meeting of the employees one of the defendants, who was a member of the executive of the Carriers' Society, assured the men, without the authority of the executive as required by the rules, that they would be supported if they went on strike, and thereafter, in pursuance of a resolution passed at the meeting, the other defendant, who, as the oldest employee, acted as spokesman of the men, gave notice to the employers that the men would strike unless the plaintiff joined their society or left the employers' employment. As the employers did not wish the works to stop they dismissed the plaintiff without notice, the men agreeing to indemnify them for the week's wages due in lieu of notice. Held, in an action for damages for procuring a breach of the plaintiff's contract of service, that, as there was no trade dispute, the defendants were not protected by the Trade Disputes Act 1906, and that the defendants' acts were illegal and entitled the plaintiff to damages. Chan. Div. (Astbury J.).-29th April

(Viscount Cave, Lord Atkinson, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Lord Wrenbury, and Lord Phillimore).-30th April 1920.

MASTER
SERVICES

Davis v. Thomas.

AND SERVANT - TERMINATION OF
ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYERS FOR

a

PROTECTION OF COMMON TRADE INTERESTSMEMBER DISMISSING SERVANT AT REQUEST OF ASSOCIATION.-At the request of an association of yeast dealers, of which he was a member, an employer dismissed, on due notice, a servant engaged under a contract terminable on month's notice. Held, in an action by the servant against the association for damages and an injunction to restrain the association from interfering with any person, company, or corporation with a view to causing such person, company, or corporation to break his or their contract with the plaintiff or to cease to employ him, that the action failed on the ground that the plaintiff's dismissal was not illegal and no illegal means had been used to procure it. Decision of P. O. Lawrence J. (ante, p. 8), affirmed.-Court of Appeal (Lord Sterndale M.R., Warrington CONTRACT—SALE OF GOODS-TENDER OF DE- and Younger L.JJ.).—30th April 1920.

1920.

Payne & Routh v. Lillico & Sons.

LIVERY-TENDER BY SELLER OF QUANTITY IN
EXCESS-CONTRACT PROVIDING FOR MARGIN OF
EXCESS OR DEFICIENCY.-The sellers under a
contract for the sale of 4000 tons of maize
meal, "2 per cent. more or less," were given the
option of shipping a further 3 per cent. more or
less on the contract quantity. They tendered
delivery of a quantity over and above the margin
provided for, and the buyer refused to accept
delivery. Held that the tender of delivery was
bad inasmuch as the limited variation in the
amount to be delivered expressly agreed to by
the parties must be adhered to, although had it
been no more than a matter of pounds in
tons or ounces in hundredweights it might have
been disregarded.-K.B. Div. (Rowlatt J.).
29th April 1920.

many

Duke of Northumberland v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue.

REVENUE-EXCESS MINERAL RIGHTS DUTYCOMPUTATION OF SUM ON WHICH DUTY PAYABLE

-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTION-FINANCE (NO. 2) ACT 1915 (5 & 6 GEO. V. CAP. 89), SECTION 43, SUBSECTIONS (1) AND (2)-Held that in computing the sum on which excess mineral rights duty is payable under section 43 (1) and (2) of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1915, the rate at which income tax may be deducted from the pre-war standard of rent is the rate current during the accounting year and not the rate payable in the pre-war year. Decision of the Court of Appeal (1919 S.L.T. 72) affirmed - House of Lords

Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Blott.

REVENUE-SUPER-TAX- BONUS SHARES-IN

COME TAX ACT 1842 (5 & 6 VICT. CAP. 35), 1910 (10 EDW. VII. CAP. 8), SECTION 66, SUBSECTIONS 40 AND 54-FINANCE (1909-10) ACT SECTION (2).-A company declared a bonus out of its profits and allotted shares to the shareholders in satisfaction of the bonus under powers contained in the company's articles. The shareholders had no option to receive the bonus in cash. Held that a shareholder was not liable to super-tax on the amount of the bonus shares allotted to him. Decision of Rowlatt J. (1919 S.L.T. 95) affirmed.-Court of Appeal (Lord Sterndale M.R., Warrington and Scrutton L.JJ.). -3rd May 1920.

Midland Railway Co. and Others v. Brotherton &
Co. Ltd. and Others.

CARRIAGE-CARRIAGE BY LAND-RAILWAYS

GOODS-CHARGES "DANGEROUS GOODS.”—Held that a railway company has a discretion to place particular goods within the statutory classification of " dangerous goods," and that where the company has done so on reasonable grounds its decision cannot be overruled by any Court.Railway and Canal Commission (Lush J., Mr Tindal Atkinson K.C., and Mr Macnamara).20th May 1920.

H.M. ADVOCATE v. MICHAEL BREEN

AND ANOTHER.

function of a jury. The word "court" must therefore be understood to refer to either judge or jury, as the context demands.

As an example of judicial construction of The second obstacle placed by the draftsman statute the decision of the High Court of Jus- in the course of the subsection looked even more ticiary pronounced in this case on Monday, 6th unsurmountable, and was overcome only by December, is of the greatest interest. A vital reasoning which, be it said with respect, is as section of the Mental Deficiency and Lunacy subtle as it is profound and true. The jury is (Scotland) Act 1913 had strangely lain inert, to return two verdicts: (1) that the charge is unused (at least in proceedings in the High proved, and (2) that the accused is mentally Court) for seven years. When the time came defective. These are the necessary preliminaries for section 9 to "do its bit" as a beneficent of the subsequent statutory procedure for securpart of the engine designed "to make better ing remedial detention. But all the world and further provision for the care of mentally knows that the usual finding or verdict of the defective persons in Scotland, it was found jury is "Guilty as libelled," and as the Lord that its machinery was ill-planned and difficult Justice-General remarked, that verdict is the to put in motion, and it took all the skill of a conviction. It was made clear, accordingly, in very strong Full Bench to adjust its parts the opinion of the Court, that this customary and shew that it was capable of being employed verdict of the jury is in reality a little more for the purpose for which it was intended. than it usually seems to be; that it is indeed the finding in fact of the jury, but stated in a form which, by virtue of the previous direction of the trial judge, sounds as, and indeed actually is, a finding of mixed fact and law. The trial judge has said, "Gentlemen, if you find facts A, B, and C proved, you will find the accused guilty of the offence charged." There is always an inference to be drawn from the proved facts, an inference of the guilt of the accused, and it is the function of the judge, and not of the jury, to draw that inference-it is a question of law. In the ordinary case the judge draws the inference ab ante on the hypothesis that the jury may find the facts proved. In proceedings under this subsection it will be necessary to keep fact and law strictly separate; and the trial judge will require so to direct the jury, viz. that their verdict is desired only upon the question whether the facts averred against the accused have been proved. He will then be able to stay his own hand short of conviction, i.e. short of inferring the guilt of the accused. At first blush the distinction between the ordinary verdict and this restricted verdict may seem to be perilously narrow; but attention to the hypothesis of feeble-mindedness, or of insanity at the date of the offence, shews that there is substance in it, and that it is literally and universally true that proof of the facts can never exhaust the whole question before the Court, for the simple reason that proof of the facts can never by itself establish the mens rea of an accused.

Expressions are used in section 9 (1) of the Act which are, as the Lord Justice-General pointed out in delivering the opinion of the Court, strange to the criminal law of Scotland. The two objectionable phrases are italicised in the following brief version of the subsection: "Where a person is charged with any offence punishable. with penal servitude or with imprisonment and the court is of opinion that the charge is proved, . . . the court, if it appears to it that such person is a defective within the meaning of this Act, may, without proceeding to convict . . . . adjourn the proceedings and report the case to the procuratorfiscal with a view to the presentation of a petition by . . . . him for a judicial order under this Act, provided that for the purposes of this Act a person shall be deemed to be a person found guilty of an offence where the court is of opinion that the charge is proved." The Lord JusticeGeneral observed that the general object of the section clearly was that the Court should have a discretionary power, "before the stigma of conviction is actually affixed to an accused defective" to have him remedially dealt with by detention following upon the statutory procedure.

But in demonstrating that the detailed provisions of the subsection were capable of achieving that object, his Lordship encountered two formidable difficulties. First, it became necessary to read two meanings into the word "court," according to the exigencies of the context in which it was used. For the learned judge put it beyond all doubt or controversy that, in a High Court case, the two questions of fact, viz. whether the charge is proved, and whether the accused is mentally defective, must necessarily be questions for the jury, who sit along with and under the direction of the judge. It was made equally clear that in the context "the court may. . . . adjourn the proceedings" there is, and can be, no reference to any known

It is extremely curious to observe, further, that in the sense of the subsection the words "a person found guilty of an offence" are not synonymous with "a person convicted of an offence." The proviso to the subsection is obviously inserted with the view of catching the defective with the ipsissima verba of the earlier section which renders him subject to the Act, viz.: "Section 3. (1) A person who is defective shall be subject to be dealt with under

Birkenhead L.C. said, "I myself take the view in the Books of Sederunt and to be printed and that Conway's case cannot be maintained." His published in common form. Lordship on the following day at the hearing |

DECISIONS IN THE ENGLISH

CONTRACT

COURTS.

Dewes v. Fitch.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE AGREE

attempt was made by the defendants to charter other vessels. Held that the words "agents or owners" did not limit the contract to one of carriage in vessels of which the defendants were owner or managers, but that the contract was a general carrying contract and the defendants were liable in damages for breach.-K.B. Div.

MENT NOT TO BE CONCERNED IN BUSINESS OF (Bailhache J.).—7th May 1920.

SOLICITOR-RESTRICTION LIMITED AS TO AREA BUT UNLIMITED AS TO DURATION.-The managing clerk to a solicitor was employed under an agreement in terms of which he bound himself to serve for a period of three years or more and undertook that, on the expiration of the agreement, he would not be concerned in the business of a solicitor within a radius of seven miles. Held that although the restraint was unlimited as to duration it was, in the circumstances, reasonable and enforceable. Decision of Eve J. (ante, p. 72) affirmed.-Court of Appeal (Lord Sterndale M.K., Warrington and Younger L..JJ.)-4th May 1920.

Owners of S.S. "Richard de Larrinaga" v.

Admiralty Commissioners.

INSURANCE—MARINE INSURANCE-WAR RISKS -COLLISION WITH WARSHIP GOING TO TAKE UP STATION AS ESCORT.-A merchant vessel was insured with two sets of underwriters against war risks and marine risks respectively. While in convoy, at night, the vessel came into collision with one of His Majesty's warships. Both vessels, in obedience to orders, were steaming without lights, and there was no negligence on the part of either. The warship was on her way to take up duty as escort to a convoy. Held that the warship was engaged in a warlike operation and that the loss fell on the war risk underwriters. Decision of Bailhache J. (ante, p. 63) affirmed.Court of Appeal (Bankes, Scrutton, and Atkin L.JJ.).-4th May 1920.

Cork Gas Consumers Co. v. Witherington & Everett.

SHIP

"AGENTS OR OWNERS

Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal
Hotel Ltd.

WAR

ROYAL

- DEFENCE OF THE REALM PREROGATIVE-NATIONAL EMERGENCY-RIGHT TO REQUISITION PREMISES-RIGHT OF SUBJECT TO PAYMENT-DEFENCE ACT 1842 (5 & 6 VICT. CAP. 94)-DEFENCE OF THE REALM CONSOLIDATION ACT 1914 (5 GEO. V. CAP. 8).—A building was requisitioned for occupation by the Government on behalf of the Crown for administrative purposes in connection with the defence of the realm. Held that the Crown was not entitled to use and occupy the premises without payment of compensation under the Defence Act 1842, either in virtue of the Royal Prerogative or the powers conferred by the Defence of the Realm Acts and Regulations. Decision of the Court of Appeal (1919 S.L.T. 71) affirmed.-House of Lords (Lord Dunedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Moulton, Lord Sumner, and Lord Parmoor). 10th May 1920.

National Provident Institution v. Brown.

REVENUE-INCOME TAX-PROFITS RESULTING

OF

CONVERSION FROM PURCHASE, SALE, OR TREASURY BILLS-LIABILITY TO ASSESSMENT TO INCOME TAX-NO TRANSACTIONS DURING YEAR OF ASSESSMENT-INCOME TAX ACT 1842 (5 & 6 VICT. CAP. 35), SECTION 100, SCHEDULE D, CASE 3, RULES 1 AND 2.-Held (1) that the profits resulting from the purchase, sale, holding to maturity, or conversion into War Loan of Treasury Bills were assessable to income tax as profits or gains under section 100, Schedule D, Case 3, Rules 1 and 2 of the Income Tax Act 1842, the measure of the profit in the case of bills sold or converted before maturity being the amount by which the bill had increased in value by reason of its advance towards maturity, excluding any increase due to the state of the market or alteration in the value of money, and (2) that where the tax payer had no transactions in Treasury Bills during the year of assessment he was not liable to pay income tax by reason of the fact that he had made profits therefrom in the previous year. Decision of Rowlatt J. (1919 S.L.T. 95) varied.-Court of Appeal (Lord Sterndale M.R., Warrington and Scrutton L.JJ.).

CHARTER - PARTY CONTRACT WITH OF VESSELS FOR CARRIAGE OF COAL-OUTBREAK OF WAR PREVENTING CARRIAGE IN VESSELS OF WHICH THE CARRIERS WERE AGENTS OR OWNERS-CARRIERS FAILING TO PROVIDE OTHER VESSELS-LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.-In June 1914 the defendants by a charter-party in which they were described as "agents or owners" agreed with the plaintiffs to carry a quantity of coal from England to Cork between July 1914 and June 1915. On the outbreak of war two of the defendants' vessels were at Hamburg and could not escape, and all their other ships except two were requisitioned by the Admiralty. These two could not have carried all the coal, and no-10th May 1920.

London General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. General

Marine Underwriters' Association.

Williams v. Singer.

REVENUE-INCOME TAX-TRUSTEES-INCOME

over of the income in the event of the tenant for life ceasing or declining so to reside. Held that personal residence was necessary to entitle INSURANCE—MARINE INSURANCE-DUTY TO the tenant for life to payment of the income and DISCLOSE-MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCE UNKNOWN that the maintenance of an establishment was TO BOTH ASSURED AND INSURER-CIRCUMSTANCE not sufficient.-Court of Appeal (Lord Sterndale DEEMED TO BE KNOWN TO ASSURED-MARINE M.R., Warrington and Younger L.JJ.).—14th INSURANCE ACT 1906 (6 EDW. VII. CAP. 41), May 1920. SECTION 18 (1), (3) (b).—The cargo of a vessel on a voyage from Italy to the United Kingdom was insured on 24th September 1918 and that evening the vessel put into port with her cargo on fire. The casualty was posted at Lloyd's next morning and a casualty slip containing the information was sent to the insurers who, however, did not read it and later in the day, through their brokers, effected a reinsurance with the defendants, another insurance company, who had also received a casualty slip but, like themselves, were ignorant of the fire when the reinsurance was effected. Held, in an action on the reinsurance policy, that the insurers must be deemed to have known of the casualty and that it was their duty to have disclosed it to the reinsurers, and that the action therefore failed. -K.B. Div. (Bailhache J.).-12th May 1920.

Coman v. Governors of Rotunda Hospital.

REVENUE-INCOME TAX-HOSPITAL DERIVING INCOME FROM LETTING ROOMS-INCOME TAX ACT

1842 (5 & 6 VICT. CAP. 35), SCHEDULE D.-The Governors of the Rotunda Hospital, Dublin, were assessed to income tax in respect of revenue derived for the support of the hospital from allowing certain rooms occupied by them to be used for public entertainments and by giving the use of furniture and providing heat, light, and attendance. Held that the governors had engaged in a business, or a concern in the nature of business, and thereby had earned annual profits which were outside the scope of Schedule A and were therefore taxable under Schedule D, that no exemption conferred by the Income Tax Acts was applicable to these profits, and that therefore the assessments were duly made.-House of Lords (Lord Birkenhead L.C., Viscount Finlay, Viscount Cave, Lord Atkinson, and Lord Shaw of Dunfermline).13th May 1920.

FROM SHARES IN FOREIGN COMPANY INCOME PAID DIRECT TO BENEFICIARY RESIDENT ABROAD -FINANCE ACT 1914 (4 & 5 GEO. V. CAP. 10), SECTION 5.-Held that trustees, resident in the United Kingdom, who held investments in a foreign company, were not liable for income tax or income derived therefrom which was not received by the trustees but was paid direct to the beneficiary who was domiciled and resident abroad. Decision of the Court of Appeal (1919 S.L.T. 73) affirmed.—House of Lords (Viscount Cave, Lord Atkinson, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Lord Wrenbury, and Lord Phillimore).-17th May 1920.

LAW LIBRARY.

BOOK NOTICE.

Company Law and Precedents. By Arthur Stiebel,
M.A. In Two Vols. Second Edition. 1920.
London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.

A book so well known to the legal profession as Mr Stiebel's work on the law of joint-stock companies requires neither introduction nor eulogy from a reviewer. On the appearance of the first edition more than eight years ago, it quickly took its place among the leading textbooks on its subject. But few departments of law develop more rapidly than that relating to companies; legislation and decision have alike contributed to make text-books out of date; and the time had certainly come for a new edition. In this new edition the book has grown into two bulky volumes; and both the substantive law, in decision or statute, and the matter of practice or procedure have undergone revision and amplification. The official position of the author as Registrar of the Winding-up Department of the English High Court gives to his views on practice and procedure a special authority; and throughout his work he never forgets, in writing mainly for lawyers, to be eminently clear and useful to those company officials-accountants, auditors, and so forth-who are not lawyers. The new edition will fully maintain, and even enhance, the high reputation which was deservedly won by the original work.