Privilege of person in

Moreover, upon the principle of furthering terpreted justice, and even holding out invitation to all liberally. persons to attend the Courts, great latitude has been allowed in construing the extent to which this privilege of their person shall be carried. Thus, a man shall not be required, when going to a Session, to proceed in the direct road, and the protection is not forfeited by the allegation, that he went out of the way, because it may be, the party went to buy a horse, victuals, or other necessaries for his journey. Neither is the law so strict in point of time, as to require a person to set out immediately after the trial is over; for where a woman had a trial at Whinchester assizes, which was over at four in the afternoon, and she staid there till after dinner on Saturday; and in the evening at seven, was arrested going home to Portsmouth, which is twenty miles, the Court held that she ought to be discharged, her protection not being expired, and a little deviation, or loitering on the way, would not cancel it.*

And indeed of late years, in all cases where this privilege of person in attending judicial proceedings of all kinds has come in question, the decisions have been uniformly favorable to its extension.†

1

But it seems that if a man be arrested by

* 2 Str. 987.

† 3 East R. 89.-8 Term R. 534.

process out of the Courts at Westminster, the Sessions have no power to discharge him, unless he be so arrested in the face of the Court,* which would be a contempt, and punishable accordingly.

Neither shall a man who attends the Court without any sufficient cause, to do a mere voluntary act there, be privileged in going and returning; as if a defendant go to the Court to confess an indictment, for, there is no occa sion, and no process which should compel him to attend.†

pleading his

own cause.

PLEADERS. Every man has a natural right Person to defend himself, or plead his own cause, which no municipal regulation can deprive him of, without manifest injustice. Whether it may be more prudent for each individual to ex ercise that right, or to entrust his protection to other hands, he, and he alone, ought to have the privilege of determining. But where the

* 2 Hawk. c. 1. + Salk. 544,

It has been a common observation in the Courts, that "the man who advocates his owu cause, has a fool for his "client." There is much levity, but some truth, in the observation, and especially when applied to such persons as are in general the Suitors of the Court of Quarter Session; because both ignorance and prejudice commonly unite to prevent them from discovering the strong points of their case, and of enforc ing them with effect; while a pardonable attachment to the display of irritating circumstances, irrelevant to the proper subject of discussion, distract the attention, and weary the patience of their auditors.

H

Suitors of Courts seek for assistants to advocate their interests, all Courts have claimed, and apparently with reason on their side, the right Advocates. of making regulations, on the condition of complying with which, such advocates should be admitted to plead. In the Courts of Quarter Session, this privilege has been confined, and very properly, to gentlemen of the legal profession; barristers, and attornies. Where the former can be obtained, it has been usual" as the phrase goes," to "silence" the latter; or in other, and more respectful words, to prefer and encourage the superior order.

This preference may have been originally wrong in its principle, but it is unquestionably right in its practical effects; not that it is to be reasonably presumed more actual knowlege can be exhibited by a young barrister, at the commencement of his professional career, than by an expérienced attorney; but because the latter is, perhaps, reluctantly obliged, and frequently unconsciously seduced, to mix, with his professional services, no inconsiderable degree of local prejudice, and jealous irritability; from which the stranger barrister may reasonably be expected to be exempt. Viewing the exercise of this duty, however, as confined to these two descriptions of persons, we have only to see what official engagements operate as a prohibition upon individuals.

Of Barristers it is sufficient to observe, that

they are defined to be "Counsellors learned in the Law," admitted to plead "at the bar, and there to take upon them the protection and defence of clients."* Serjeants and King's counsel, do not usually plead at Sessions, it being considered infra dignitatem; but among Barristers below these degrees, called utter or ouster Barristers, or Barristers without the bar, there seems to be no exception either of law or courtesy, so they be not constituent parts of the Court, as Justices on the Bench, or Clerk of the Peace.

Respecting Attornies, there are many restric- Attornies. tions, both general and particular. "No person shall act as solicitor, attorney, or agent, or sue out any process at any General, or Quarter, Session of the Peace, without being admitted and inrolled according to law, on pain to forfeit 50%. to him who shall sue within twelve months, with treble costs; and if any attorney or solicitor shall permit any person not admitted and inrolled, to make use of his name in such Session, he shall forfeit 504, in like manner.

And no Clerk of the Peace or his deputy, or any under sheriff or his deputy, shall act as a solicitor, attorney, or agent, at any General, or Quarter Session of the Peace of the county or place, where he shall execute his said office, on pain of 50%. as aforesaid."+

* 1 Black. Com. 23.-Wood's Ins. 448. +22 Geo. 2, c. 46.

Prohibitions.

These prohibitions, however, only extend to persons who having some pretensions to act as attornies, have either omitted to entitle themselves to such privilege, by a neglect of the previous forms prescribed by law, admission and inrollment; or who have become disqualified from acting in the capacity of attornies, from having been invested with some office which the law declares to be incompatible. On the latter point the statute referred to is sufficiently specific; for the former ground of disqualification, it is necessary to resort to the other statutes on the subject in a general way, and in the order in which they were passed. The very early ones, however, being considered as obsolete, or irrelevant, it is sufficient to notice the effect of the more modern ones in the following order.

"No recusant convict shall practice as an attorney in any court, on pain of 1007.; half to him that shall sue, and half to the king.*

If an attorney be convicted of having delayed his client's suit, or of having demanded more than fees and disbursments, besides being liable to pay costs and treble damages to his client, he is declared to be "disabled from acting."t "No person convicted of forgery, perjury, or common barretry, can practice as an attorney

* 3 J. 1, c. 5.

† 3 J. 1, c. 7,