numbers did not exceed 4000. By this specious policy, he inspired them with a little spirit, and those dastardly wretches, who ever shuddered at the British bayonet, who had not, at any time, (though superior in numbers) dared to stand a charge; those undisciplined men, defended by their breastworks, and their impenetrable houses, kept up a continued and cross fire on our defenceless soldiery. Their musquets rested on the parapets, which served to give them a more steady aim, as merely the upper part of their heads were visible; after discharging they entirely disappeared until they had re-loaded. Thus, Sir, the first return was eleven hundred killed and wounded; the second, I know not how many then, alas! most unhappily fell major Trotter, whose confirmed bravery and patriotism is not sufficiently known to his countrymen. Oh, brave and enthusiastic spirit! if e'er thou hoverest o'er thy native land, despise not the tear of one who would emulate thy patriotic virtues, and hasten, were it in his power, the investigations which will speak peace and honour to thy ashes! You say, general Whitelocke's modesty would not allow him to mention the party he headed on the accursed morning of the 5th of July. General Whitelocke, (I should add his excellency) with general Levison Gower, stormed Mr. White's house, as the former observes in his dispatches, being distant about three miles from the great square and fort. Pudet hæc opprobria nobis, et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli.

I shall take the liberty, should these observations meet your approbation, to send you a few remarks on the Spanish letter you have just commenced publishing, most part of which is extremely erroneous, and unjust to England.* I have the honour to be, &c. &c. MILES BRITANNICUS.

POETRY.

LINES, OCCASIONED BY READING CERTAIN ORDERS, PREVIOUS TO AND AFTER THE ATTACK ON A REMOTE TOWN.

No muse here dictates, and no fancy glows,

To paint our follies, or relieve our woes;
A blunt narration's all we can expect,

Of boasted failure, and avow'd defect.
So W- thought, as will be said, or sung,
And preach'd confusion in the vulgar tongue.-
Perhaps thought not, for wisdom hid her head,
And, like the gen'ral, lay secure in bed.

Sir S

-I's steady zeal was first to sound

The empty streets, and gain the rising ground;
There quiet stand, whilst others sections form'd,
And cut in wings the crowded housetops storm'd;
Light troops in rear, the solid van inspir'd,

And cannons follow'd, where they should have fir'd;
Corps were to move, as fun'rals lie in state,
With constant orders, orders still to wait,-
To move straight forward was the hero's theme,
And gain the city no! to gain the stream!
But, if they suffer'd by the field-day plan,
Tadvance, so say the orders, as they can.
Cæsar, himself, in private, left the rules,
Which order corporals to lead with tools.

And when you wish th' opposing town to win,
To break the doors, and let the soldiers in ;

No more by fire encouraging the foe,

But prove, without it's use, how much you know.

* I shall be happy to insert any communication from my sensible correspondent. My object, in the insertion of the Spanish letter, was to give the fullest and most in partial accounts of a transaction that must be thoroughly investigated, for the saka of the national honour, and the national feeling.

Orders must conquer, firing's all a joke,
Attacks are useless, when the musquets smoke ;
So when a butcher, rais'd to high command,
To the lov'd contract signs the feeling hand,
(Such as of late in Poh's walls expir'd)
With the true love of butcher's glory fir'd,
And glad in distant climes in blood to roam,
Promotes the slaughter, which he lov'd at home.
But here! alas, to what ill-fated star,

Can man ascribe the issue of the war?

He tells the troops, they've conquer'd, but, alack!
That, as they've conquer'd, so they must go back.
The finest feelings in his bosom glow,

Who loves his country, ought to spare the foe,-
He thanks the troops for all their glorious deeds,
Too dear such thanks, when such an army bleeds ;
And gives, for anxious nights, and toilsome days,
The sterile comfort of a Wh's praise;
And crowns the farce, by stating one brave fact,
As if, by heav'ns! our Britons did not act.

As if one man rewarded could atone

The crimes, another (not a man) has shewn:
Crimes, which have justly rais'd Britannia's fears,
Crimes, which have caused our curses and our tears,
Which, nursed by ignorance, and fed by pride,
Extinguish'd conscience, when our heroes died.

COLLEGE AT CALCUTTA.

To the East India Directors.

In the Morning Post of November 5, 1807, I read an account of the reduction of that noble institution,-the College at Calcutta. The revenues of India produce about fifteen millions per annum, and the East India directors grudge the small sum of 30,000l. per annum, to support the college founded by that great and enlightened character, the Marquis of Wellesley. Are then the East India Directors so uneducated as not to be able to appreciate the importance of such an institution? Important in the highest degree to present and future ages, and of the deepest interest to the whole civilized world. How could men, so illiberal and uneducated, be elected to the direction, in such a liberal, civilized, and enlightened country as England?-But is there not a controul in parliament?- Cannot the East India board, who are able to appreciate, as men of education, the value of such an institution, interfere, to prevent this eternal disgrace to our nation, and rescue the honour of England? PHILOMATHES.

POLITICAL LITERATURE.

A Refutation of the Charge brought against the MARQUIS WELLESLEY, on account of his Conduct to the NABOB OF OUDE.---From Authentic Documents, by J. Brand, Cl. M. A. &c. &c.

Although every honest man must deprecate the occurrence of such proceedings as those, which have lately tarnished the national character, in the conduct which has been manifested towards lord Wellesley, it is impossible not to admit, that they have produced one good effect, in directing the public attention to possessions, the prosperity of which are so essential to the security and welfare of this country. It is melancholy to reflect, that this feeling is not the result of any increased estimation of the value of our empire in India, or of a more just sense of the services of those who have contributed to its establishment; but may be considered to proceed from the avidity with which the public receive any accounts that have a tendency to lower the great, and to injure even those from the execution of whose abilities the country has derived the greatest advantages. Whatever may be the motives, however, it is certain, that the affairs of India have excited more interest since the return of lord

Wellesley to England, than they appear to have done at any period since the agitation of Mr. Fox's India bill, in 1784. The rank and acknowledged talents of the person, who has had so great a share in the direction of those affairs, together with the deep interest which a powerful faction in this country must feel in the debasement of his character, and in the depreciation of his services, may contribute, in a great measure, to produce this effect; but it is to be hoped, that the consequence of these discussions on the transactions of our countrymen in India, will, at last, be felt in a more general understanding of the principles, which must regulate the administration of our territories in India, and in a more accurate appreciation of the importance of those territories to the external influence, and the internal prosperity of the mother country.

Of the exact nature of those principles, I have afforded ample statements in various dissertations, which it has been my duty to submit to the public, in the progress of this review.. I have uniformly contended, that the principles which governed the administration of lord Wellesley in India, are the only principles by which we can hope to maintain our Asiatic possessions in security and prosperity; and I have never yet seen any publication which has offered any proof, that those principles are incorrect, or inconsistent, either with the maxims of justice, or with the constitution of this country, as applicable to the government of our empire in India. I have seen many works which strongly confirm my view of this important question, and to some of these I have already directed the attention of my readers, in order that they might be satisfied, that I was not singular in my opinion, and that my judg ment had not been formed without a laborious, and, I hope, impartial examination of the whole case.

In this view of the subject, I shall now proceed to examine a work of which the title is prefixed to this dissertation. The limits of my review, as well as the nature of the subject, will not admit of my doing more than merely to exhibit an analysis of Mr. Brand's refutation; but enough, I trust, will be shewn to induce those, who really wish to make themselves masters of the question, to examine the work itself, with that attention which it deserves. To some, the style of Mr. Brand's refutation may appear dry; others may think the manner of treating the subject too profound for common understandings; but no man can deny to Mr. Brand the merit of strict impartiality, and of great originality, with a vast fund of general information, and with uncommon diligence and accuracy.

The work is divided into three parts;-the first containing a preliminary dissertation " on the rights and duties of a power establishing a prince, and continuing, of necessity, to subport him on a throne, against foreign and domestic enemies; (which is precisely the situation of the company, and of the state of Oude towards each other:) the second demonstrating, "that nabobs cannot, of right, be denominated princes," but, must be considered as "imperial lieutenants;" and the last exhibiting a detailed and most curious examination of the various papers on East India affairs, which have been printed for the House of Commons, compared with the oral evidence taken by parliament on the Oude charge.

My readers will recollect, that in discussing this question, I have invariably stated, that the East India company having, in fact, established the nabobs of Oude in their government, and maintained them in that office against external and internal enemies, made itself responsible for the acts of those nabobs, and acquired a right to compel them to adopt such measures as should be beneficial to their subjects. All parties have admitted, that the government of Oude cannot stand by its inherent strength. While it exists, therefore, as Mr. Brand justly observes, it must be assisted by some other power, and that power must act where the weakness is; that is internally: the most solid buttress, built not in contact with an edifice, is no prop to it when ready to fall. Now, two powers cannot operate together in one state, without operating on each other, each modifying the action of the other according to its strength: and it may, therefore, at times, become right for the protecting power to act in controul of the feebler government: protecting also the state itself against all foreign force, it will have a right of control over it in all its political relations.

This principle seems to be so consistent with the maxims of common sense, as to require no farther elucidation. But as the enemies of lord Wellesley contend, that

we had no right to interfere with the government of the nabobs of Oude, except, when our assistance was specially demanded for that purpose, I shall add a few observations from Mr. Brand's work, to demonstrate the absurdity of such an assertion.

And first, with regard to the nabobs rights abstractedly taken; "Prescription," says Mr. Brand," cannot be pleaded by, or for, an individual holding the government of a country in such a manner; whether the usurpation were his own act, that of his father, or grandfather, The better emotions and affections of mankind, are not to be appealed to by a fiction, that such fraudulent occupiers of dominion are princes by prescription and by real covenant, of which they have broken the great condition on their parts, their right is none. And this was the only right the individual whom we call the nabob of Oude could possess, when we placed him on the musnud. And the only rights he possessed, with respect to us, were defined by our compacts with him. The qualifications and style he is suffered to take in these treaties, are the complimentary forms of diplomacy only, with no binding sense annexed to them. The practice of admitting such forms has been carried somewhat further in Europe:in Cromwell's treaty with France, the style he took was, of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland, protector. And the king of France, in his treaties with Spain, always styled himself king of Navarre. But the most singular instance to be found, is, in all the treaties between this country and France, previous to the last, where, in one of the two instruments, the king of Great Britain constantly styled himself king of France also.”

Such being the situation of the nabobs of Oude, as defined by the general law of nations, it is evident, as Mr. Brand observes, that the dependant prince could not be placed on the throne, and supported thereon by the greater power, without it had been able to conquer the state for him, the people not being attached to him and ́ the army hostile. His elevation is, in effect, conquest, achieved by its arms, or by the terror of its arms. It was in its power to assume the government; instead whereof it appoints a sovereign. But it is under an obligation to see, that, at least, the people should be placed in as good a situation under such a prince, as they ought to have been under a conqueror. And Montesquieu has extremely well determined, what would be due to the subjects of such a principality.

"A conquest, he observes, is an acquisition, and we acquire to preserve and use, not to destroy: the spirit of acquisition carries with it the spirit of conservation and use, not that of destruction.-The conqueror continues to govern the state according to its former laws, and only assumes the exercise of the political and civil government; or he gives to both a new form.*

"States," that writer further affirms, "that are conquered, are not ordinarily such as preserve their primitive institutions in full force. Corruption has introduced itself into them: laws have ceased to be executed, and government itself has become an oppressor. Who can doubt that such a state might not be a gainer by conquest itse!£ A state in the situation described might be rendered a great gainer thereby. It is the duty of the protecting state to see, that their beneficiary realises to it every advantage that it would have obtained from a beneficent and enlightened conqueror; and not to suffer its situation to be continued worse than its own conquest should have rendered it."

This argument is illustrated in another place, in a manner still more happy; "Nations," it is remarked," are individuals with respect to each other, and are capable of many of those mutual relations in which individuals may stand: there is a relation in common life, in every point, exactly similar to that of the two states here described; both in its origin, and the duties and rights of the superior power arising out of it, which regard the government and the people of the inferior state. although that relation be artificial, and of legal origin, yet it is the closest possible copy, struck out by necessity, of one of the two strongest natural relations,—that of parent and child. That of the superior power, and of the government and people of the other state, as above defined, precisely in every particular, coincides with

And,

that of guardian and ward. The parallel between the private and public relations might be drawn out in more particulars, the greater heads of it will be here only given.

"First. The origin of the relations is one and the same: the incapacity of the weaker power to protect itself against external or internal enemies, without the assistance of the stronger, perfectly resembles the inability of the ward to protect himself from injury in his estate, or in his domestic affairs.

"Second. As the weaker power cannot wage war, or make peace, only under the auspices of the stronger, so the ward cannot come solely into a court of justice, to defend himself against any false claim on his estate, or to recover any part of it, of which he is fraudulently or forcibly deprived. He must sue, treat, and conclude, under the authority of his guardian.

"Third. When a difference of opinion arises between the two powers, relating to a measure of the internal government of the weaker; if it cannot be compromised, that of the stronger shall prevail; signified either by its head, or his accredited minister, or resident with the inferior state. The ward, in his conduct and domestic matters, is under the like direction of his guardian; or very frequently of a tutor, whom the guardian has empowered to act for, and to represent, himself. "Fourth. The superior is firmly bound to the protection of the inhabitants of the inferior state against all oppression, even if exercised by the ruler whom he hath set over them. On the guardian devolves the protection, not only of the person, but of the estate of his ward; and, if it be a landed estate, of the tenantry of the same. Here his duty is double: in defence of his ward and his interests, all frauds and waste he must see prevented or punished; but all oppressions, vexations, or unjust impositions, attempted against them, under the name of his ward, or in consequence of his errors, or depraved passions, he is with all the power he has to repress.

"These relations might be further compared as to some less leading particulars; but it appears superfluous, and it is evident, that the rights and duties of the protecting state, with respect to the inferior, are the same as those of a guardian with respect to his ward, and none other."

These general principles appear to me to be incontrovertible. In applying them to the case of the nabobs of Oude, Mr. Brand is very successful in demonstrating the strict dependence, (as shewn by their own confessions,) of those nabobs on the British government, and the absolute necessity, from the dilapidation of the revenues of Oude, of the interference of the company in the affairs of a state, with the inhabitants of whom, the company had, by appointing its ruler, contracted such important duties. "Politicians lately," he observes, "when Europe contained a due number of nearly equal states, mixed with others of inferior strength, divided the whole number into two classes, as differing in their power of resisting an attack by a government of the average military strength and resources. The stronger were called substantive, and the weaker non-substantive powers.

"There exists, perhaps, no government internally unassailed by something of resistance, or enmity to it, latent or declared. The power of the opponent principle frequently does become superior to that of government, which, therefore, will be unable to exist without succours from a foreign power. Such a government, considered internally, may be properly called a non-substantive government. It may also be exposed to an invading enemy, whom it is utterly unable to resist: a foreign power may take it under its protection against its enemies of both kinds. The rights and duties of such a power have been abstractedly shown in the first preliminary dissertation prefixed to this tract; and, in the course of it we shall consider all the points there laid down as proved, and cite them as such.

"In that subordinate situation, Oude and its rulers have long stood to this country. From the body of the evidence before the House, a great number of authentic testimonies might be brought forward for this, but that of lord Cornwallis will be here alone produced, as among all our governors general, he is supposed to have regarded the dignity of those rulers, or nabobs, with the most favourable eye. Writing to Asoph ul Dowlah, in 1787, with regard to his strength against foreign enemies, he states, that "the protection of his dominions cannot be effected in a proper man