should become victorious, they would, in their turn, appropriate the fruits of their Conquests. Thus the example given by the allies served as a justifiable precedent, of the sweets of which the French no sooner tasted, than they resolved to banquet upon it, while there was any thing left upon the face of the earth worth consuming. But there is a striking difference between the advantages which the hostile parties derived from the pursuit of this principle. In the case of the allies, whatever each power gained, served, indeed, as a temporary augmentation of its individual power, but it tended to weaken the collected efforts of all, to excite jealousy amongst them, and to diminish the force and reputation of their united efforts in the public cause. Far different was the case with the French; whatever they acquired devolved into the hands of one power only, which was actuated by the same principles, the same policy, and the same interests. Hence, while the separate force of each of the confederate powers was partially withdrawn from the aggregate mass, in order to secure provinces and fortresses for their selfish views, the collective force of France was poured upon the remnant of the collected forces of the allies, and finally succeeded in overpowering them. Whatever the French acquired beyond their immediate frontier, either by force or fraud, they instantly incorporated as an integral part of their empire; and thus they demonstrated, in glaring colours, that, while the allies were acting without any specific system, they were carrying on their operations upon a regulated and determined system. Yet, the evidences of this fact which were successively presented to the senses of the allies, and the existence of which ought to have roused all Europe in arms, made no alteration in their plan of proceeding. Instead of meeting the irruption of a deluge of ruthless barbarians with a correspondent vigour, instead of opposing an armed and loyal population against an armed and unprincipled population; they suffered year after year to be wasted in unprofitable operations, and in the augmentation of regular armies, which always exhaust the strength of a country; all this while the undisciplined French were conquering, and upon each conquest were laying the foundations of fresh conquests, which were to terminate in the subjugation of the whole continent. The power of France was the image of a circle, from the centre of which every radius was projected with equal force to the circumference; the power of the confederates had no consistent shape, and whenever it made itself felt, it merely touched the circumference of France, and went off with the velocity of a tangent. What was the consequence of this want of concert or system to the allies themselves? They all declared, that they were devoured alive by the levy of their regular armies, that their means were exhausted, and that they could not continue upon the field without pecuniary assistance. Great Britain, according to custom, furnished that assistance, which was all they expected from her- and the effects of which we feel in the pressure of that monumental debt, which ought, at length, to convince the people of this country, that in a contest for the existence of nations, men, and not money, constitute the sinews of war. The French have completely established this proposition, and overturned the old notions of military economy: they produced men, and the men produced money, and land too. Now, if the principles of the war had been duly understood, affairs would have assumed a different aspect; for, in that case, every man would have felt the necessity of resisting a system of rapacity and oppression which had no limit but the confines of the habitable globe itself. The civilized world would have taken up arms, and, the impulse having been once given, nothing could have remained but to have directed, with prudence, judgment, and patriotism, this tremendous mass of population. That these are not fairy dreams every one must be assured, who has paid the least attention to the plans of the continental powers within the last two years. When they heard and saw the storm gathering over their heads they began to prepare, in good earnest, to resist it; and what measures did they adopt? When it was too late, when sentence of condemnation had been passed upon their kingdoms, they resorted to the very measures which they had despised at the outset of the revolution war, but which they discovered, by sad experience, were the only safeguards of society-they armed their whole male population. But the measure was adopted when the French cannon was thundering at their doors. Ten days before the battle of Auerstadt, the king of Prussia ordered arms to be put into the hands of his subjects; a week after this decree, he, with the wreck of his army, was flying beyond the Oder, and the hereditary dominions of the House of Brandenburgh, embra of a ferocious stranger, cing as loyal a population as ever existel, were in the power The moment the court of Vienna received the intelligence of the fate of the Prussian regular army, it issued ordes for a general conscription of every male inhabitant, from the age of sixteen, upvards, and in the mean time, established in every province an armed militia. The emperor Alexander evinced greater prudence, by taking time by the forelock; for the instant his army was set in motion towards the frontiers, he published an ukase, in vhich he declared to his subjects, and to all the world, the little reliance which can be placed upon a regular army against the system of the French." The miseres," said he," which have so rapidly overtaken the neighbouring countries, evince tae present necessity of recourse to unusual means, to great and vigorous measures, which can only be carried into effect by a zealous attachment to our country; by a manly firmness of spirit, and a true sense of national honour. A people really inspired and actuated by sentiments of this description, ARMING IN A BODY, may raise an insurmountable rampart against every hostile attack, however formidable. Neglect, in providing for their internal security, by such general armaments, during the present contest with France, in opposition to her system of plunder and rapine, has been attended with the most pernicious consequences to Austria, and not a little contributed to hasten the downfall of Prussia. Their fate was determined by the loss of a few battles; after which the enemy meeting no obstacle, and dreading no opposition from AN UNARMED POPULATION, forced his way through the interior provinces, spread devastation and terror, by his rapid and violent depredation, destroyed the scattered remains of a routed army, and effected a total overthrow of their empires."* After so full an acknowledgment, from so high an authority, it is needless for me to expatiate any further upon this topic. The prostration of Europe, at the feet of its rapacious oppressor, sufficiently illustrates the truth and justice of my reflections.But it is extremely to be lamented, that experience wrought no wholesome change in the politics of the European cabinets. Although they perceived the inefficacy of their military system, they never dreamt of amending it, until their ruin became certain; and in the same manner they adhered to their political errors, notwithstanding the avowed designs of France to aggrandize her power at the expense of neutral and feeble states. Thus the first confederate war terminated, with the recognition on the part of Austria, and the German empire, of the principles of disorganization and partition, upon which France had acted. The court of Vienna relinquished all future title to the Netherlands, and to the greatest part of its possessions in Italy, for the temporary usufruct of the Venetian territories. But it is to be observed, that France, on no occasion, receded a single inch. What she gave away, as a compensation for what she had conquered from other states, was not her own she always took care to enrich herself by impoverishing others; and all her treaties were framed upon military principles, to qualify her to renew the war, whenever she pleased, in the heart of the dominions of her enemies. A breach having been made in the original principle of the first confederacy, by the secession of Prussia, and the treaty of Campo-Formio, Great Britain stood alone in the contest with France, and, during her single-handed struggle, displayed greater energy, and performed greater exploits, than when she acted in co-operation with her allies. The original principle of the war then took a different direction, and, being left to provide for ourselves, we prosecuted the contest with so much vigour and success, in the maintenance of our liberties, national institutions, and independence, that the disspirited continent was stricken with admiration, and very soon reimbarked in the common cause. But, unhappily, the same malignant influence which had broken up the first coalition, influenced the movements of the second. The parties went to war, more with a view of recovering what had been lost in the first war, than for the purpose of repressing a system of aggrandizement and rapine that threatened Europe with a continuation of those evils which it had been their original object to repel. Accordingly, that confederacy was dissolved in the same manner as the former, that is, with an acknow * Vide the whole of this excellent proclamation, in the 5th number of the 2d volume of this Review, page 93. should become victorious, they would, in their turn, appropriate the fruits of their conquests. Thus the example given by the allies served as a justifiable precedent, of the sweets of which the French no sooner tasted, than they resolved to banquet upon it, while there was any thing left upon the face of the earth worth consuming. But there is a striking difference between the advantages which the hostile parties derived from the pursuit of this principle. In the case of the allies, whatever each power gained, served, indeed, as a temporary augmentation of its individual power, but it tended to weaken the collected efforts of all, to excite jealousy amongst them, and to diminish the force and reputation of their united efforts in the public cause. Far different was the case with the French; whatever they acquired devolved into the hands of one power only, which was actuated by the same principles, the same policy, and the same interests. Hence, while the separate force of each of the confederate powers was partially withdrawn from the aggregate mass, in order to secure provinces and fortresses for their selfish views, the collective force of France was poured upon the remnant of the collected forces of the allies, and finally succeeded in overpowering them. Whatever the French acquired beyond their immediate frontier, either by force or fraud, they instantly incorporated as an integral part of their empire; and thus they demonstrated, in glaring colours, that, while the allies were acting without any specific system, they were carrying on their operations upon a regulated and determined system. Yet, the evidences of this fact which were successively presented to the senses of the allies, and the existence of which ought to have roused all Europe in arms, made no alteration in their plan of proceeding. Instead of meeting the irruption of a deluge of ruthless barbarians with a correspondent vigour, instead of opposing an armed and loyal population against an armed and unprincipled population; they suffered year after year to be wasted in unprofitable operations, and in the augmentation of regular armies, which always exhaust the strength of a country; all this while the undisciplined French were conquering, and upon each conquest were laying the foundations of fresh conquests, which were to terminate in the subjugation of the whole continent. The power of France was the image of a circle, from the centre of which every radius was projected with equal force to the circumference; the power of the confederates had no consistent shape, and whenever it made itself felt, it merely touched the circumference of France, and went off with the velocity of a tangent. What was the consequence of this want of concert or system to the allies themselves? They all declared, that they were devoured alive by the levy of their regular armies, that their means were exhausted, and that they could not continue upon the field without pecuniary assistance. Great Britain, according to custom, furnished that assis tance, which was all they expected from her-and the effects of which we feel in the pressure of that monumental debt, which ought, at length, to convince the people of this country, that in a contest for the existence of nations, men, and not money, con stitute the sinews of war. The French have completely established this proposi tion, and overturned the old notions of military economy: they produced men, and the men produced money, and land too. Now, if the principles of the war had been duly understood, affairs would have assumed a different aspect; for, in that case, every man would have felt the necessity of resisting a system of rapacity and oppression which had no limit but the confines of the habitable globe itself. The civilized world would have taken up arms, and, the impulse having been once given, nothing could have remained but to have directed, with prudence, judgment, and patriotism, this tremendous mass of population. That these are not fairy dreams every one must be assured, who has paid the least attention to the plans of the continental powers within the last two years. When they heard and saw the storm gathering over their heads they began to prepare, in good earnest, to resist it; and what measures did they adopt? When it was too late, when sentence of condemnation had been passed upon their kingdoms, they resorted to the very measures which they had despised at the outset of the revolution war, but which they discovered, by sad experience, were the only safeguards of society-they armed their whole male population. But the measure was adopted when the French cannon was thundering at their doors. Ten days before the battle of Auerstadt, the king of Prussia ordered arms to be put into the hands of his subjects; a week after this decree, he, with the wreck of his army, was flying beyond the Oder, and the hereditary dominions of the House of Brandenburgh, embra cing as loyal a population as ever existel, were in the power of a ferocious stranger, and the people converted into the slaves of insolent conquerors. The moment the court of Vienna received the intelligence of the fate of the Prussian regular army, it issued ordes for a general conscription of every male inhabitant, from the age of sixteen, upvards, and in the mean time, established in every province an armed militia. The emperor Alexander evinced greater prudence, by taking time by the forelock; for the instant his army was set in motion towards the frontiers, he published an ukase, in vhich he declared to his subjects, and to all the world, the little reliance which can be placed upon a regular army against the system of the French." The miseries," said he, "which have so rapidly overtaken the neighbouring countries, evince tae present necessity of recourse to unusual means, to great and vigorous measures, which can only be carried into effect by a zealous attachment to our country; by a manly firmness of spirit, and a true sense of national honour. A people really inspired and adtuated by sentiments of this description, ARMING IN A BODY, may raise an insurmountable rampart against every hostile attack, however formidable. Neglect, in providing for their internal security, by such general armaments, during the present contest with France, in opposition to her system of plunder and rapine, has been attended with the most pernicious consequences to Austria, and not a little contributed to hasten the downfall of Prussia. Their fate was determined by the loss of a few battles; after which the enemy meeting no obstacle, and dreading no opposition from AN UNARMED POPULATION, forced his way through the interior provinces, spread devastation and terror, by his rapid and violent depredation, destroyed the scattered remains of a routed army, and effected a total overthrow of their empires."* After so full an acknowledgment, from so high an authority, it is needless for me to expatiate any further upon this topic. The prostration of Europe, at the feet of its rapacious oppressor, sufficiently illustrates the truth and justice of my reflections.But it is extremely to be lamented, that experience wrought no wholesome change in the politics of the European cabinets. Although they perceived the inefficacy of their military system, they neve: dreamt of amending it, until their ruin became certain; and in the same manner they adhered to their political errors, notwithstanding the avowed designs of France to aggrandize her power at the expense of neutral and feeble states. Thus the first confederate war terminated, with the recognition on the part of Austria, and the German empire, of the principles of disorganization and partition, upon which France had acted. The court of Vienna relinquished all future title to the Netherlands, and to the greatest part of its possessions in Italy, for the temporary usufruct of the Venetian territories. But it is to be observed, that France, on no occasion, receded a single inch. What she gave away, as a compensation for what she had conquered from other states, was not her own she always took care to enrich herself by impoverishing others; and all her treaties were framed upon military principles, to qualify her to renew the war, whenever she pleased, in the 2. heart of the dominions of her enemies. A breach having been made in the original principle of the first confederacy, by the secession of Prussia, and the treaty of Campo-Formio, Great Britain stood alone in the contest with France, and, during her single-handed struggle, displayed greater energy, and performed greater exploits, than when she acted in co-operation with her allies. The original principle of the war then took a different direction, and, being left to provide for ourselves, we prosecuted the contest with so much vigour and success, in the maintenance of our liberties, national institutions, and independence, that the disspirited continent was stricken with admiration, and very soon reimbarked in the common cause. But, unhappily, the same malignant influence which had broken up the first coalition, influenced the movements of the second. The parties went to war, more with a view of recovering what had been lost in the first war, than for the purpose of repressing a system of aggrandizement and rapine that threatened Europe with a continuation of those evils which it had been their original object to repel. Accordingly, that confederacy was dissolved in the same manner as the former, that is, with an acknow * Vide the whole of this excellent proclamation, in the 5th number of the 2d volume of this Review, page 93. : ledgment of the additional encroachments of France, and with the cession of fresh territories, and strong holds. Great Britain vas again left to her own insular exertions, but under circumstances of augmented difficulty; for, in addition to her natural and implacable enemies, she had also to contend against a formidable confederacy of the northern powers, which, by the artifice and intrigues of the French, had been framed for the purpose of wresting from her those maritime rights which had been uniformly acknowledged by the general consent of all the powers in Europe. Notwithstanding the appalling features of this innatural combination, we dispersed the northern confederacy in a moment, and defeated our original enemy wherever we had an opportunity of trying our strength with him. At length, the people began to cherish a desire for peace, in consequence of the prevalent opinion, that some of the objects of the war were unattainable, while others had been accomplished. There appeared to be no field of glory in reversion for us, no prospect of gathering fresh laurels the widely-extended range of human conflict had been hotly disputed, and nobly trodden. The people were evidently wearied, yet not exhausted, by nine years of war, carried on in every portion of the habitable world; a war, which, in the justice and grandeur of its principles, the astonishing exertions which it called forth, and the mighty consequences dependent upon its termination, had required an unprecedented sacrifice of our country's blood and treasure. Two preceding attempts to negociate with France had induced the unfortunate persuasion, that peace was prac ticable, and that it could be made consistently with the national honour and security. Accordingly, peace was made, but it soon appeared, that it was a peace of experi ment only, for it was violated, by the French, within a week of its ratification; a fact which ought to operate as an awful warning to us in future. No pains were spared to conciliate the inveterate animosity of the enemy, and every temptation was proffered to induce him to relinquish the paths of his inhuman ambition. We yielded up to France all the possessions which we had conquered from her, under the fallacious hope, that her attention would be diverted from interfering in the domestic policy of inoffensive nations, to the revival of her industry, commerce, and dilapida ted estate. It was admitted that the peace was not glorious for Great Britain: all the glory rested with France; but it was the glory of ruling over the shadows of citiesand the images of nations.-Having thus held out every boon, and having surrendered, as a pledge of our sincerity, every inch of conquest upon which we had expended our best blood, and bestowed a profusion of treasure, at sort of a peace did we enjoy It was a clouded and disturbed repose, a troubled moment of constraint, incertitude, and suspicion, which rendered the alarms and expenses of a nominal peace more painful to endure, than the evils attendant upon actual warfare. We were kept in a constant state of perturbation and of preparation; in vain our government remonstrated with the ruler of France against his unwarrantable invasions of public right, of which almost every mail from the continent brought the most melancholy details. It was impossible that a brave and powerful nation should long be a tame spectator of such ambitious encroachments upon the independence of Europe. It was evident, to every thinking man, that Buonaparte had it more in his power to ruin us by the intervention of peace, than by the pursuit of war. He could run us to the most enormous expenses, he could compel us to quit our thresholds whenever he pleased. The event has verified the prediction of Mr. Windham, who, in a most masterly, and argumentative speech, pointed out the consequences of a peace with France." If we are of opinion," said he, "that war continued at present, must be ruin in the course of a few years; what do we suppose it must be when, to replace us where we now are, we must begin by the recovery of that list of places, which the present treaty has given up? France, therefore, will be under no necessity of going to war with us: and, nothing but her own intemperance, and insolence, and an opinion of our endurance and weakness, beyond even what they may be found to deserve, can enforce upon us that extremity. She has much safer and surer means of going to work; means, at the same time, sufficiently quick, to satisfy any ordinary ambition; she has nothing to do but trust to the progress of her own power in peace, quickened, as often as she shall see occasion, by a smart threat of war. I canPicha judicious application of these two means is not calculated not conceive the to obtain. A ance has now made, mixed with proper proportions of a |