would treat you to a point of law, with which he would not compliment your predecessors.

I own that it gave my heart a pang to hear an honorable and generous man go back to a confuted defamation, and rally the discomfited, and disgraced assault which had been made upon the fairness of the Sheriff's panel, and the characters of the individual Jurors :-if I thought that this had moved from his own heart, I should wish to expunge from my recollection something so unworthy of that pure source, but I attribute it not to him, but to his client; to those instructions, which in a desperate and factious case, call upon him to struggle for a verdict, however to be obtained; and I remind him triumphantly of all those facts, that he may learn from them the true nature of the service in which he is now engaged, that he may undeceive himself as to the magnanimous character with which he conceives himself to be invested, that he may recall the other circumstances of the triak to his recollection, that he may remember the points of variance and special pleading, upon which the geography of St. Mary's Parish was called in aid of the liberties of Ireland; that he may admit that if his defence has been as it certainly has been brilliant and splendid, its course has been attended by some satellites, which like other satellites, have not a little

eclipsed its lustre, and that if his client be a nation, and if his cause be a people's rights, he has defended them in no other manner than he would have defended a thief at the Old Baily.

In this manifold defence, the first topic to which I shall advert is Mr. Burrowes's repetition of his former argument upon the law of the Convention Act.Much as I admire the talent and ingenuity which he has displayed, I must be permitted to say, that he has not upon the present occasion, argued with more force than upon the former, and unless he has argued with more effect, I shall not conceive myself called upon, or indeed authorized to discuss a second time as a matter of law argument, that upon which the Court has already solemnly decided and therefore, unless I shall hear from your lordships, that doubts have been excited by Mr. Burrowes, as to the propriety of your former determination, I shall certainly abstain from any further reasoning, which might seem to imply my doubts of the soundness of your decision, and shall not compromise the deference which I think every professional man owes to the judgment of a Court of Justice, by bringing its authority into question

[Judge DAY.-I remain unshaken in my former opinion, and I am the more persuaded of

that being the right construction of the Act, from the observations which I have since heard in opposition to it.]

Solicitor General continued. The Attorney General and myself were most happy to find that your Lordships had permitted Mr. Burrowes a second time to discuss this question, and not only did not object to such a proceeding, but rejoiced that a further opportunity should be offered, of weighing the value of those arguments, which he might wish to advance-but now that your Lordships have again declared your deliberate and solemn opinion, I shall not think myself at liberty to do more, than to announce it as the fixed and settled law of the land.-I trust, that such an adjudication will open the eyes even of those, who are determined to be blind upon this subject.I trust, that no one will now hold the alarming language or promulge the formidable doctrine that the criminal law is unsettled, because only the Court of King's Bench has pronounced upon it, and that the subjects of this realm are at liberty to go on in experimental and intermediate violation of that law, until, mayhap the House of Lords may be called upon to decide upon it.-Upon a former occasion, I stated my opi

nion

upon this statute, with reserve and diffi

dence, although I was supported in it by the profoundest lawyer, and one of the wisest men who lives. I could not be over confident even in his opinion, when I knew that learned and able men had differed from us, but now I am warranted to assume another tone-I am not now to argue in support of my own fallible construction, but to announce and insist upon the highest authority, which I recognize in this land as long as the constituted and lawful authorities. of this land are suffered to exist: so long the criminal law of the country is attested in the most unequivocal manner, when pronounced by the Court of King's Bench; and so long as that adjudication stands unreversed, it is emphatically the law, and let him that hears it so announced, disobey it at his peril. Let no man entertain the visionary and frantic notion, that this law, so pronounced, lies in abeyance, because perhaps upon some future occasion it may be brought under the consideration of the dernier resort, that in the mean time the King's subjects are absolved from the obligation of obeying it; and that the opinion of counsel is to supersede the authority of the Judges, and what the King cannot do, dispense with the law of the country: the proposition for which we contended, and which I understand your Lordships to have now established, I shall broadly and frankly

state. That all assemblies of Representatives or Delegates returned by election, which assume to represent the People, or any portion of the People, are unlawful Assemblies, although the sole purpose of such Representation or Delegation be to petition Parliament, if the object of such Assembly be by such Petition or otherwise, to procure an alteration of matters established by law in church or state-that such Assemblies may be dispersed by the magistracy, and that all who concur in the election of members to such Assemblies, are guilty of a misdemeanor. Although I feel myself precluded from any argument in support of your Lordships declared opinion, I trust that I may stand excused,' if I shall make one observation, suggested by Mr. Burrowes's mode of treating the subject yesterday; the principal difference between his late and his former speech, is that originally he struggled for the restrained construction of the word pretence, and insisted that it must be construed as false pretence; and yesterday he urged that topic less strenuously, but contended for a distinction, which in his former argument he had put less forcibly, between general Representation and Delegation for a particu lar purpose, admitting that general Representation is criminal, but alledging that Delegation for a particular purpose is not so: let me suggest