better than his Majesty knows them himself, and who disregard the clear and explicit statement of Germany's naval policy contained in the preamble of the Navy Bill of 1900, are apparently also better informed about Germany's shipbuilding capacity than is the head of the German Admiralty, Admiral Tirpitz. Admiral Tirpitz expressly declared in the Reichstag that it was not true that Great Britain built warships more quickly than Germany; but that, on the contrary, Germany built warships more quickly than Great Britain. The semi-official naval yearbook, Nauticus, and the semi-official naval monthly, Marine Rundschau, have given exact calculations of the building times of a large number of British and German warships, which absolutely confirm Admiral Tirpitz's contention, that Germany builds her warships more quickly than does Great Britain. The first German Dreadnought was launched seven months after she was laid down, and her successors are to be built even more rapidly. Furthermore, according to Die Flotte, for August 1907, five private German shipbuilders have declared that they are able to lay down every year seventeen Dreadnoughts, and to complete them within from twenty to twenty-four months. Nevertheless, the advocates of naval economy persist in speaking of Germany's shipbuilding inferi ority, and in assuring the British public that Germany requires three years or more to build a Dreadnought.

As the German programme stands at present, Germany will lay down four Dreadnoughts and Invincibles every year during the next three years, and then she will lay down only three. That programme will very likely be considerably exceeded, especially if the British Government shows a desire to withdraw from the race for naval supremacy by making puerile proposals of naval disarmament which serve only to strengthen Germany's determination to outbuild this country. The British disarmament proposals were declared impractical and absurd by the leading organs of the Conservative, Liberal, and Clerical parties of Germany, and even the German Socialists, who favour disarmament in the abstract, exposed the childish proposals of the Liberal Government to well-deserved ridicule. The Vorwärts, for instance, wrote:

With the greatest number of the Liberal advocates of disarmament, their point of view originates simply in the consideration that strong naval and military armaments demand more and more from England's purse and her human material, whilst England possesses all that she can wish for, and has therefore nothing to gain from fresh conquests. All over the world she has the most valuable colonies. She is in that satisfied frame of mind which makes the fortunate winner at cards say: 'Let us leave off, I am tired of playing any longer,' and the thing is, therefore, to secure what she has got, and to diminish her heavy financial burdens. This desire is comprehensible, but the other Powers will hardly respect it. SocialDemocracy is very much in sympathy with the disarmament idea, but no amount of sympathy can get over the fact that in the world as at present constituted there is little chance of a general disarmament. The conception that war is

only a product of human unreason is on the same level as the idea that revolutions are only mental aberrations of the masses. War is rooted in the opposing interests of the nations, as are revolutions in the opposing interests of the classes.

There is no hope for England to secure her possessions and her peace cheaply by a piece of paper. She can secure them only by her armed strength.

The foregoing pages should prove to the most sceptical that the vast naval preparations of Germany are directed against Great Britain, that Germany is determined to challenge Great Britain's naval supremacy, that the British Empire is approaching a period of extreme danger, that the nation may within a few years be placed before the alternative of either abandoning its empire, its influence, and perhaps its freedom to its rival without a struggle, or of fighting for its very existence with perhaps the most dangerous Power which has ever challenged this country.

German shipbuilding programmes are habitually exceeded by the Government, and the present shipbuilding programme will hardly prove an exception to the rule. The shipbuilding programme of Germany is considered to be totally inadequate by many leading German politicians and writers. Hence they have urged the Government to lay down in every year six ships of the Dreadnought type instead of four. In Germany the belief is freely expressed that the German shipbuilding programme will soon again be enlarged, and that the present programme has not been made larger in order to avoid arousing prematurely the suspicion of Great Britain. The German Emperor's 'private and political' letter to Lord Tweedmouth, which admittedly dealt with the shipbuilding policy of Great Britain, and which was written at the very time when the British shipbuilding programme was being considered by the Cabinet, had apparently the same object. The English newspapers were wrong in complaining at the Emperor's 'secret machinations.' Diplomacy is not guided by the principles of a cricket match, and we ought to be grateful to Lord Tweedmouth for his timely indiscretion in showing the Emperor's letter to other persons, an indiscretion which was calculated to defeat the Emperor's object, and which, if it was intentional, as seems likely, was highly praiseworthy, although it may have greatly mortified his Imperial correspondent.

The question now arises: What steps ought Great Britain to take in view of Germany's naval policy? According to Mr. Balfour and to Mr. Asquith, Great Britain will at the end of 1911 have afloat twelve ships of the Dreadnought and Invincible type, whilst Germany will have thirteen. However, Germany is not satisfied with merely a numerical superiority. The German ships will not measure 18,000 tons as originally intended, but considerably more than 20,000 tons. Each German battleship is designed to outclass in speed and armament its British prototype.

Unfortunately the thoughtful, authoritative and strictly fair article of Sir William White, the late Director of Naval Construction, which appeared in the last issue of this Review, makes it perfectly evident to all that the present Government is starving the fleet not only in the provision of Dreadnoughts, but also in the provision of other ships and of those works and appliances which are indispensable in modern naval war. Although the shipbuilding programme of Great Britain is quite insufficient in itself, only 10 per cent. of the money applied to construction will be spent during the present financial year. On destroyers costing 64,000l. each only 4000l. are to be expended this year, and the small fast cruisers voted, which are indispensable for the protection of British commerce, are to be begun only at the end of the financial year. Germany is rapidly building docks for the accommodation of her Dreadnoughts regardless of expense. On the East Coast of Great Britain, the coast facing Germany, there is not a single dock to be found in which Dreadnoughts can be repaired. Besides the two naval harbours on the East Coast, Chatham and Sheerness, are most unsatisfactory as naval bases, a fact which is known to every naval officer. Under these circumstances the position of Great Britain towards Germany is, as regards naval bases, a dangerous one. Nevertheless, out of the 3,250,000l. which are supposed to be required for converting Rosyth into a first-class naval base-the sum needed for equipping it will probably exceed 5,000,000l.—only 30,0007. are to be provided during 1908–1909. On the South Coast of England the position is almost as unsatisfactory as it is on the East Coast. For the entrance lock at Portsmouth, which is not large enough to admit ships of the Dreadnought class, 1,000,000l. is needed. Yet only 65,000l. is to be spent during the ensuing year. Futhermore, naval stores and ammunition have been depleted to a dangerous extent. Sir William White proves that at least 1,500,000l. worth of naval stores have been drawn from the home depots without replace ment. Lastly, the money applied to the repair of the fleet appears to be insufficient. Germany's naval policy is met with paper programmes. The next naval war will find Great Britain unprepared, unless the Government abandons its policy of make-believe.

During a long time it has been the settled policy of the Liberal party to starve the fleet in order to be able to pose as champions of peace and economy with their supporters, and to declaim against the 'reckless wastefulness' of the Unionists and their 'bloated armaments' as soon as these tried to make good the neglect of their predecessors. From the party politician's point of view the traditional policy of the Liberals was very useful. It is true that incidentally it imperilled the safety of the empire, but that was apparently a minor consideration. At present the Liberals are again practising naval economy at the cost of national security. Will they allow Germany to obtain a temporary naval superiority which may become a per

manent one, and which may involve this country in the greatest dangers, in order to gain a trick in the party game? Will it not be madness, in view of the evident drift and the officially declared aim of Germany's naval policy, to allow Germany to outbuild this country in first-class battleships? Will it not be an almost equally great madness for this country to be satisfied with but a small margin of naval superiority over Germany, and thus allow her to hope that by a special effort she might succeed in outbuilding Great Britain? Will that prospect not give her an inducement constantly to enlarge her programme and thus accelerate the mad shipbuilding race? Would it not be a wiser economy to demonstrate to Germany at once that naval competition with Great Britain is hopeless for her by laying down the doctrine that for every German ship voted Great Britain will lay down two?

It is not sufficient that Great Britain possesses merely a supremacy over Germany in first-class battleships. She must possess an overwhelming supremacy. Accident, floating mines, a surprise attack by torpedo boats, a mistake of a captain or an error of judgment on the part of an admiral-for we cannot count upon always having a Nelson upon our side-may destroy or temporarily cripple a few of our best ships, and might convert a theoretical superiority into a very real inferiority. Besides, some of our own Dreadnoughts and Invincibles may in case of an Anglo-German war have to be detached in order to protect British interests in other directions. For these reasons it is necessary that the doctrine should be laid down that for every German battleship Great Britain will build two, and preparations should immediately be made to secure that by the end of 1911 not twelve but twenty-six British Dreadnoughts and Invincibles will be ready to meet the German thirteen.

In view of the growing disproportion in the increase of British and of German wealth-during the last year German savings-banks deposits have increased by about 30,000,000l., whilst the British savings-banks deposits have increased by only 430,000l.—and the evident economic decay of Great Britain which these and many other figures I might give prove, it is clear that the question whether Germany will outbuild Great Britain, or whether Great Britain will outbuild Germany, is a purely financial one. Great Britain has no monopoly of naval ability. The longest purse can build the strongest fleet. Mr. Lloyd-George's amendment of the Patent Laws, which no longer allow foreign manufacturers who hold British patents to manufacture abroad, has caused some important patent-protected German industries to migrate to this country, and these German industries, as the late President of the Board of Trade has told us, will give occupation to thousands of British working men. The capital so transferred from Germany to Great Britain is said to amount already to 25,000,000! An amendment of the Fiscal Policy of Great Britain, sufficiently high

protective duties for our industries, will compel German industries which now import their productions into Great Britain to migrate wholesale to this country. With them a large part of Germany's wealth will be transferred to this country, the flight of British capital towards Protectionist countries will cease, English industries will flourish again, and Germany will no longer financially be able to dispute Great Britain's naval supremacy. A strong tariff will pay for a strong fleet, and enable us to preserve our independence, wealth, and empire. The latent resources of Great Britain and her. Colonies are ample. All that Great Britain desires is to preserve and develop her country and possessions. All that she may desire from Germany she can obtain by means of a tariff. Therefore, a strong tariff will make an Anglo-German War senseless on the part of Great Britain and impossible on the part of Germany, whose resources will be crippled when Great Britain introduces Protection. Hence a strong Protective tariff may prove a stronger safeguard of Great Britain's peace and independence than her Navy, the most satisfactory alliances and treaties of arbitration, and the most cordial assurances of friendship and good will towards Great Britain on the part of the German Emperor.

J. ELLIS BARKER.