the French army in Flanders, had naturally to be informed about the movements and despatch of the troops under his orders, so as to be ready to fill up the gaps caused by those who were leaving Flanders to take part in the expedition. The Duc de Fitzjames, who was then under orders to join Charles Edward in Scotland, had also to be told that his services would not be required there, as the Prince was then in England; but that he was to hold himself in readiness to join this expedition. On the whole the secret was well kept for the first few weeks. There were few English men-of-war or cruisers to be seen in the Channel; and it is quite possible that a crossing might have been effected without exciting the suspicion of the British Admiralty if only everything had been ready in time.

At last the preparations were so far advanced that the War Office considered itself entitled to order the Duc de Richelieu, the grand-nephew of the great Cardinal, who had been chosen to take command, to join his forces at Boulogne. He had just distinguished himself, according to some authorities, by turning the fortune of war at the battle of Fontenoy in favour of the French. He had not only himself strongly urged but actually led the charge which, it was believed, had finally won the day. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether he was the best selection that could have been made. He was then in the prime of life, but, although a man of great courage and resource on the field of battle, he lacked the capacity for organising an invasion which required not only the most elaborate preparations, but the decision to seize the favourable moment when it arrived. Marshal Saxe, though he was often described as a slow and heavy German, and possessed neither the brilliant wit nor showy talents of Richelieu, might possibly have succeeded where the other failed. As Argenson himself said, Saxe saw the situation from only one point of view, and that was the right one. The art of war was a much simpler thing than one thought; and Saxe had mastered its principles. He did not, like his more brilliant rival, get discouraged by adverse circumstances, and abandon one policy for several others in turn.

Richelieu had always had a remarkable career, for he got himself talked about at the age of twelve, and had

been thrice imprisoned in the Bastille before he was twenty-one; once for having made love to the Duchess of Burgundy, the King's mother, a second time for a duel, and lastly for conspiracy against the safety of the State. His character was deplorable. He had been the boon companion of the Prince Regent in some of his worst excesses, and had by his advice and example done much to demoralise the King at an early age. He was a great favourite with women, and owed his success mostly to their patronage. Anne de Pléneuf, Marquise de Prie, who, as mistress of the Duc de Bourbon, ruled France from 1723 to 1726, had him appointed ambassador to Vienna, where Morosoni describes him as the handsomest man and most gallant gentleman at Court, celebrated for his love affairs, which have caused the greatest scandal.' He had indeed the most fascinating manners and expressed himself with the greatest ease and eloquence. In 1743 he again owed much of his favour to the protection of the Duchesse de Chateauroux, then the King's mistress.

In spite of all this he was certainly out of place at Boulogne, where another man, with a tithe of his talents but endowed with greater diligence and foresight, could have profited by the opportunities the situation afforded before the English Government got wind of the preparations that were being made at Boulogne and Calais. Richelieu was not ready when these occasions arose; and, when once he perceived that the opportunity had been lost, got hopelessly discouraged. To begin with, his arrival at Boulogne was delayed. He should have reached that place on Dec. 20 at latest; but, instead of going directly thither, he went round by Ostend and Ghent. He wished to give his orders at Ostend, in order to mislead the enemy into the idea that he proposed sailing from Ostend and Dunkirk; and he visited Ghent in order to see Marshal Saxe and obtain from him the loan of a general officer to take command at Calais. When he reached Boulogne the situation was hardly satisfactory. Lally-Tollendal, the Colonel of the Lally regiment of the Irish Brigade and one of his Major-Generals, was down with 'colera morbus' (sic); and, for some unexplained reason, Walsh, on whose shoulders the whole organisation rested, was under arrest. These were, how

ever, but momentary inconveniences. Richelieu at once ordered Walsh to be released; and Lally speedily recovered full health and strength.

But for these and other delays, the Channel might possibly have been crossed and a landing effected on the British coast with the most fruitful results, in so far as Charles Edward was concerned. Everything ought to have been ready by Christmas night; but both the War Office and the Admiralty were behindhand in their preparations. A hard frost, which closed the locks of Bourbourg, was responsible for more than a week's delay. Even then, had Richelieu arrived on the spot on the 20th, or even insisted on starting immediately on his arrival, he might have accomplished something. He himself fully admitted all that these delays had cost him in a letter addressed to Argenson on the 29th, in which he lays particular stress on the absence of his artillery at the crucial moment:

'I could easily have effected a crossing if only my artillery had been at Calais, as the English men-of-war are now anchored in sight of Ostend. I might have done so with the moral certainty of avoiding all accidents, for an Irish officer, whom Lally has sent me, has just followed the whole coastline from Dungeness to Dover. He was pursued by a privateer whom he managed to elude; and this officer, who has brought me a map of all that part of the coast, has seen nothing that could give us the slightest anxiety. If there is no change in the situation, if the winds become as favourable to us as they have been, and the enemy remain in their present state of ignorance, I hope to be in a position in two days to take full advantage of the situation. This, however, must become harder as time goes on; and, if I am to believe M. Bart, or if the enemy gets wind of what is going on, my friends and I will be worthy of all commiseration. I hope to move my artillery this evening and to march my men at the same time. Let us, however, suppose for a moment that some of the artillery has not arrived or is not on board; if only a small quantity of men and guns are missing, I will cross myself by the first favourable wind, and allow them to follow the next day. If, on the other hand, the enemy acquire positive information of what is going on, or by some chance their vessels cross my route, the attempt must prove extremely hazardous. I am taking every precaution imaginable to be well informed on my side, and will act with the

greatest prudence in an undertaking where I am exposed to so much risk and danger.'

He finishes his letter in the following words:

'M. de Sechelles has arrived at Calais to complete the supplies and to repair a most unfortunate mistake-the absence of those hundred horses belonging to the artillery which you had promised me, which are on my establishment, but which I have not seen, and I do not know where to find them.'

It is not very easy to apportion the blame for this blunder, which certainly proved fatal to the success of the expedition. Aunay complains that, notwithstanding all the representations he had made to Walsh, there was much confusion in the order for the embarkation of the artillery; and that Lally was unable to give any other answer than that it was Walsh's business, and that he ought to be left alone to do as he thought best. Argenson, for his part, argued that all the artillery ought to have been either at Dunkirk or ready to go thither from St Omer and Ypres, where he had made arrangements for having it loaded on barges. If this had not been done, Aunay was himself the responsible party, as he had been told to come to an understanding on this very subject with Bart and Lally. Argenson adds that Richelieu was also to blame for the delay, as he had always wished to collect his artillery at Dunkirk so as to mask by this manoeuvre the real port of embarkation. Argenson repudiates at the same time all responsibility for the want of horses. Had not Richelieu said he would not require any, as he hoped to commandeer them on his landing in England? And the requisite harness for this purpose had been added to the supplies which had been despatched to headquarters.

It would not be profitable to follow this controversy further, or to attempt to determine how far Argenson and Richelieu were respectively responsible for the delays. One thing is certain, that, if only a landing had been effected even on December 28 (N.S.), the story of Charles Edward's march into England might have ended differently. In considering this matter we are always exposed to a certain amount of confusion through the difference between the Julian calendar, still observed at that time in

England, and the Gregorian calendar, which had long been adopted in France. Charles Edward had, according to English calculations, arrived at Derby on December 4, and did not start on his retreat until the 6th. The 28th (N.S.) corresponded with the 17th (O.S.) on which day the Prince was in Westmorland, and Carlisle still held out for the Jacobite cause.

It has been argued that the landing of a foreign force might have roused the country to the utmost heights of patriotic fervour; but this is very far from certain. The House of Hanover was by no means popular with the masses of the people; and a third of the invading army consisted of men who, although Irish for the most part, still were born British subjects, and could speak the language of the country. When, in addition to this, we bear in mind that the Duke of York, a descendant of that race which had ruled England for nearly threequarters of a century, one of the handsomest princes in Europe, with the most engaging manners, had already arrived at Dunkirk and was to have accompanied the expedition, no one can say that it was an absolutely forlorn hope. His brother had landed in Scotland with a very small following, and yet his personality and his descent had not only roused the loyalty of the Scottish Highlanders, but had overcome all opposition until he got within easy marching distance of the capital.

Richelieu, on his side, must bear his share of the blame for the failure. The artillery had arrived at St Omer and at Ypres at the end of November, and could have been despatched at the very shortest notice to Dunkirk, where he wished to detain it with the object of masking the real port of embarkation. He wished, however, to make assurance doubly sure, as he was convinced that, if only the wind remained in the proper quarter and the English Government continued in ignorance of his movements, he ought to get his artillery to Calais in time and effect the crossing under the most favourable auspices. But many of his followers were becoming disheartened by their first rebuff and were fast losing faith in the enterprise. Bart, the son of that Jean Bart who half a century earlier had wrought such havoc among British ships, had quite changed his mind, He doubted whether it was as easy to effect a crossing