Art. 5.-AN IMPERIAL AIR POLICY.

1. The Official History of the War in the Air. By the late Sir Walter Raleigh. Clarendon Press, 1922. 2. Aviation in Peace and War. By Sir F. H. Sykes. Arnold, 1922.

3. A History of Aeronautics. By E. C. Vivian and LtCol W. Lockwood Marsh. Collins, 1921. 4. The German Air Force in the Great War. By Major G. P. Neumann. Hodder and Stoughton, 1921.

THE full development of aviation is of the highest importance to Motherland and Empire. It is of the very greatest value for establishing our security and preserving the peace of the world. It is a most potent factor for consolidating, uniting, and organising the Empire, as well as for promoting trade and increasing national prosperity. Defence,' as Adam Smith wisely observed a hundred and fifty years ago, 'is more important than opulence.' Great Britain is the arsenal, the citadel, and the treasury of the Empire. The Empire could most easily be conquered in London. Thus the security of Great Britain against attack is essential to all the States in our Imperial Commonwealth, and, in view of the supreme importance of England's security from attack and defeat in the air, the military aspect of the aviation problem should be considered in the first instance.

In military matters, as in politics, there are always two parties-two great schools of thought—a conservative and a progressive. The older admirals and generals are apt to put their trust into the proved weapons and to view new methods with distrust and dislike; but that attitude of mind, though perfectly intelligible, may prove most dangerous. It has been asserted that William the Conqueror defeated the English because the latter were mainly armed with the weapons of the Stone Age. Superiority in war-material has proved a decisive factor in fighting since the earliest ages. Even the greatest military and naval commanders have made disastrous mistakes by disdaining new discoveries and inventions.

In the beginning, the flying machine was treated as an interesting toy. On March 7, 1907, the First Lord of

the Admiralty wrote to the brothers Wilbur and Orville Wright as to their epoch-making invention :

'I have consulted my expert advisers with regard to your suggestion as to the employment of aeroplanes, and I regret to have to tell you, after the careful consideration of my Board, that the Admiralty, whilst thanking you for so kindly bringing the proposal to their notice, are of opinion that they would not be of any practical service to the Naval Service.'

Germany was encouraged to go to war in 1914, partly because she was far ahead of all other nations in regard to her mechanical outfit. Had it not been for her great superiority in the heaviest artillery, in quick-firing guns, in aviation, and in chemical weapons, she would scarcely have embarked on the disastrous adventure. Her great strength in those directions enabled her to escape defeat through four years of warfare. Infantry and cavalry can be improvised in case of need, but the scientific weapons require years of labour for their development. The war was much protracted because the Allies had neglected heavy artillery, aviation, and chemical warfare, and it took them years to make up for their neglect. It almost seemed as if history might repeat itself if Great Britain should be involved in further hostilities. We have drastically reduced our army and navy and have almost destroyed the most potent and most promising weapon of all-the air weapon.

When the War was concluded, the British Air Force consisted of about 300,000 officers and men. At present, it amounts only to some 30,000. The number of aeroplanes has diminished at a similar ratio. The reduction of our air strength would perhaps not matter so much if other nations had reduced their Air Forces in a similar manner. But that is not the case. The position, in fact, is highly alarming. On March 21, Lord Birkenhead stated in the House of Lords:

'If I understand aright the information given by the Secretary of State for Air in another place, at the present moment Great Britain has 371 service machines, and France has 1260 service machines. In 1925, if the present programmes are maintained and not amended, Great Britain

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will have 575 service machines and France 2180. The number of squadrons at the moment is-Great Britain 34, France about 84. . . . If you take the disposition of forces for home defence, Great Britain has assigned five squadrons of which four, I believe, are bombing squadrons, and only one a fighting squadron. I believe at this moment there is only one fighting squadron, but the noble Duke will check my statement on this point. There exist at present in France available for home defence, available for any sudden purpose, 44 squadrons, of which 32 are fighting squadrons. . . . In 1922 we built in this country 200 aeroplanes altogether for civil and military purposes. France built in 1922, 3300, of which 3000 were military and 300 civil.

'What so many people are apt to forget is this, that this very vital function which was discharged all those years in the past by the Navy must, so far as the greater ambit and range of it are concerned, be discharged in the future by the Air Force, and as we could not claim security for the people of this country in the past unless our Fleet was adequate, so, to-day, we are entirely lacking in our duty to the people of this country, unless we are able to afford them the guarantee of an Air Force which can defend them from attack.'

Replying to Lord Birkenhead, the Under Secretary of State for Air, the Duke of Sutherland, said:

'The learned Earl's figures for British machines were quite correct; that is to say, 34 squadrons and 395 machines; but the French figures he gave were not quite correct. According to our latest information, the French figures are 140 squadrons and 1260 machines-I think the noble and learned Earl said they had 84 squadrons. One hundred and eleven of these French squadrons are at home and 29 overseas. I think he said that the number of British squadrons at home now were five, but the number is ten, and will, I think, be fourteen, because, although there are only five purely home defence squadrons, there are five other squadrons attached to the Army and Navy and working with them, which makes ten squadrons in all, together with four further squadrons which would be at home but for the fact that they are at the present moment at the Dardanelles. 1925 the British machine figures will have been increased to 575 at the present rate of expansion, and the French machine figures to about 2180, on the assumption that no alterations are made in the programme of expansion which has still to pass the French Chamber and Senate.

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'Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that three-quarters

of the total French Air Force is kept at home in France while nearly two-thirds of our squadrons have at present to be permanently overseas, leaving only fourteen squadrons at home. This is chiefly due to the geographical position of the British Empire. It must be remembered that the Mediterranean, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, and India, at which 20 squadrons of the Royal Air Force are normally stationed, lie at a far greater distance from the British Isles than Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, or Syria do from France.

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'In conclusion, if we wish to raise the Royal Air Force to a one-Power standard on the basis of the present French strength, we shall have to face immediately an expenditure of 23,000,000l. per annum; whilst, if, and when, the full French programme of expansion is carried into effect, this figure will have to be increased to 35,000,000l. per annum.'

The position disclosed in these two speeches is disquieting and even alarming. With regard to the most powerful and the most promising weapon, the British position has deteriorated to such an extent that it may almost be said that Great Britain no longer counts as a military factor in comparison with France. Unfortunately, France is not the only nation which recognises the supreme necessity of a strong and ever-ready air force. Under the guidance of Signor Mussolini, Italy will apparently create an Air Force able to meet that of the French, and the United States of America certainly does not intend to be aerially inferior to France.

The call for economy is, of course, the substantial explanation of our weakened air-strength. But the other great European Powers, though still more needing to cut down national expenditure, have been impressed with the absolute necessity of maintaining a strong position in the air. How is it that France, with far less taxation and no unemployment problem, can afford to spend so much more on her Air Force and Aviation generally? Moreover, there is far less excuse for reducing our air strength than applies in the case of our land and sea forces; partly because future warfare is likely to be associated with the air; while air attack is almost certain to be the initial form of offence against this country.

With regard to attacks from the air, Great Britain is eminently vulnerable. It would, indeed, be no exaggeraVol. 240.-No. 476.

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tion to say that this country is the most vulnerable in the world. We are absolutely dependent on imported food for our existence. Occasionally the stock of bread corn suffices only for a few weeks. Whenever our stores run low, a short blockade might cause general starvation and force the nation to its knees. It scarcely needs lengthy argument and description to show that the foodships travelling to this country can more easily be turned back or destroyed by a predominant Air Force, even if relatively small in number, than by a very large number of submarines and surface ships.

There is even a still greater danger than that of blockading these islands from the air. The position of London invites bombardment with high explosives, gas, chemicals. London lies nearer the sea border than any central European capital. While only about one-tenth of the French live in Paris, about one-fifth of the British live in London. London can easily be found in any weather because of its huge size and especially because of the Thames. In Paris, Berlin, and Vienna and other capitals tall houses provided with deep cellars are general. The people may find shelter against high explosive bombs in the cellars, and, if heavy gas is used, may take refuge in the upper stories of houses. The vast majority of the people of London live in low houses unprovided with underground cellars. If London is bombarded with gas which rises to an altitude of twenty or thirty feet, the great majority of the population might be exterminated within a very short time.

The air weapon and the chemical weapon proved their enormous power during the War. Since the armistice, both aviation and chemical warfare have progressed greatly. As has been already implied, the air weapon and the chemical weapon cannot be improvised. It takes years to build and organise a large air fleet and to train the men, and we cannot mobilise our old pilots. Men quickly deteriorate when they have given up flying. Moreover, a good aviator remains at the height of his power for only a short time, and the rapid progress of construction and design causes old aviators to feel out of place in a new machine. It also takes years to organise chemical warfare on a large scale, as we found to our cost during the War. It is