacting temper. With rare magnanimity Castlereagh had in 1812 offered to forgo the Foreign Office in his favour; but Canning demanded, in addition, the leadership of the House of Commons, and that demand Lord Liverpool, perhaps wisely, refused to concede. In At long last, however, Canning's chance came. 1822 Castlereagh's overwrought brain gave way and he died by his own hand. Canning had just accepted the Governor-Generalship of India and was on the point of sailing to take up his post. Was the 'whole heritage' of his old rival to devolve upon him? The Foreign Office was his for the asking; but the King and the Cabinet were alike reluctant to entrust him with the leadership of the House of Commons. Canning's terms, however, were peremptory. All or nothing, or he would sail for India. There was a delay of five |