counts in them, it frequently happened, that the banian managed his concerns as he pleased; filled the offices in his department, appointed the servants about his person, and held his master's honour under his entire control. But, at the present time, a bond debt is rarely heard of. No money-lender, European or native, dare confess his holding the bond of a student in college. The native banians curse the college, and with reason, for it prevents the junior civil servants from borrowing money, while preparing for the service; and it teaches them to keep their own accounts, and to transact business with the natives, in their own language, after they have entered the service. By a calculation, on the premises, it will be found, that five hundred thousand rupees are now in the chests of black men; which, had not the college been established, would, by this time, have been lent to the junior civil servants of the last four years; and, after the lapse of fourteen years, would have amounted to a sum which they could never pay. The youth in college can scarcely credit the accounts they sometimes hear of the system of extravagance which prevailed in former times. It is supposed that there are old servants of the company, now at home, whose individual debts, at one period, in this country, amounted to more than all the debts in college. Neglect of study, is cause sufficient, at the college of Fort-William, to expel a student. He must be an entire stranger to what is passing in Bengal, who does not perceive that the college of Fort-William is sensibly promoting a melioration of the European character, as well as the civilization of India. (p. 159 to 163)

In p. 172, is a translation of an admirable address to the students, by the Shanscrit professor. He says, "Thousands of the learned, in distant nations, will excel in this triumph of literature; what a singular exhibition has been this day presented to us! In the presense of the supreme governor of India, and of its most learned and illus trious characters, Asiatic and European, an assembly is convened, in which no word of vill native tongue is spoken, but public uiscourse is maintained, on interesting subjects, in the languages of Asia. The colloquial Hindoostanee, the classic Persian, the commercial Bengalee, the learned Arabic, and the primeval Shanscrit, are spoken fluently, after having been studied grammatically, by English youth. Did ever any university in Europe, or any literary institution in any other age or country, exhibit a scene so interesting as this? And, what are the circumstances of these youth? They are not students who prosecute a dead language, with uncertain purpose, impelled only by natural genius or love of fame. But, having been appointed to the important offices of administering the government of the country in which these languages are spoken, they apply their acquisitions, immediately, to useful purposes; in distributing justice to the inhabitants, in transacting the business of the state, revenual and commercial, and in maintaining official intercourse with the people, in their own tongue, and not, as hitherto, by means of an interpreter. The acquisitions of our students may be appreciated, by their affording to the suppliant native immediate access to his principal." (p. 172, 3.]

"The acquisitions of our students are appreciated at this moment by those learned Asiatics, now present in this assembly, some of them strangers, from distant provinces, who wonder every man to hear, in his own tongue, important subjects discussed, and new and noble principles asserted by the youth of a foreign land. I, now an old man, have lived for a long series of years among the Hindoos. I have been in the habit of discoursing with the Brahmins on every subject, and of superintending schools for the instruction of the Hindoo youth. Their language is nearly as familiar to me as my own. I may say, indeed, that their manners, customs, habits, and sentiments, are as obvious to me, as if I was myself a native. And knowing them, and hearing, as I do, their daily observations on our government, character, and principles, I am warranted to say, (and I deem it my duty to embrace the public opportunity now afforded me of saying it,) that the institution of this college was wanting to complete the happiness of the natives under our dominion; for this institution will break down that barrier, (our ignorance of their language,) which has ever opposed the influence of our laws and principles, and has despoiled our administration of its energy and effect. Where the institution to cease from this moment, its salutary effects would yet remain. Good has been done, which cannot be undone. Sources of useful knowledge, moral instruction, and political utility, have been opened to the natives of India, which can never be closed. One hundred original volumes in the oriental

languages and literature, will preserve for ever, in Asia, the name of the founder of this institution. Nor are the examples frequent, of a renown, possessing such utility for its basis, or pervading such a vast portion of the habitable globe. My lord, you have raised a monument of fame, which no length of time, or reverse of fortune, is able to destroy; not chiefly because it is inscribed with Mahratta and Mysore, with the trophies of war, and the emblems of victory; but because there are inscribed on it the names of those learned youth, who have obtained degrees of honour for high proficiency in the oriental tongue. These youth will extend the domain of British civilization, security, and happiness, by enlarging the bounds of oriental literature, and thereby diffusing the spirit of christian principles throughout the nations of Asia. These youth, at the moment of entering on the public service, enjoy the fame of possessing qualities, (rarely combined) constituting a reputation of threefold strength for public men,-genius, industry, and virtue. No revolution of opinion, or change of circumstances, can rob you of the solid glory derived from the humane, just, liberal, and magnanimous principles, which have been embodied by your administration." (p. 173 to 7.)

There are most convincing reasons given, why the college should be in India, and not here. It seems that even the great oriental scholar, sir Wm. Jones, was totally unintelligible to the natives, when he arrived in India.

But want of space prevents further quotation,except of the following passage from p.36. "This institution will be best appreciated by every affectionate parent in the hour of separation from his child, destined to the public service in India. Let any parent (especially if he has himself passed through the company's service in India,) declare whether the prospect of this institution has aggravated or mitigated the solicitude of that painful hour, whether it has raised additional doubts and fears, or inspired a more lively hope, of the honourable and prosperous service, of the early and fortunate return, of his child."..

And this is the nobleman, the perspicuity and energy of whose administration left room but for one regret that they were not transferred for exertion to Europe, which, during the same period, so precisely stood in want of them: this is the statesman, who is presumptuously arraigned, by some demagogue, with sinister views, or a few distant, uninformed spectators, lodged in safety at their fire sides.

Let none presume to arraign who has not sagacity to perceive the necessity, before they venture to pronounce judgment on his administration, for placing themselves in, and imagination enough mentally to transport themselves into, the situation and cir cumstances of danger in which the marquis acted.

Let the reader listen to the dictates, either of his heart or his understanding, and say whether this nobleman, capable of forming, and pledging himself to, such a system as the publication developes, can have failed, in any part of his administration, to make his conduct harmonize, according to the circumstances, with the highest tone of morals! He has little sensibility who, perusing the work itself, shall fail to breathe a prayer for a blessing on its author.

COURT MARTIAL, AT HALIFAX, IN NOVA SCOTIA.

Minutes of the Proceedings of a Court Martial, assembled and held on board his Majesty's ship Belleisle, in Halifax harbour, Nova Scotia, on Wednesday, August 26, 1807, to try Jenkin Ratford, of his Majesty's ship Halifax, for mutiny, desertion, and contempt, as set forth in a letter from her Commander. PRESENT, The Honourable Sir Alexander Cochrane, K. B. Rear-Admiral of the White, and Second Officer in the command at Halifax, President.

Francis Pickmore,

William Charles Fahie.

Edward Hawker,

CAPTAINS.

John Erskine Douglas,
Philip Beaver.
Nathaniel Day Cochrane.

Being all the captains of the rank of post at this place. On the court assembling, at half past ten o'clock, the prisoner being brought forward, the evidence being called over, and audience admitted, read the order addressed to the president from the honourable George Cranfield Berkeley, vice-admiral of the white, and commander in chief at Halifax, Nova Scotia, &c. dated the 25th of August, and the president's order to the judge advocate to officiate as such; when the members, and judge advocate, were severally sworn, agreeable to act of parliament; and the fol lowing letter, containing the charges against the prisoner, read:

of the war in favour of the allies; but I think it is saying too much to assert, that by such an intervention, Austria could have negociated on her own terms. With this single exception, I must, however, acknowledge the general merits and sound reasoning, contained in this excellent pamphlet; and my readers will agree with me, in opinion, that the author has brought the charge of remissness home to our late administration, with much greater success and justice than against the Austrians. After remarking upon the degenerated state of the continent, he proceeds to consider the abstemious policy adopted by the late ministers, while they were in power. "For several years past," says he," but more particularly since Buonaparte's unqualified usurpation, we have conducted the war on principles most palpably erroneous; and that force which, concentrated, might have been efficiently employed, has been either frittered away in the inanity of colonial expeditions, or has been cooped up in places, which, from their position, have deprived it of all possibility of active operation. But if this obvious mistake has been long persisted in, at no period was it pushed to such an extent, nor has it been productive of such mischievous consequences, as during the rule of the late administration. If ever there was a moment pregnant with important events; if ever there was a crisis on which the destiny of empires balanced, it occurred whilst they were entrusted with the direction of public affairs. Instead, however, of giving proofs of that enlightened judgment which can alone wisely plan, or vigorously execute, the whole of their time which was not engaged in occupations that personally concerned them, was consumed in arrangements of domestic policy, which, without inconvenience, might have been deferred, or in preparing and dispatching armaments which it would have been infinitely more judicious altogether to have omitted. Of what consequence was it, whether we possessed a fortress or a few miles of domain on the coast of South America; or whether we occupied Egypt with five thousand men; or whether we bombarded Constantinople with seven sail of the line? Our grand enemy was Buonaparte: our grand object was to rescue the continent from the grasp of his domination. Had we kept our troops collected in some convenient position at home, with an ample provision of transports ready to receive them at the moment their services were wanted. so as to have enabled us, a few weeks before, or even after the battle of Eylan, to land forty or fifty thousand men in the rear of the allied armies, is there a military character in Europe, who will estimate at so low a rate the value of such a detachment of British soldiers, as to maintain, that Buonaparte would not have been exposed to the risk of total destruction. This body of men occupying the left wing of the French army, and being more than its match, would have enabled general Benigsen, by contracting his lines, to strengthen his centre and his left wing, and, by such a movement, to out-flank the centre and right wing of his antagonist. Thus assisted, Dantzick would have been speedily relieved, and Buonaparte once overpowered in the field, harassed and pressed on every side, would, in his retreat, have been assailed by such a host of additional foes, that had he effected his personal safety, which would have been very doubtful, he would have been so reduced in strength, and so blemished in reputation, that ha never again could have become a formidable foe. Nor would the destruction of his army, had it been accomplished, have been the greatest benefit which Europe would have derived from such an event. What would have been of far greater consequence, that magic spell, which has, for so great a length of time, obscured and enchained all the faculties of human action, would have been at once dissolved, and human affairs, after such tedious and distant deviations from their regular course, would have reverted to their former channels. All the false splendour which encircles Buonaparte's character, would have instantly vanished, and he would have appeared in his native baseness; as abject in adversity, as in prosperity he has been haughty, cruel, and unjust. The satellites who have revolved with him in his rapid and destructive orbit, would, with their primary planet, have disappeared; and those who are now occupying thrones and principalities, would have returned to the humble avocations, for which they are, by birth and edu cation, and manners, best fitted."

These reflections are as striking as they are just; and the author has fully estab lished their truth, by a train of melancholy facts, which carry irresistible conviction with them.

1

"At the close of the late negociations with France, which were conducted with so much affected courtesy and moderation, but with so little real skill, and which were even protracted long after the result was obvious to the dullest capacity, there was yet time to repair the mischief which had been so studiously disregarded, or so culpably sought. When Buonaparte left Paris to take the command of his armies against Prussia, secret intelligence, in which we have ever been so miserably deficient, was no longer of use. The determination which he had long privily made, was now publicly proclaimed; and it surely required no great depth of penetration to discover the progression of his plans. Was not this then the moment to combine our preparations, to organize our schemes, to collect our resources, and to be ready, with a powerful and commanding force, effectually to assist those, who, by becoming his enemies, were sure to become our allies? The only foe we had to dread was Buonaparte. Against him our whole strength ought, consequently, to have been directed. If we overcame him, every collateral object was gained: if he prevailed, any advantages we might gain in other quarters, would be of little avail. To what end then, on what

principles of sound judgment, or prudent policy, we could so inconsiderately engage in distant expeditions, from which, if we succeeded, we could derive no benefit equivalent to the expense, and which, moreover, by seriously diminishing our strength at home, disabled us from effecting the attainment of all our hopes and speculations, which was the destruction of Buonaparte's continental authority. The fate of our expeditions to Egypt and Constantinople has been such as, from the preparations, was to be expected. By the former, many brave men have been uselessly sacrificed in occupying a district, which they, eventually, will be compelled to abandon: by the latter, the commercial world has been exposed to the loss of a lucrative branch of trade, and the country has been involved in a war with an old and faithful ally. Our expedition to South America, which was on a greater scale, has been pregnant with proportionably greater folly, and has had a proportionably disastrous termination. Independently of the disgrace of failure, it has been attended with very extensive inconvenience and loss. The bravery of our soldiers was never more conspicuous, and on that account, their slaughter is doubly to be deplored. Yet, however creditable the conduct of this expedition may have been to our national courage, it has certainly, in the estimation of mankind, plucked many a leaf from the wreath of our military skill. But it partook, in its origin, of those palpable defects with which every scheme concerted by the late administration so surprisingly abounded, and nothing but what has happened could have been calculated on by any well-informed and reflecting mind. "A blunder, still more ruinous in its consequences, was committed by the assem blage of a numerous army, in Sicily, of whose services, from its position, we were totally deprived. That kind of infatuation which could have induced the late ministry to coop up in such a corner, so powerful a force, it is impossible to account for, A measure, so replete with absurdity, betrays a degree of obstinacy, or of ignorance, which in statesmen is altogether inexcusable, and has been the cause of disasters to this country, most mournful in their nature, and in their consequences irreparable. The moment is now passed, at which Buonaparte might have been successfully attacked, nay, at which he might, to a moral certainty, have been vanquished; nor is it likely speedily to recur. Their total mismanagement of the resources of the empire has, therefore, been accompanied with no trifling or ordinary mischief. It has diverged in every direction: it has been felt in every combination; it has injured the essential interests of the civilized globe; and it has inflicted a wound on the glory and pros perity of Great Britain, which all the skill of science or art may not be able to heal." Having thus exposed the incapacity and mismanagement of our late ministry, the author next proceeds to consider the means left for us to extricate ourselves from those augmented difficulties and dangers in which we have been involved. Decisive and vigorous conduct, celerity of action, and promptitude of attack, display an energy of character, and create for themselves, advantages which, while they surmount difficulty, diminish danger. Without recommending the conduct of France, as a pattern altogether fit for the adoption of our government, our author, nevertheless, subscribes to the general opinion, that her successes have been chiefly owing to the rapidity of her movements; and therefore, he thinks, justly, that we ought to con template her conduct, to a certain extent, so as to secure our safety.

To the ancient public law of Europe, the author pays all due homage; but he, netertheless, draws a distinction, which cannot be too strongly inculcated into the minds of the people. "If," says he, p. 27, " we cannot preserve ourselves by adhering to those prescriptive rules, which, from being deserted by others, no longer protect us, we surely are released from all obligation to obey them: and it depends entirely on our discretion to adopt that new mode which new circumstances require. If others suffer from this change in our conduct, we are not to blame-that is their misfortune, not our crime; and the whole mischief is to be imputed to him who forces us into this unavoidable state. In conformity to this reasoning, we are not only justifiable in having recourse to those regulations, which are best qualified to defeat and confine his; but we become guilty of an evident dereliction of a most sacred duty, by postponing the determination so to act. Every society is indispensably bound to watch over its preservation. When that leading object of its solicitude can be effected by the maintenance of mild laws, and the observance of ancient usages, a departure from them is a wicked, and may become a dangerous experiment. But when, by an adherence to them, its existence, from the previous departure of others, is endangered, it is not only weak, but criminal, to persevere in its obedience. Self-preservation supersedes every other obligation, and to the safety of the common-wealth, every other consideration must yield.

"Buonaparte, therefore, having, in every particular, totally annulled the public law of Europe, and, in his principles and his acts, far outstripped every occasional excess, which has ever been committed by those in whose hands the power of empire has before resided, we must resort to the solitary alternative, which his injustice bas left us, and endeavour to oppose the profligacy and outrage of his designs, by the sternness of retaliation. Thus, he having declared this country in a state of blockade, and, by the most nefarious and rigorous edicts, compelled every port, over which his authority extends, to be shut against our manufactures, we should instantly resolve to cut off his means of supply, as well as those of his dependents and friend, by excluding all possibility of commercial dealings from their havens. We should convert our navy to the same use which he makes of his army; and, by putting a complete hindrance to neutral intervention, convince him, that our power could be more detrimentally employed than his. Affairs have at length reached that aggravating and outrageous point of enmity, that it is worse than folly to be any longer restrained in our proceedings by the delicacy of sentiment, or the forms of ceremony. Buonaparte has, in the plainest terms, declared, and he has acted up to the declaration, that every nation which he can coerce by force, or terrify by threats, or persuade by argument, shall be hostile to Great Britain, and shall, in concert with him, contribute its aid to augment our embarrassments, and accelerate our ruin. This being the case, we should be guided in our actions towards him according to the conduct which he observes towards us; and as long as he perseveres in the enforcement of his pernicious doctrines, we should retaliate by similar acts, till we have convinced him of the folly of the experiment on his part.

"Whilst we continue to persevere in our present system of meekness and moderation, by confining ourselves to the obsolete public law of Europe, we evidently disarm ourselves of half our power, Buonaparte, who is restrained by no such squeamish disposition, derives signal and innumerable advantages from the severity of his commercial regulations: but should we interpose with our preponderating means, and retaliate on him and his friends, by the same rigorous inhibitions, he would speedily discover that the chief suffering recoiled on himself. Such is the singular and afflicting posi tion of Europe at this moment, that, strictly speaking, there are but two independent states. From the continent, which he has subjugated, Buonaparte has banished all neutrality. The only neutrality which is left among the nations of the globe, is a maritime one, which of course exists by sufferance from us. From this sufferance France derives all the benefit, and we incur all the mischief. On what principles of policy or justice we are bound to tolerate such an unequal state of things, it is need, less to attempt to explain."

Upon thesepsiniples, the author lays down several valuable precepts for the fu to eof our naval power, and for intercepting the injurious effects occa under neutral flags. And the same deductions from the general