4 have heard in due time from the bar; or to show quickness of conceit1 in cutting off evidence or counsel too short; or to prevent information by questions, though pertinent. The parts of a judge in hearing are four to direct the evidence; to moderate length, repetition, or impertinency of speech; to recapitulate, select, and collate the material. points of that which hath been said; and to give the rule3 or sentence. Whatsoever is above these is too much; and proceedeth either of glory and willingness to speak, or of impatience to hear, or of shortness of memory, or of want of a stayed and equal attention. It is a strange thing to see that the boldness of advocates should prevail with judges; whereas they should imitate God, in whose seat they sit, who represseth the presumptuous, and giveth grace to the modest.5 But it is more strange, that judges should have noted favourites, which cannot but cause multiplication of fees, and suspicion of by-ways. There is due from the judge to the advocate some commendation and gracing, where causes are well handled and fair pleaded; especially towards the side which obtaineth not; for that upholds in the client the reputation of his counsel, and beats down in him the conceit of his cause. There is likewise due to the public a civil reprehension of advocates, where there appeareth cunning counsel, gross neglect, slight information, indiscreet pressing, or an over-bold defence. And let not the counsel at the bar chop with the judge, nor wind himself into the handling 5 Who represseth, &c.] James iv. 6; 1 Pet. v. 4. 'God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble.' The conceit] The high notion or conception he had formed. 8 Chop] Bandy words or petty arguments. Hence the expression to chop logic. To chop originally meant to change or exchange. of the cause anew, after the judge hath declared his sentence; but, on the other side, let not the judge meet the cause half way, nor give occasion to the party to say, his counsel or proofs were not heard. Thirdly, for that that concerns clerks and ministers: The place of justice is a hallowed place; and therefore not only the bench, but the foot-pace' and precincts, and purprise2 thereof, ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption; for, certainly, grapes (as the Scripture saith) will not be gathered of thorns or thistles; neither can justice yield her fruit with sweetness amongst the briers and brambles of catching and polling clerks and ministers. The attendance of courts is subject to four bad instruments. First, certain persons that are sowers of suits: which make the court swell, and the country pine. The second sort is of those that engage courts in quarrels of jurisdiction, and are not truly amici curiæ,5 but parasiti curia, in puffing a court up beyond her bounds for their own scraps and advantage. The third sort is of those that may be accounted the left hands of courts; persons that are full of nimble and sinister tricks and shifts, whereby they pervert the plain and direct courses of courts, and bring justice into oblique lines and labyrinths. And the fourth is the poller and exacter of fees; which justifies the common resemblance of the courts of justice to the bush, whereunto while the sheep flies for defence in weather, he is sure to lose part of his fleece. On the other side, an ancient clerk, skilful in precedents, wary in proceeding, and understanding in the business of the court, is an excellent finger of a court, and doth many times point the way to the judge himself. Fourthly, for that which may concern the Sovereign and Estate: Judges ought, above all, to remember the conclusion of the Roman Twelve Tables, Salus populi suprema lex; and to know that laws, except they be in order to that end, are but things captious, and oracles not well inspired. Therefore it is a happy thing in a State, when Kings and States do often consult with judges; and again, when judges do often consult with the King and State: the one, when there is matter of law intervenient in business of State; the other, when there is some consideration of State intervenient in matter of law; for many times the things deduced2 to judgment may be meum and tuum, when the reason and consequence thereof may trench to point of Estate.3 I call matter of Estate, not only the parts of Sovereignty, but whatsoever introduceth any great alteration or dangerous precedent; or concerneth manifestly any great portion of people. And let no man weakly conceive, that just laws and true policy have any antipathy; for they are like the spirits and sinews, that one moves with the other. Let judges also remember, that Solomon's throne was supported by lions on both sides;5 let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne: being circumspect, that they do not check or oppose any points of Sovereignty. Let not judges also be so ignorant of their own right as to think there is not left to them, as a principal part of their office, a wise use and application of laws; for they may remember what the apostle saith of a greater law than theirs: Nos scimus quia lex bona est, modo quis ea utatur legitime. 1 Salus Populi, &c.] The weal of the people is the supreme law. Bacon erred in referring this to the Tables compiled by the Decemvirs; the sentence is Cicero's, De Leg. iii. 3. 2 Deduced] Brought, or referred. May trench, &c.] Lat. Ad rationes Statûs penetret. The spirits] The vital spirits. See p. 32, note I, 5 Solomon's throne, &c.] 1 Kings x. 19. Nos scimus, &c.] 1 Tim. i. 8. We know that the law is good if a man use it lawfully.' LVII. OF ANGER. To seek to extinguish anger utterly is but a bravery' of the Stoics. We have better oracles: Be angry, but sin not : let not the sun go down upon your anger.2 2 Anger must be limited and confined, both in race3 and in time. We will first speak how the natural inclination and habit, to be angry, may be attempered and calmed; secondly, how the particular motions of anger may be repressed, or at least refrained1 from doing mischief; thirdly, how to raise anger or appease anger in another. For the first: there is no other way but to meditate and ruminate well upon the effects of anger, how it troubles man's life. And the best time to do this is to look back upon anger when the fit is thoroughly over. Seneca saith well that anger is like ruin, which breaks itself upon that it falls. The Scripture exhorteth us to possess our souls in patience. Whosoever is out of patience is out of possession of his soul. Men must not turn bees: animasque in vulnere ponunt. Anger is certainly a kind of baseness; as it appears well in the weakness of those subjects in whom it reigns, children, women, old folks, sick folks. Only men must beware that they carry their anger rather with scorn than with fear; so that they may seem rather to be above the injury than below it: which is a thing easily done, if a man will give law to himself in it. For the second point: the causes and motives of anger are chiefly three. First, to be too sensible of hurt; for no man is angry that feels not himself hurt; and, therefore, tender and delicate persons must needs be oft angry; they have so many things to trouble them, which more robust natures have little sense of. The next is the apprehension and construction of the injury offered, to be in the circumstances thereof full of contempt. For contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself. And therefore when men are ingenious in picking out circumstances of contempt, they do kindle their anger much. Lastly, opinion of the touch of a man's reputation doth multiply and sharpen anger. Wherein the remedy is, that a man should have, as Gonsalvo3 was wont to say, telam honoris crassiorem. But in all refrainings of anger, it is the best remedy to win time, and to make a man's self believe that the opportunity of his revenge is not yet come, but that he foresees a time for it; and so to still himself in the meantime, and reserve it. To contain anger from mischief, though it take hold of a man, there be two things whereof you must have special caution: the one, of extreme bitterness of words; especially if they be aculeate and proper; for communia maledicta3 are nothing so much; and again, that in anger a man reveal no secrets; for that makes him not fit for society. The other, that you do not peremptorily break off in any business in a fit of anger: but howsoever you show bitterness, do not act anything that is not revocable. For raising and appeasing anger in another: it is done The apprehension, &c.] The apprehending and construing. The Latin has Si quis curiosus et perspicax sit in interpretatione. 2 The touch] The wounding, or sullying. • Gonsalvo] Viceroy of Naples. Died in 1515. ▲ Telam honoris crassiorem] A more substantial web of honour. Compare the Advancement, II., 'Gonsalvo said, the honour of a soldier should be e tela crassiore, and not so fine as that everything should catch in it and endanger it.' • Communia maledicta] General revilings. |