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by interpretation or repeal by future statutes. And those that I shall mind your lordships of, are so direct in point, that they can bear no other exposition at all, and sure I am they are still in force.

The first of them is the Grand Charter of the Liberties of England, first granted in the 17th of king John, and renewed in the 9 Hen. 3, and since confirmed in parliament ab ve 30 times. The words are these, ch. 29. "Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut disscisietur de libero tenemento suo, vel libertatibus,

Possessions, which doth preserve, as sacred, that meum et tuum, that is the nurse of industry, and mother of courage, and without which, there can be no justice, of which meum et tuum is the proper object. But the undoubted birthright of free Subjects, hath lately not a little been invaded and prejudiced by pressures, the more grievous, because they have been pursued by imprisonment, contrary to the franchises of this land; and when, according to the laws and statutes of this realm, redress hath heen sought for in a legal way, by demanding Habeas Corpus from the Judges, and a dis-vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut utlagerecharge or trial according to the law of the land, success bath failed; that now enforceth the commons, in this present parliament assembled, to examine by acts of parliament, precedents and reasons, the truth of the English Subjects Liberty, which I shall leave to learned gentlemen, whose weighty Arguments, I hope, will leave no place in your lordships memories, for the errors and infirmities of your humblest servant, that doth thankfully acknowledge the great favour of your honourable and patient

attention.

MR. LITTLETON'S ARGUMENT.

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tur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terræ.'

These words, nullus liber homo,' &c. are express enough, yet it is remarkable that Matthew Paris, an author of special credit, doth observe, fol. 432, that the Charter of 9 II. S, was the very same as that of 17 John, in nullo 'dissimilis' are his words; and that of king John he setteth down verbatim, fol. 342, and there the words are directly Nec eum in

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carcerum mittemus:' and such a corruption 9 H. 3, and 28 E. 1, when this Charter was as is now in print, might easily happen betwixt first exemplified, but certainly there is suffici

Made by the command of the House of Commons out of Acts of Parliament, and authorities of law, expounding the same, at the ent left in that which is extant to decide this first Conference with the Lords, concerning question. For the words are, 'That no Freethe Liberty of the Person of every Freeman.* man shall be taken or imprisoned, but by the My lords; Upon the occasions delivered by lawful judgment of his peers;' which is by a the gentleman that last spake, your lordships jury of peers, ordinary jurors, or others, who have heard the Commons have taken into their are their peers, or by the law of the laud: serious consideration the matter of Personal which words,Law of the land,' must of Liberty, and after long debate thereof on divers necessity be understood in this nation, to be days, as well by solemn arguments, as single by due process of the law, and not the law propositions of doubts and answers, to the end of the land generally, or otherwise it would no scruple might remain in any man's breast comprehend bond-men (whom we call Vilunsatisfied, they have upon a full search, and leins) who are excluded by the word 'Liber;' clear understanding of all things pertinent for the general law of the land doth allow their to the question, unanimously declared: That lords to imprison them at their pleasure without no Freeman ought to be committed or detained cause, wherein they only differ from the freein prison by the command of the King or Privy-men in respect of their persons, who cannot be Council, or any other, unless some cause of the commitment, detainer, or restraint be expressed, for which by law he ought to be committed, detained, or restrained. And they have sent me, with other of their members, to represent unto your lordships the true grounds of such their Resolution, and have charged me particularly, leaving the reasons of law and precedents for others, to give your lordships satisfaction, that this Liberty is established and confirmed by the whole state, the king, the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, by several acts of parliament; the authority whereof is so great, that it can receive no answer, save

imprisoned without a cause. And that this is the true understanding of these words, 'Per legem terræ,' will more plainly appear by divers other statutes that I shall use, which do expound the law accordingly. And though the words of this Grand Charter be spoken in the third person, yet they are not to be understood of suits betwixt party and party, at least not of them alone, but even of the king's suits against his subjects, as will appear by the occasion of getting of that Charter, which was by reason of the differences betwixt those kings and their people, and therefore properly to be applied unto their power over them, and not to ordinary questions betwixt subject and subject. This Argument of Mr. Littleton is printed Secondly, The word per legale judicium in Cottoni Posthuma;' as if made by sir Ro-parium suorum,' immediately preceding the bert Cotton, bart. But whosoever consults the other of per legem terræ,' are meant of Trials Historians of those times, will find, that Diggs, at the king's suit, and not at the prosecution of Littleton, Selden and Coke, were the four a subject. And therefore, if a peer of the realm lawyers appointed by the House of Commons be arraigned, at the suit of the king, upon an to manage that memorable Conference. Indictment of murder, he shall be tried by his

peers, that is nobles; but if he be appealed of murder by a subject, his trial shall be by an ordinary Jury of 12 ficeholders, as appeareth in 10 E. 4, 6, 33 II. 8, Brooke Title Trials 142. Stan. Cor. li. 3, ca. 1, fol. 152. and in 10 E. 4, 6, it is said, such is the meaning of Magna Charta, for the same reason: therefore as per judicium parium suorum' extends to the king's suit, so shall these words per legem terræ.'

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And in 8 E. 2, rot. parl. u. 7, there is a Petition that a Writ under the privy-seal went to the guardians of the great seals, to cause lands to be seized into the king's hands, by force of which there went a writ out of the Chancery to the Escheator, to seize, against the form of the Grand Charter, that the king nor his ministers shall out no man of his freehold without reasonable judgment, and the party was restored to his land: which shewed the statute did extend to the king.

There was no invasion upon this personal liberty, till the time of Edw. S, which was soon resented by the subject; for in 5 E. 3, c. 9, it

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is ordained in these words: It is enacted that no man from henceforth shall be attached by any accusation, nor fore-judged of life or limb, " nor his lands, tenements, goods, nor chattels, seized into the king's hands, against the form of the Great Charter, and the law of the land.' 25 E. 3, c. 4, it is more full, and doth expound the words of the Grand Charter, and is thus: Whereas it is contained in the Grand Charter of the franchises of England, that no freeman "shall be imprisoned, nor put out of his freehold, nor free custom, unless it be by the law of the land; it is awarded, assented, and established, that from hence none shall be taken by petition or suggestion, made to our lord the king, or to his council, unless it be by Indictment, or presentment of his good and lawful people of the same neighbourhood; which such deeds shall be done in due manner, or by process 'made by writ original at the common law, nor that none be outed of his franchises, nor of his freehold, unless he be duly brought in to an'swer, and fore-judged of the same by the course ' of the law; and if any thing be done against the same, it shall be redressed and holden for nought'

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Here your lordships see the usual words, the law of the land,' are rendered by due proces of the law.

36 E. S, Rot. Parl. n. 9. Amongst the pe titions of the commons, one of them being translated into English out of French, is thus; first, that the Great Charter, and the Charter of the Forest, and other Statutes made in his time, and the time of his progenitors, for the profit of him, and his commonalty, be well and firmly kept; and put in due execution, without putting disturbance, or making arrest contrary to them by special command, or in other manner.

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The answer to the Petition, which makes it an act of parliament, is, Our lord the king, by the assent of the prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and the commonalty, hath ordained and established, that the said Charters and Statutes be held, and put in execution, according to the said 'Petition.' It is observable, that the Statutes were to be put in execution according to the said Petition, which is, that no arrest should be made contrary to the Statutes, by special com

mand.

This concludes the question, and is of as great force as if it were printed, for the Parliament Roll is the true warrant of an act, and many are omitted out of the Books, that are extant in the Roll.

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S6 E. 3, Rot. Parl. n. 22, explaineth it further; for there the Petition is, Whereas it is 'contained in the Grand Charter and other Statutes, that no man be taken or imprisoned by special command without Indictment, or other due process to be made by the law, and ' oftentimes it hath been, and yet is, many are hindered, taken and imprisoned without Indictment, or other process made by the law upon them, as well of things done out of the Forest of the king, as for other things; that it would therefore please our said lord to command those to be delivered, which are so taken by special command against the form of the Charter and Statutes as aforesaid.'

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The Answer is, The king is pleased, that if“ any man find himself grieved, that he come and make his complaint, and right shall be done unto him.' 37 E. 3, c. 18, agreeth in substance with them: it saith, Though it be 'contained in the Great Charter, that no man be taken nor imprisoned, nor put out of his 'freehold without process of the law; neverthe'less divers people make false suggestions to the king himself, as well for malice as otherwise, whereat the king is often grieved, and divers of the realm put in damage, against the form ' of the same Charter; wherefore it is ordained, that all they which make such suggestions, shall be sent with the same suggestions, to the 'Chancellor, Treasurer, and his grand council, and that they there find surety to pursue their suggestions, and incur the same pain that the other should have had, if he were attainted, in 'case that the suggestion be found evil; and that then process of law be made against

28 E. 3, c. 3, it is more direct, this liberty being followed with fresh suit by the subject, where the words are not many, but very full and significant; That no man, of what state or condition soever he be, shall be put out of his lands or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned,hem without being taken or imprisoned,against nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he 'the form of the said Charter, and other Sta* be brought in to answer by due process of law.' 'tutes.' Here the law of the land in the Grand

Charter is explained to be without process of law.

42 E. 3, c. 13. At the request of the Commons by their Petition put forth in this parlinment, to eschew mischief and damage done to divers of his commons by false accusers, which oftentimes have made their accusations, more for revenge and singular benefit, than for the profit of the king, or of his people; of which accused persons some have been taken and caused to come before the king's council by writ, and otherwise upon grievous pains against the law; it is assented and accorded for the good governance of the commons, That no man be put to answer without presentment before justices or matter of record, or by due process and writ original, according to the old law of the land: and if any thing from hence be done to the contrary, it shall be void in the law, and holden for

error.

But this is better in the Parliament Roll, where the Petition and Answer, which makes the Act, are set down at large, 42 E. 3, Rot. Parl. n. 12.

The Petition.

'Item. Because that many of your commons are hurt and destroyed by false accusers, who make their accusations more for their revenge and particular gain, than for the ⚫ profit of the king, or of his people : and those that are accused by them, some are taken, and others are made to come before the king's council by writ, or other command⚫ment of the king, upon grievous pains, contrary to the law: That it would please our lord the king, and his good council, for the just government of his people, to ordain, that if hereafter any accuser propose any matter for the profit of the king, that the same matter be sent to the justices of the one bench or of the other, or the Assizes, to be enquired and ⚫ determined according to the law; and if it • concern the accuser or party, that he take his 'suit at the Common Law; and that no man

* be put to answer without presentment before the justices or matter of record, and by due 'process and original writ, according to the ancient law of the land. And if any thing ⚫ henceforward be done to the contrary, that it 'be void in law, and held for error.'

Here by due process and original writ, according to the ancient law of the land, is meant the same thing, as per legem terræ,' in Magna Charta; and the abuse was, they were put to answer by the commandment of the king.

The King's Answer is thus : Because that this Article is an Article of the Grand Charter, the king willeth that this 'be done, as the Petition doth demand.' By this appeareth that' per legem terræ,' in Magna Charta, is meant by due process of the law.

Thus your lordships have heard Acts of Parliament in the point. But the Statute of Westminster, 1. c. 15, is urged to disprove this opinion, where it is expressly said, That a man is

not repleviable, who is committed by the command of the king; therefore the command of the king, without any cause shewed, is sufficient to cominit a man to prison. And because the strength of the Argument may appear, and the Answer be better understood, I will read the words of the Statute, which are thus:

And forasmuch as sheriffs and others, which have taken and kept in prison persons detected for felony, and oftentimes have let out by replevin such as were not repleviable, and have kept in prison such as were repleviable, 'because they would gain of the one party, and grieve the other; and forasmuch as be'fore this time it was not certainly determined what persons were repleviable, and what not, but only those that were taken for the death of a man, or by the commandment of the king, or of his justices, or for the forest; it is provided, and by the king commanded, that such prisoners as were before outlawed, and they which have abjured the realm, provers, and 'such as be taken with the manner, and those which have broken the king's prison, thieves openly defamed and known, and such as be appealed by approvers; so long as the approvers are living, and if they be not of good name, and such as be taken for burning of houses feloniously done, or false money, or 'for counterfeiting the king's seal, or persons excommunicate taken at the request of the bishop, or for manifest offences, or for treason touching the king himself, shall be in no wise repleviable by the common writ, or without 'writ.'

But such as be indicted of larceny by inquests taken before sheriffs or bailiffs by their that amounteth not above the value of twelveoffice, or of light suspicion, or of petty larceny, pence, if they were not guilty of some other larceny aforetime, or guilty of receipt of felons, or of commandment, or of force, or of aid of felony done, or guilty of some other trespass, for which one ought not to lose either life or member: and a man appealed by an approver, after the death of the approver; if he henceforth be let out by sufficient surety, wherbe no common thief or defamed, shall from of the sheriff will be answerable, and that with out giving aught of their goods. And if the sheriff, or any other, let any go at large, by surety, that are not repleviable, if he be sheriff hath a fee, which hath keeping of prisons, and or constable, or any other bailiff, or such as thereof be attainted, he shall lose his office and fee for ever. And if the under-sheriff, constable or bailiff, or such as hath fee for keeping of prisons, do it contrary to the will of his lord, or any other bailiff being not of fee, they shall have three years imprisoment, and make a fine at the king's pleasure; and if any man withhold prisoners repleviable, after that they have offered sufficient surety, he shall pay a grievous amercement to the king; and if he take any reward for the deliverance of such, he shall pay double to the prisoner, and also shall pay a grievous amercement to the king.

The Answer.

:

It must be acknowledged, that a man taken by the commandment of the king is not repleviable, for so are the express words of this Statute: but this maketh nothing against the Declaration of the House of Commons; for they say not, the sheriff may replevy such a one by sureties, scilicet manucuptores, but that he is bailable by the king's court of justice for the better apprehending whereof, it is to be known, that there is a difference between repleviable, which is always by the sheriff upon pledges or sureties given, and bailable, which is by a court of record, where the prisoner is delivered to his bail, and they are his gaolers, and may imprison him, and shall suffer for him body for body, as appeareth 33 & 36 Edw. 3, titulo Mainprize 12 & 13, where the difference betwixt Bail and Mainprize is expressly taken. And if the words of the Statute themselves be observed, it will appear plainly, that it extends to the Sheriff and other inferior officers, and doth not bind the hands of the judges.

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The Preamble, which is the key that openeth the entrance into the meaning of the makers of the Law, is, Forasmuch as Sheriffs and others have taken and kept in prison persons detected of felony.' Out of these words I observe, that it nominateth Sheriffs, and then if the Judges should be included, they must be comprehended under that general word, 'others;' which doth not extend to those of an higher rank, but to inferiors, for the best by all courses is first to be named. And therefore if a man bing a Writ of Customs and Services, and name Rents and other things, the general shall not include Homage, which is a personal service, and of an higher nature, but it shall extend to ordinary annual service, 31 E. 1, droit 67. So the Statute of 13 Eliz. c. 10, which beginneth with Colleges, Deans and Chapters, Parsons, Vicars, and concludes with these words, and others having spiritual Promotions,' shall not comprehend Bishops that are of an higher degree, as appeareth in the archbishop of Canterbury's Case, reported by sir Edw. Coke, lib. 2, fol. 46, B.

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And thus much is explained in the very Statute towards the end, when it doth enumerate those who were meant by the word, others, namely, Under-Sheriffs, Constables, Bailiffs, &c.

Again, the words are, Sheriffs and others which have taken and kept in prison.' Now every man knoweth, Judges do neither arrest, nor keep men in prison; that is the office of Sheriffs and other inferior ministers. Therefore this Statute meant such only, and not Judges.

The words are further, That they let out by replevin such as are not repleviable, that is the proper language for a Sheriff; nay, more express afterward in the body of the Statute, that such as are there mentioned, shall in nowise be repleviable by the common Writ, which is 'De homine replegiando,' and is directed to the Sheriff, nor without writ, which is by the

Sheriff ex officio. But that which receives no answer is this, that the command of the Justices, who derive their authority from the crown, is there equal as to this purpose with the command of the king. And therefore by all reasonable construction, it must needs relate to officers that are subordinate to both, as sheriffs, under-sheriffs, bailiffs, constables, and the like. And it were a harsh exposition to say, that the Justices might not discharge their own command, and yet that reason would conclude as much; and that this was meant of the sheriff and other ministers of justice, appears by the Recital, 27 Edw. 1, c. 3, and likewise by Fleta, a Manuscript, so called, because the author lay in the Fleet when he made the Book: for be, l. 2, c. 52, in his Chapter of Turns, and the Views of the Hundred Courts in the Country, setteth down the Articles of the Charges that are there to be inquired of; amongst which, one of them is De replegiabilibus injuste detentis et irreplegiabilibus dimissis;' which cannot be meant of not bailing by the Justices; for what have the inferior courts in the country to do with the acts of the Justices?

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And to make that more plain, he setteth down in that Chapter, that concerneth Sheriffs only, the very statute of Westminster 1, which he translates verbatim out of the French into the Latin; save that he renders taken by the command of the Justices, thus, per judicium Justiciariorum;' and his Preface to the Statute plainly sheweth, that be understood it of Replevin by Sheriffs; for he saith, ‘Qui debent per plegios dimitti, qui non declarat hoc Statutum;' and 'per plegios' is before the Sheriff. But for direct Authority, It is the opinion of Newton, chief justice, 22 Hen. 6, 46, where his words are these: It cannot be intended that the Sheriff did suffer him to go at large by Mainprize; for where one is taken by the 'writ of the king, or the commandment of the king, he is irrepleviable; but in such case his 'friends may come to the Justices from him if he be arrested, and purchase a Supersedeas.' This Judge concludes, that the sheriff cannot deliver him that is taken by the command of the king, for that he is irrepleviable, which is the very word of the statute: but, saith he, his friends may come to the Justices, and purchase a Supersedeas. So he declares the very question, that the Sheriff had no power, but the Justices had power to deliver him that is committed by the king's command, and both the antient and modern practice manifest as much : for he that is taken for the death of a man, or for the Forest, is not repleviable by the sheriff, yet they are ordinarily bailed by the Justices, and were by the king's writs directed to the sheriffs, in the times of Edw. 1 and 2, as appears in the close Rolls, which could not be done if they were not bailable. And it is every day's experience, that the Justices of the King'sbench do bail for murder, and for offences done in the Forest, which they could not do, if the word irrepleviable,' in Westminster 1, were meant of the Justices, as well as of the Sheriffs.

For Authorities that have been offered to prove the contrary, they are in number three. The first is 21 Edw. 3, Rot. 2, which also is in the Book of Pleas in Parliament at the Tower, upon an action there brought, fol. 44. It is not an act of parliament, but a resolution in parliament upon an action there brought, which was usual in those times: and the case is, that Stephen Rabez, the sheriff of the counties of Leicester and Warwick, was questioned, for that he had let at large by surety, amongst others, one William, the son of Walter le Pesons, against the will and command of the king, whereas the king had commanded him by letters under the privy-seal, that he should do no favour to any man that was committed by the earl of Warwick, as that man was; where unto the sheriff answered, that he did it at the request of some of the king's household upon their letters; and because the sheriff did acknowledge the receipt of the king's letters, thereupon he was committed to prison according to the form of the statute.

To this I answer, the sheriff was justly punished, for that he is expressly bound by the statute of Westminster 1, which was agreed from the beginning; but this is no proof, that the Judges had no power to bail this man.

The next Authority is 33 Hen. 6, in the Court of Common Pleas, fol. 28, b. 29, where Robert Poynings, esq. was brought to the bar upon a Capias, and was returned, that he was committed " I per duos de concilio,' (I believe it is misprinted for 'dnos de concilio,' i. e. 'dominos 'de concilio,' which is strongest against what I maintain) pro diversis causis regem tangentib.' And he made an attorney there in an action, whence it is inferred, that the return was good, and the party could not be delivered.

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'be by their ordinary commandment, he is repleviable by the sheriff, if it be not in some of the cases prohibited by the statute.' The answer that I gave unto this is, that Stamford had said nothing whether a man may be committed without cause by the king's command, or whether the Judges ought not to bail him in such case, only that such a one is not repleviable; which is agreed, for that belongs to the Sheriff. And because no man should think he meant any such thing, he concludes the whole sentence touching the command of the King and the Justices, that one committed by the ordinary command of the justice, is repleviable by the sheriff; or at least it appears not that he meant that a man committed by the king, or by the privy-council without cause, should not be bailable by the justices, and he hath given no opinion in this case; what he would have said, if he had been asked the question, cannot be known, neither doth it appear, that, by any thing that he hath said, he meant any such thing as would be inferred out of him. And now, my lords, I have performed the commands of the Commons, and as I conceive shall clear the declaration of personal Liberty, an ancient and undoubted truth, fortified with seven acts of parliament, and not opposed by any statute or authority of law whatsoever.— See Littleton's Precedents after Mr. Selden's.

MR. SELDEN'S ARGUMENT.

My lords; Your lordships have heard from the gentleman that last spake, a great part of the grounds upon which the House of Commons, upon mature deliberation, proceeded to that clear Resolution touching the Right of the Liberty of their Persons. The many acts of parliaments, which are the written laws of the land, and are expressly in the point, have been read and opened, and such objections as have been by some made to them, and some objections also made out of another act of parliament, have been cleared and answered. It may seem now perhaps, my lords, that little remains needful to be further added, for the in

To this the answer is plain: 1. No opinion is delivered in that book, one way or other, upon the return, neither is there any testimony whether he were delivered, or bailed, or not. 2. It appears expressly, that he was brought thither to be charged in an action of debt, at another man's suit, no desire of his own to be delivered, or bailed; and then if he were re-forcement and maintenance of so fundamental manded, it is no way material to the question in hand. But that which is most relied upon, is the Opinion of Stamf. in his Book of Pleas of the Crown, lib. 2, c. 18, f. 72, 73, in his Chapter of Mainprize, where he reciteth the Statute of Westm. 1, c. 15, and then saith thus: By this Statute it appears, that in four 'cases at the Common Law a inan was not re'pleviable; to-wit, those that were taken for the death of a man, by the command of the king, or his justices, or for the forest;' thus far he is most right. Then he goeth on, and saith, As to the command of the king, that is understood by the command of his own mouth, or his council, which is incorporated unto him, and spake with his mouth, or otherwise every Writ or Capias to take a man, which is 'the king's command, would be as much; and as to the command of the Justices, that is ' meant their absolute commandment, for if it

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and established a Right and Liberty belonging to every freeman of the kingdom. But in the examination of questions of Law of Right, besides the laws or acts of parliament, that ought chiefly to direct and regulate every man's judgment, whatsoever hath been put in practice to the contrary, there are commonly used also former Judgments, or Precedents, and indeed have been so used sometimes, that the weight of reason, of law, and of acts of parliament, hath been laid by, and resolutions have been made, and that in this very point, only upon the interpretation and apprehension of precedents. Precedents, my lords, are good inedia, or proofs of illustration or confirmation, where they agree with the express law: but they can never be proof enough to overthrow any one law, much less seven several acts of parliament, as the number of them is for the point. The House of Commons therefore taking into con

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