General Sessions, although such should intervene.* With respect to the reasonable notice, direct- Reasonable ed by the 9. Geo. 1. What shall be deemed notice. reasonable notice must be regulated by the circumstances of each particular case, but also, in some degree, by the practice of the Court, before which the Appeal comes; for it is incident to every Court to lay down such certain rules for its own proceedings, as will afford the inost general accommodation to its suitors, to which rules, therefore, such suitors are bound to pay a general obedience. And although reasonable notice may not have been given, the Session, cannot for this quash the order of removal; it is only a ground for adjourning the Appeal. Thus in Tr. 10 Geo. 1. the Session, quashed an order of Justices, and assigned for a reason, "that there was not due notice given of the Appeal," pur- suant to the stat. 9 Geo. 1. But by the Court. "The order of Session must be quashed, because due notice not being given was no reason to quash the order of two Justices, though it might be a reason to adjourn the Appeal."+ Neither can Sessions refuse to receive Appeals, on the ground that due notice was not *15 East's R. 632. t Foley 261. Y given for the notice relates only to the hear ing, and not to the receiving the Appeal.-In deed they are bound to receive an Appeal against an order of removal, although no notice has been given.* And after receiving it, if they are satisfied that notice sufficient for trial could not have been given, they may respite the hearing; but of that sufficiency all Sessions are to judge, An order was made on the 26th of Novem. ber, and executed on the 28th: the appellants attended the next Quarter Session held on the 13th of January following, and moved the Court for leave "to lodge the Appeal, and to respite the hearing thereof," to the then next General Quarter Session. The following entry was made by the Session: "For as "much as it appears to this Court that there "has been sufficient time since the removal of "the paupers for the appellants to give notice, "and come prepared to try this Appeal at this 46 Session, and no cause shewn why they did "not proceed accordingly; it is ordered that "the motion for lodging the same, and respiting "the hearing to the next Quarter Session, be rejected."―The Court of B. R. were of opinion "that the Justices had not acted wrong, for the motion was in effect to adjourn the Appeal; and it was evidently the intention of the par 66 7 East's R. 549. ties not to enter the Appeal, unless the Court would adjourn it: the Justices are to judge of the reasonableness of the time; and in some counties they establish a rule, regulating the time of notice; here it appears that the order of removal was executed on the 28th of November, so that there was sufficient time for the appellants to give notice, and to come prepared to try it; and the Justices who are to judge of this thought so."-Mandamus refused.* In a later case, an act of inclosure having given an Appeal to the next Session, within six months after the cause of complaint; an appellant moved the Court of Session in due time to receive his Appeal, and respite the hearing of it till the next Session;" this was refused by the Justices, because the following Session would not happen before the expiration of the six months; a mandamus was moved for, to compel them to receive this Appeal; the Court of B. R. however, were clear that the act was compulsory on the Justices "to receive the Appeal, but not "to respite it;" yet they said, as this was a conditional motion, 66 only to enter the Appeal, in case the Sessions would agree to respite the hearing." they could not compel the Justices to receive it afterwards.† 66 66 * 3 Term R. 150. Court of B. Notwithstanding, however, that Sessions R. have a have the power of exercising a discretion rejurisdiction, specting the reasonableness of notices, it must visitatorial be a sound discretion, and they may not exercise it capriciously; for, as was said in one case by Lord Ellenborough, Ch. J. "The Court of King's Bench have a kind of visita, torial jurisdiction over them, by which they will correct the errors of Justices."* Overseers of As was recently observed on another occas the poor. sion, the Courts of Quarter Session having no original jurisdiction in the appointment of overseers of the poor, they can exercise no authority over the matter, but by Appeal, and, therefore, with that part of the subject alone, have we any concern here. Who may appeal. Their jurisdiction, through the medium of an Appeal, over the appointment of overseers, extends to those appointing, as well as to those appointed; for, by the statutes in which originates the whole system, it is said, that "if any person shall be aggrieved by the determi nation of the Justices, he may appeal to the Sessions."+ The person appointed may, therefore, appeal, and the grounds of such Appeal gene. rally are, that the party is either in too high, * 10 East's R. 404. † 43 Eliz. c. 2.—Amended by 17 Geo. 2. c. 38. br too low, a situation of life, to be the object of the statute, or that there is some objection arising out of the sex, or other personal circumstances, of the individual. "6 The parishioners also, under the same description of any persons aggrieved," may appeal, on account of the unfitness of the person appointed by the Justices.* Of the statutes lately referred to, that of Eliz. directs Appeals to be only "to the Quarter Sessions," generally; that of Geo. 2, "to the next General or Quarter Sessions." It is by no means settled that the latter is a repeal of the former statute, respecting the restriction of time for an Appeal, but in proceedings under the stat. of Geo. 2, sufficient explanation has been already given of the interpretation of the word "next." At all events, costs can only be obtained in proceedings under the latter statute. The rate itself presents the most frequent The rate for source of Appeal, on the ground of its ille- relief of the gality, irregularity, or inequality. * See Pract. Expos. Title, Poor, OVERSEERS OF, sect. 1. Rex. Justices of Dorsetshire.-East's R. 200.-However, though it was said in this very recent case, by Lord Ellenborough C. J. that it was not settled, that one was a repeal of the other; there are some strong cases to shew, that such is the general understanding, especially Rex. v. Coode, 1 Bott 235.-Rex v. Micklefield, Cald. Ca. 507.-Rex v. Atkins. 4 Term R. 12. poor. 1 |