for, his client. Beardsley v. Root, 11 Johns. 464. So, a ratification of the proceedings of an attorney in a suit, if made without full knowledge of all the material facts, will not bind the client. Williams v. Reed, 3 Mas. C. C. 405.

Power to control proceedings in the suit. The right of an attorney of record to manage and control an action cannot be questioned while he remains such. Under his general authority, he may do all ordinary acts in the prosecution of the suit, or the final disposition of it. Thus, without any express power to do so being shown, he may discontinue the suit (Gaillard v. Smart, 6 Cow. 385; Barrett v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. [6 Hand] 628); restore an action after nol. pros. (Reinholdt v. Alberti, 1 Binn. [Penn.] 469); release from attachment the property of the debtor attached in the suit (Monson v. Hawley, 30 Conn. 51; Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36); permit a sheriff to renew an execution in the name of the client. Cheever v. Mirrick, 2 N. H. 376. So he may verify, by affidavit, a petition in scire facias (Wright v. Parks, 10 Iowa, 342); may have briefs printed at the expense of his client (Weisse v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 46); may waive a verification (Smith v. Mulliken, 2 Minn. 319), and in cases of special attachment, he may do all acts which the interests of his clients may require. Pierce v. Strickland, 2 Story, 292.

An attorney under his general authority cannot, however, enter a retraxit (Lambert v. Sanford, 2 Blackf. [Ind.] 137); nor release a garnishee from his attachment (Quarles v Porter, 12 Mo. 76); nor assign a judgment (Fassitt v. Middleton, 47 Penn. St. 214; Head v. Gervais, Walk. [Miss.] 431); nor admit service for his client of an original process by which the court obtains jurisdiction for the first time of his person (Musterson v. LeClaire, 4 Minn. 163), or release the liability of a witness to pay a part of the costs. Bowne v. Hyde, 6 Barb. 392; Marshall v. Nagel, 1 Bailey (S. C.), 308; Springer v. Whipple, 17 Me. 351. So an attorney, under his general authority, cannot consent to the entry of a judgment against his client, without his assent (People v. Lamborn, 2 Ill. [1 Scam.] 123); nor can he release a claim of his client on a third person for the purpose of making such person a competent witness for his client (Shores v. Caswell, 54 Mass. [13 Metc.] 413), or release an indorser of a note, in order to render him competent to testify in an action against the maker. East River Bank v. Kennedy, 9 Bosw. 573. And a general power to defend a cause will not authorize the attorney to execute an appeal bond in his client's name. Holbrook's Case, 5 Cow. 35; Clark v. Courser, 29 N. H. (9 Fost.) 170. An attorney at law has authority, by virtue of his employment as such, however, to do in behalf of his client all acts, in or out of court, necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit, and which affect the remedy only, and not the cause of action. Wieland v. White, 109 Mass. 392; Rice v. Wilkins, 21 Me. 558; Pierce v. Strickland, 2 Story, 292; Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36. Authority to demand and receive payment. An attorney, by virtue of his retainer, may demand and receive payment of his client's money. Langdon v. Potter, 13 Mass. 319; Bryans v. Taylor, Wright (Ohio), 245; Ruckman v. Allwood, 44 Ill. 183; Ducett v. Cunningham, 39 Me. 386; Megary v. Funtis, 5 Sandf. 376. Payment to the attorney is payment to his client. Ely v. Harvey, 6 Bush (Ky.), 620; Carroll County v. Cheatham, 48 Mo. 385. But the rule is well established that, without the express authority of his client, an attorney is not authorized to receive any thing but money in payment of a debt intrusted to him for collection. Huston v. Mitchell, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 307; Wilkinson v. Holloway, 7 Leigh (Va.), 277; Moye v. Cogdell, 69 N. C. 93; Wright v. Daily, 26 Tex. 730; Givens v. Briscoe, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 534, Kent v. Ricords, 3 Md. (Ch.) 392; Harper v. Harvey, 4 W.Va. 539; Trumbull v. Nicholson, 27 Ill. 149. So an attorney employed to collect a debt has no authority to release the sureties upon his client's claim (Savings Inst. v. Chinn, 7 Bush [Ky.], 539); or to receive other securities in payment of the demand (Jeter v. Haviland, 24 Ga. 252; Walker v. Scott, 13 Ark. 644); or to sell the claim (Rowland v. Stone, 58 Penn. St. 196; Noonan v. Gray, 1 Bailey [S. C.], 437; Card v. Walbridge, 18 Ohio, 411; Penniman v. Patchen, 5 Vt. 346), nor to transfer a promissory note put in his hands for collection. Child v. Eureka, etc., Works, 44 N. H. 354; Russell v. Drummond, 6 Ind. 216; Terhune v. Colton, 10 N. J. Eq. (2 Stockt.) 21. An attorney may, however, receive partial payments on any claim put in his hands for collection (Pickett v. Bates, 3 La. Ann. 627); and under his general authority to collect a note, he is authorized to receive a payment of part in money, and the residue in a note for a short period of a person of undoubted responsibility. Livingston v. Radcliff, 6 Barb. 201. But he cannot bind his client by an agreement to set off his own debt in part payment of a debt due the client. Child v. Dwight, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. (N. C.) 171; Chambers v. Miller, 7 Watts (Penn.), 63.

The attorney on record of the plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of money, has authority to receive the amount of a judgment recovered by his client, and to discharge it. Lewis v. Gamage, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 347; Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517; Canterberry v. Commonwealth, 1 Dana (Ky.), 416; Wilson v. Stokes, 4 Munf. (Va.) 455. But he has no authority to execute a satisfaction of judgment on behalf of his client, without payment; and even where the attorney holds the judgment by assignment, as security for debts due from the client, his satisfaction without payment is good only for the amount of his interest. Beers v. Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. (6 Hand) 665.

Authority to make settlements and compromises. An attorney has no authority, arising from his employment in that capacity, to compromise the claim of his client (Abbe v. Rood, 6 McLean, 106; Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436; Spears v. Ledergerber, 56 Mo. 465; Moye v. Cogdell, 69 N. C. 93; Adams v. Roller, 35 Tex. 711); or to settle a suit and conclude the client in relation to the subject in litigation without his consent. Shaw v. Kidder, 2 How. 244; Barrett v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. (6 Hand) 628, 635; Lewis v. Gamage, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 347; Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245; Davidson v. Rozier, 23 Mo. 387; Filby v. Miller, 25 Penn. St. 264; Vail v. Jackson, 15 Vt. 314. But a compromise, acquiesced in for years by the principal, will bind him forever (Mayer v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. C. C. 511); and an agreement or compromise of a suit by an attorney, even though made without special authority, will not be interfered with unless it is so unreasonable as to warrant a belief that the attorney was imposed upon or did not exercise his judgment fairly. Potter v. Parsons, 14 Iowa, 286; Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436. So it is held that an attorney who is director in a railroad company, and is openly employed to prosecute a suit against the road, may compromise the suit, and recover his fees for legal services in the case. Christie v. Sawyer, 44 NH 298.

An attorney employed to bring or to defend an action has authority to submit the cause to arbitration (Talbot v. McGee, 4 T. B. Monr. [Ky.] 377; Inhabitants of Buckland v. Inhabitants of Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Scarborough v. Reynolds, 12 Ala. 252; Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Penn. St. 315; Coleman v. Grubb, 23 id. 393; Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436; Abbe v. Rood, 6 McLean, 106); but the exercise of this authority appears to be limited to the case where there is a cause pending, which the attorney has been employed to manage. Jenkins v. Gillespie, 18 Miss. (10 Smedes & Marsh.) 31. In Pennsylvania, an attorney cannot affect his client's title to real estate by entering into any agreement or submission, whether in a pending cause or not. Houston v. Mitchell, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 307; Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Penn. St. 185; Pearson v. Morrison, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 20.

Authority to make admissions, etc. An attorney, under his general authority as such, may admit facts on the trial or in pleading, waive a right of appeal, review, notice, etc., and confess judgment. Alton v. Gilmanton, 2 N. H. 520; Rogers v. Greenwood, 14 Minn. 333; Talbot v. M'Gee, 4 T. B. Monr. (Ky.) 377; Lyon v. Williams, 42 Ga. 168; Smith v. Dixon, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 438; Pike v. Emerson, 5 N. H. 393. So, an agreement by him to refer a cause is binding upon his client (ib.; Tiffany v. Lord, 40 How. 481; Yates v. Russell, 17 Johns. 461; Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Smith v. Dixon, 3 Metc. [Ky.] 438); and so are admissions of payment made by an attorney. Wenans v. Lindsey, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 557. The attorney may also bind his client by the admission of a fact for the purpose of trial (Storke v. Kenan, 11 Ala. 819; Farmers' Bank v. Sprigg, 11 Md. 389); by a stipulation substantially settling the issues to be tried (Bingham v. Supervisors, 6 Minn. 136); by a waiver of all informalities and irregularities (Hanson v. Hoitt, 14 N. H. 56); by consenting to an order of the court (Hart v. Spaulding, 1 Cal. 213); or by making proper agreements in regard to the suit (Farmers' Trust, etc., Bank v. Ketchum, 4 McLean's C. C. 120). But a client is not bound by a contract entered into on his behalf by the attorney, without authority conferred, or subsequent ratification by the former (Ireland v. Todd, 36 Me. 149); and a stipulation by the attorney not to appeal, or seek a new trial, will not bind his client. People v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 11 Abb. 66. So, a waiver of trial by jury in criminal cases is not binding on the defendant if it be made by his attorney without consulting him, even though he was present in court. Brown v. State, 16 Ind. 496; see Cancemi v. The People, 18 N. Y. (4 Smith) 128. Control of judgment or execution. An attorney, by virtue of his general employment to prosecute a suit, has no authority to discharge a judgment, unless on full payment of the amount (Beers v. Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. [6 Hand] 665; Wilson v. Wadleigh, 36 Me. 496); nor to assign the judgment or execution (id.); nor to direct the sheriff what property to levy upon on the execution (Averill v. Williams, 4 Denio, 295), nor to consent to vacate a

judgment which is pending and secured on appeal. Quinn v. Lloyd, 36 How. 378; 5 Abb. N. S. 281. But his power extends to opening a default which he has taken, and vacating the judgment entirely, even though his client has instructed him to the contrary: Read v. French, 28 N. Y. (1 Tiff.) 285. It is held that the attorney of a judgment creditor has implied authority to direct the sheriff as to the time and manner of enforcing the execution (Willard v. Goodrich, 31 Vt. 597; Gorham v. Gale, 7 Cow. 739; Erwin v Blake, 8 Pet. 18; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 16 Serg. & Rawle, 368); to discharge a defendant from arrest on a ca. sa. issued by him (Hopkins v. Willard, 14 Vt. 474; Scott v. Seiler,5 Watts [Penn.], 235); to stay execution upon a judgment (Silvis v. Ely, 3 Watts & Serg. [Penn.] 420), or to take out execution on a judgment recovered by him for his client, and to procure a satisfaction thereof by a levy on lands, or otherwise, and to receive the money due on the execution. Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. 98; Erwin v. Blake, 8 id. 18. But he has no implied authority to release property levied on under execution (Banks v. Evans, 18 Miss. [10 Smedes & Marsh.] 35); nor to discharge an execution in favor of his client unless upon payment of its whole amount (Jewett v. Wadleigh, 32 Me. 110); nor to release a judgment obtained by him for his client (Harrow v. Farrow, 7 B. Monr. [Ky.] 126); nor to release the sureties of his client's debtor (Givens v. Briscoe, 3 J. J. Marsh. [Ky.] 532); nor to purchase real estate under his client's execution (Washington v. Johnson, 7 Humph. [Tenn.] 468); nor to stay an execution as to a principal debtor so as to discharge a surety (Union Bank v. Govan, 18 Miss. [10 Smedes & Marsh.] 35), nor to discharge the defendant from execution on a ca. sa. without satisfaction. Kellogg v. Gilbert, 10 Johns. 220; Simonton v. Barrell, 21 Wend. 362.

Authority in auxiliary proceedings. It is a general rule that an attorney is only authorized to appear and act for his client in the proceedings which constitute a part of the action. Thus, employment in the principal case does not give authority to appear in a suit for contempt. Pitt v. Davison, 37 Barb. 97; see Headley v. Good, 24 Tex. 232; Walradt v. Maynard, 3 Barb. 584. But an attorney who receives a note from his client to collect is warranted by his general retainer to bring a second suit on the note, after being nonsuited in the first, for want of sufficient proof of the execution of the note. Jackson v. Wilson, 12 Johns. 317.

Authority, when terminated. An attorney employed to take the care and management of a suit has a right to consider his employment as continuing to the end of the litigation, unless dismissed by his client (Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt. 285); and his authority to act cannnot be ended by himself alone to his client's detriment. Love v. Hall, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 408. The death of the client terminates the attorney's authority, and he cannot give nor receive notice of motions in the cause, before the successor, made a party in due form, has authorized him to act thereon. Putnam v. Van Buren, 7 How. 31; Austin v. Monroe, 4 Lans. 67; Balbi v. Duvet, 3 Edw. Ch. 418; Judson v. Love, 35 Cal. 163; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 333; Risley v. Fellows, 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) 531; Campbell v. Kincaid, 3 T. B. Monr. (Ky.) 566. See Succession of Liles, 24 La. Ann. 490.

The authorities in some of the States hold that the general power of an attorney ceases with the entry of judgment for his client (see Hinckley v. St. Anthony Fulls, etc., Co., 9 Minn. 55; Juckson v. Bartlett, 8 Johns. 361; Adams v. Fort Plain Bank, 23 How. 45; Egan v. Rooney, 38 id. 121; Richardson v. Talbot, 2 Bibb [Ky.], 382); but in other cases it is held that his authority continues until the judgment is satisfied, unless previously revoked by the client. Gray v. Wass, 1 Me. (1 Greenl.) 257; Nichols v. Dennis, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 188; Flanders v. Sherman, 18 Wis. 575.

3. CHANGE OF ATTORNEYS, ETC.:

Change of, by client. The relation of attorney and client requires the most unlimited confidence and perfect harmony, and a client has an absolute right to change his attorney at any stage of a suit; subject, however, to proper provisions for the rights of the attorney as to compensation, etc., which may have previously attached. Hazlett v. Gill, 5 Rob. 611; Faust v. Repoor, 15 How. 570; Board of Supervisors v. Brodhead, 44 id. 411; Wells v. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246; Re Paschal, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 483. And a change can only be made upon the order of the court. Hoffman v. Van Nostrand, 14 Abb. 336; Mumford v. Murray, Hopk. 369; Sloo v. Laro, 4 Blatch. 268; Walton v. Sugg, Phill. L. (N. C.) 98.

Withdrawal of attorney. No attorney or solicitor can withdraw his name, after he has once entered it on the record, without leave of court. And while his name continues there, the adverse party has a right to treat him as the authorized attorney or solicitor, and the

service of notice upon him is as valid as if served on the party himself. United States v. Curry, 6 How. (U. S.) 106; see Boyd v. Stone, 5 Wis. 240; Martinis v. Johnson, 21 N. J. L. (1 Zabr.) 239.

Authority of attorney to employ assistants or substitutes. An attorney has no implied authority to retain associate counsel, and charge his client with liability for their fees (Paddock v. Colby, 18 Vt. 485; Voorhies v. Harrison, 22 La. Ann. 85; Cook v. Ritter, 4 E. D. Smith, 253; Scott v. Horsie, 13 Vt. 50); nor has he any implied authority to employ a substitute to act in his place. Matter of Bleakley, 5 Paige, 311; Hitchcock v. M'Gehee, 7 Port. (Ala.) 556; Johnson v. Cunningham, 1 Ala. 249; Gillespie's Case, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 525. But an attorney employed to manage a suit may, in the absence of his employer, engage assistant counsel, and such counsel may charge his fees to the attorney or his client. Otherwise, if the party, or his authorized agent, is present at the trial. Briggs v. Georgia, 10 Vt. 68.

Attorneys as partners. Where attorneys, who are copartners, accept a retainer, it is a joint contract, continuing to the termination of the suit, and neither can be released from the obligations they have assumed, so far as their clients are concerned, by a dissolution of their firm, or any other act or agreement between themselves. Walker v. Goodrich, 16 Ill. 341. They are equally responsible for moneys collected and not paid over, though one of them had no participation in that particular transaction. Dwight v. Simon, 4 La. Ann. 490. And where two attorneys are in partnership, and one receives money, demand on him is a demand on both, and renders both liable (M' Furland v. Crary, 8 Cow. 253); so, if one does the business of a client unskillfully, both are liable to him in damages. Warner v. Griswold, 8 Wend. 665; see McGill v. McGill, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 258; Livingston v. Cox, 6 Penn. St. 360. Attorney's clerks. The clerk represents the attorney, during his absence, as to all ordinary business of the office (Power v. Kent, 1 Cow. 211); thus, an agreement made by the clerk, in the absence of his principal, waiving an irregularity, was held to be binding upon the latter. Ib.; Sibley v. Waffle, 16 N. Y. (2 Smith) 183. But an attorney's clerk, however extensive his general powers may be, cannot discontinue an action without the consent of his principal (Irvine v. Spring, 35 How. 479; S. C., 7 Rob. 293); nor can he bind the attor ney's client by a discharge, without satisfaction, of a debt due the client. Carter v. Talcott, 10 Vt. 471. Even the attorney has no authority to do so. Ib.

4. DUTIES, LIABILITIES, AND DISABILITIES:

Duty of attorney. The highest degree of fairness and good faith is required from an attorney, and the courts will closely scrutinize the dealings between attorneys and their clients, and will relieve the latter from any undue consequences resulting from them, whenever the good faith of the contract does not clearly appear. Gray v. Emmons, 7 Mich. 533; Jennings v. McConnell, 17 Ill. 148; Starr v. Vanderheyden, 9 Johns. 253; Bròb v. Smith, 1 Dana (Ky.), 582; Mills v. Mills, 26 Conn. 213. It is the duty of the attorney to disclose to his client every adverse retainer, and every prior retainer which may affect his judgment or his client's interest; but the concealment of the fact will not necessarily imply fraud. Williams v. Reed, 3 Mas. C. C. 405.

Skill. An attorney is bound to reasonable skill and diligence, and the skill has reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Reasonable skill constitutes the measure of his engagement, and he is responsible for ordinary neglect. Wilson v. Russ, 19 Me. 421; O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga. 195; Cox v. Sullivan, 7 id. 144; Holmes v. Peck, 1 R. I. 242; Stevens v. Walker, 55 Ill. 151; Bowman v. Tallman, 27 How. 212; S. C., 40 id. 1 ; Wright (Ohio), 466. See Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212; Evans v. Watrous, 2 Port. (Ala.) 205, where it is held that an attorney is liable only for gross negligence or gross ignorance in the performance of his professional duties.

Liabilities of attorney. Whenever an attorney disobeys the lawful instructions of his client, and a loss ensues, the attorney is liable for the damages occasioned by such loss. Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51; Armstrong v. Craig, 18 Barb. 387. So it is the duty of an attorney, who undertakes to collect a debt, to sue out all process necessary to the object; and if he neglects to do so, he is answerable to his client for the injury sustained by him. Crooker v. Hutchinson, 2 D. Chip. (Vt.) 117; Oldham v. Sparks, 28 Tex. 425; Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Eccles v. Stevenson, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 517; Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435; Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 44. An attorney is liable for losses sustained by his negligence, but the questions of negligence and injury are matters of fact for the jury (Hogg v. Martin.

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Riley [S. C.], 156); and he is liable only to the extent of the injury his client has received. Suydam v. Vance, 2 McLean's C. C. 99.

An attorney is not bound to proceed in a cause unless his legal fees are tendered or secured to him, if he makes that request. Castro v. Bennet, 2 Johns. 296; Gleason v. Clark, 9 Cow. 57.

Disabilities. In Indiana an attorney may be surety for his client. Church v. Drummond, 7 Ind. 17; Abbott v. Zeigler, 9 id. 511. But in some of the States he is disqualified. See Love v. Sheffelin, 7 Fla. 40; Massie v. Mann, 17 Iowa, 131; Gilbank v. Stephenson, 30 Wis. 155; Branger v. Buttrick, id. 153. As to the rule in New York, see Ryckman v. Coleman, 13 Abb. 398; Miles v. Clarke, 4 Bosw. 632; Walker v. Holmes, 22 Wend. 614; in South Carolina, Dillon v. Watkins, 2 Spears, 445.

The attorney in a cause is not disqualified from being a witness (Little v. McKeon, 1 Sandf. 607; Robinson v. Dauchy, 3 Barb. 20; Frear v. Drinker, 8 Penn. St. 520; Hall v. Renfro, 3 Metc. [Ky.] 51); even though his judgment fee depends on his success (Newman v. Bradley, 1 Dall. 241), or he expects a larger fee if his client succeeds. Boulden v. Hebel, 17 Serg. & Rawle (Penn.), 312; Miles v. O'Hara, 1 id. 32; Slocum v. Newby, 1 Murph. (N. C.) 423. But the practice of an attorney testifying, or making affidavit for his client, is very objectionable. See Little v. McKeon, 1 Sandf. 607; Spencer v. Kinnard, 12 Tex. 180; Stratton v. Henderson, 26 Ill. 68.

It is irregular for one and the same attorney to appear for both parties in a suit (Sherwood v. Saratoga, etc., R. R. Co., 15 Barb. 650); and where he has been retained by one party he cannot recover for professional services rendered in the same matter to the other. Herrick v. Catley, 30 How. 208; S. C., 1 Daly, 512. So an attorney is never allowed to change sides in the same cause, though at different trials. But when an attorney, in the course of other business, has obtained a knowledge of matters connected with the suit in question, he will not generally be prevented from acting against the party through whose business he obtained such knowledge. Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392; Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387. Under the Revised Statutes of New York it is made an offense for an attorney to purchase a chose in action for the purpose of suing upon it. 2 R. S. 288, $$ 71, 73. See, as to construction of statute, Mann v. Fairchild, 3 Abb. Ct. App. 152; Brotherson v. Consalus, 26 How. 213; Van Rensselaer v. Sheriff, 1 Cow. 443; Baldwin v. Latson, 2 Barb. Ch. 306. Liability of attorney to third persons. A person injured by an attorney's appearing for him without authority has a remedy by action against the attorney. Smith v. Bowditch, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 138; Coit v. Sheldon, 1 Tyler (Vt.), 304; Munnikuyson v. Dorsett, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 374. So, an action will lie against an attorney for maliciously suing out process. Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535. An attorney and his client are both liable, if the attorney illegally issues a fi. fa. Newberry v. Lee, 3 Hill, 523.

But an attorney is not liable civilly for ordering a levy on property, if he acts in good faith and on reasonable cause. Hunt v. Printup, 28 Ga. 297. And see Seaton v. Cordray, Wright (Ohio), 102; Ford v. Williams, 24 N. Y. (10 Smith) 359; 13 N. Y. (3 Kern.) 577. To sustain an action against an attorney for acts done in the prosecution of his client's rights, it must be shown that such acts were malicious and without foundation. Wigg v. Simonton, 12 Rich. (S. C.) 583.

Where an attorney procures money to be advanced by a third person, in the prosecution of an action, without attempting to pledge the credit of his client therefor, the attorney alone is responsible to such third person. Bell v. Mason, 10 Vt. 509.

An attorney may also incur liability for costs, fees of officers, witnesses, etc. Thus, in Georgia, where an attorney institutes a suit for a plaintiff living out of the State, he is liable, if the suit is dismissed or the plaintiff cast, for all costs. Carmichael v. Pendleton, Dudley (Ga.), 173. And in New York, an attorney is liable for costs to the amount of $100, when he proceeds in a suit after the removal of his client from the State, whether the costs accrued before or after such removal (Wright v. Black, 2 Wend. 258; see Boyce v. Bates, 8 How. 495); so, where one is made lessor in ejectment without his authority, the plaintiff's attorney, and not he, is liable for the costs (People v. Bradt, 6 Johns. 318); and the costs of an irregularity arising from the gross ignorance or negligence of the attorney will be charged upon him personally (Kane v. Van Vranken, 5 Paige, 62; Er parte Robbins, 63 N. C. 309; see Cushman v. Brown, 6 Paige, 539; Powell v. Kane, 5 id. 260; 2 Edw. 450); so courts have the right to punish gross violations of decency and decorum on the part of