Page images

matters of fact, 602, 605; Such jurisdiction opinion that he considered the republican
does not abolish trial by jury, 605; Sum. polity unsuited to a large extent of Coca-
mary view of the authority of the Supreme try, and his praise of a confederate repub-
Court, 603; Whether the State Courts are lic, 99, 100, 101, 845; True extent of his
to bave concurrent jurisdiction in regard to doctrine, requiring a separation of the
causes submitted to the Federal jurisdiction, legislative, esecutive, and judiciary powers
606, 608 ; In instances of concurrent juris. 874, 376; His remarks concerning the jadi-
diction between the national and state ciary, 576. Note.
courts an appeal would lie from the state NATURALIZATION: Provision of the constito-
courts to the Supreme Court of the United tion concerning iL, 333, 336.
States, 609; Whether an appeal would lie NAVIGATION of the lakes, 117.
from the state courts to subordinate Federal Navy: Practicability of creating a Federal
judicatories, 609, 610.

navy. 115, 116; Its advantages, 117, 118;
JURISDICTION : Literal meaning of the word The Southern States, the nursery of wool;
noticed, 603. Note.

and the Northern of men for ships, 11:;
JURY TRIAL: Answer to the objection that the Importance of establishing a pary as early

constitution contains no provision for the as possible, 206; Power in the Federal
trial by jury in civil cases, 611, 626; In no Constitution of erecting one, 324, 325.
case abolished by the constitution, 6!4; NEGATIVE ON BILLS: (See "Great Britain, *
Examination of the remark that trial by * President")
jury is a safe ard again an oppressive NETHERLANDS: Their government, 17?; Aa
exercise of the power of taxation, 615; evil attending the constitutivn of the Sities
The strongest argument in its favor, in General, 360.
civil cases, is, that it is a security against New HAMPSHIRE: Provision in her constitu-
corruption, 616, 617: Difference between tion concerning the separation of the legis
the limits of the jury trial in the different lative, executive, and judiciary pwers Site
states of the Union, 617, 618; Ineligible in 877; The size of her senatorial districts,
many cases, 618, 619; Proposition concern- compared with the size of the districts par
ing it made by the minority of Pennsyl- posed by the convention, 439, 440; Provisa
vania, 619; Proposition from Massachusetts, ion concerning impeac ment, 497. Nate

NEW JERSEY: Provision in her constitutioa
LEGISLATION: Erils of a motable, 470, 471, 472, concerning the separation of the legislative,

executive, and judiciary powers, 879; ller
LEGISLATURE: Danger of its usurrations in a provisions concerning the unity of the ere.
Representative Republic, 382, 387, 391,

cutive and a council of appointment, 324.
Louis XIV: Anecdote of, 61.

NEW YORK: Her controversy with the district
LYCIAN CONFEDERACY: 102, 147, 360.

of Vermont, s: Alleged excellence of ter

constitution, 216; Provision in her consti.
VABLY, Abbé de : His remark concerning a tution concerning the separation of the le-

Confederate Republic, 52; His remark on gislative, executive, and judiciary powers
the tendency of the Achæan league to mod- 378: Namber of Representatives in the
eration in Government, 162.

more numerous branch of her legislature,
MAINTENON, Madame de : 78.

423: Size of her senatorial districts com-
Marlborough, Joun, Duke of: €0; SARAI, pared with that of the districts proposed
Duchess of, 78.

by the convention, 439; Her constitntion
MARYLAND: Provision in her constitution con- makes no provision concerning the locality

cerning the separation of the legislative, of elections, 462; Provision concerning im.
executive, and judiciary power, 379; con- peachments, 497: Provision concerning the
cerning her Senate, 451.

unity of her executive, 324 and late:
MassACHUSETTS: Insurrections and rebellions Where, by ber constitution, the qualified

in Massa husetts, 82, 179, 180; Provision in power of negativing bills is veatel 391;
her constitution concerning the separation Provision of her constitution prohibiting
of the legislative, execntive and judiciary any person more than sixty years oll frum
powers, 877; Number of Representatives being a juilge, 553, 556.
in the more numerous branch of her Le. Norti! CAROLINA : Revolt of 1 part of. 22;
gislature, 423; Size of her senatorial dis- Provision in her constitutivn cineering a
tricts compared with that of the districts separation of the legislative, executive, and
proposed by the convention, 439; Provision juicirry powers, 830.
concerning impeachments, 497. Note. Pro- | Numa: 291.

position from in regard to jury trial, 622. PENNSYLVANIA: Disturbances in, 55; Provis-
Maxing: Certain maxims in Geometry, ethics, iun in her constitution concerning the sepa

and politics, carrying internal evidence, 244. aration of the legislative, executive, und
Military Force: (Sée " Constitution," - Stand- judiciary powers, 373, 379, 886, 387; Num-
ing armies.")

ber of Representatives in the more ru.
MILITIA: Its disadvantages and merits, 210, merous branch of her legislature, 423; Pro
211; Power of regulating it, 230, 236.

vision concerning impeachments 497.
MINORITIES: Two moules of protecting them Note; Proposition froin the minority of

from usnrpations by majorities, 400, 401, concerning jury trial. 619.
412; To give a minority a negative upon a PERICLES: Examples of the injury resulting
majority which is always the case where to his country from his personal motives
more than a majority is requisite to a de- of action, 77.
cision, is, in its tendency, to subject the Poland: Her government, 169, 170, 302; Aa
sense of the greater number to that of the evil of the Polish Dict, 560,
lesser, 188.

POLITICAL ECONOMY: There is no common
Minos, 291.

measure of national wealth, and why, 101,
MISSISSIPPI: Navigtion of the, 117.

MONEY: Power under the constitution of coin- Post-ROADS: Provision of the Constitution
ing it, 334, 350.

concerning them, 837.
MONTESQUIEU : Refutation of the erroneous PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES : Esagger.


ation noticed of the authority vested in between the principle of representation
him by the Constitution, 303, 304; The among the ancients, and in the United
power of filling casual vacancies in the States, 479.
Senate falsely ascribed to him, 503, 506, 507; | REPUBLIC: Defined, 109. (See “ Confederate
Why thiv power of filling, during the recess Republic, ") Its advantages, 109, 110, 112;
of the Senate, vacancies in Federal offices, Error of the opinion that it is unsuitable
is contided to him, 506, 507; Peculiar eligi- to a large district of country, 132, 133;
bility of the mode provided for his appoint. Natural limits of one, 181, 132; One of its
ment 518, 510; Why the office of Presi. weak sides, the inlets which it affords to
dent will seldom fall to the lot of any man foreign corruption, 159, 190; Defined or
not qualified in any degree to fill it, 511; described, 301, 302; Inapplicability of the
His constitution compared with that of the title to certain governments which have
King of Great Britain, and with that of the received it, 301, 302; Obligation of the
Governor of New York, 513, 515; His Federal Government to guarantee to every
qualified negative on bills, 514, 515, 516; A State a republican form of government,
shield to the executive, 547; An addition-

al security against the enacting of improp- RHODE ISLAND: Provision in her constitution
er laws, 647; The power likely to be exer- concerning elections, 410; Number of rep.
cised only with great caution, 619; Practice resentatives in the more numerous branch
in Great Britain, 549: Cases for which, of her legislature, 423; Iniquitous meas-
chietly, it was designed, 519; Where vest- ures of, 475.
ed by the constitution of New York, 551; | Rome: Senate of, 477 ; Tribunes of, 479, 482;
Refutation of the doctrine chat & vigorous Evils arising from her having plural consuls
executive is inconsistent with the genius and tribunes, 324, 560.
of a republican government, 522; The ROMULUS, 291.
unity of the executivo defended, 528; Ob- RUTHERFORTH, Dr. Thomas, cited, 635. Note.
jections to a plural executive, 523, 525; SENATE: (See Elections," " Judiciary,") Will
Objections to an executive council, 523, generally be composed with peculiar care
530; The responsibility of the President, and judgment, and why? 221; Its consti-
necessary, 529; The term of four years for tution, 466, 502; Qualifications of Senators,
his office defended, 532, 535, 387; His re- 466, 467; Appointment of Senators by the
eligibility defended, 538, 543, 544; Danger Sunte Legislatures, 467; Equality of repre-
of instability in the system of administra- sentations in the Senate, 467, 469; Number
tion, 539; Danger, particularly, from fre- of Senators and duration of their appoint-
quent periodical changes of subordinate ment 469; Its power in regard to making
officers, 539; Evils to be apprebended from treaties, 483, 489; Provision for the bien-
the perpetual or temporary ineligibility of nial succession

aird of new Sena-
the President, after serving one term, 539, tors, 481, 485; Viewed as a court of im-
542; Fallacy of the advantages expected peachment, 490, 502; the objection which
to arise from it, 543, 544; The provision in would substitute the proportion of two-
the Constitution for the compensation of thirds of all the members composing the
the President, 545, 546; His power as Senate, to that of two-thirds of the mem-
Cominander-in-Chief of the army and bers present considered, 560, 561; Its cooper-
navy, 652; His power of requiring the ation with the President in appointments, a
opinions in writing of the heads of the ex- check on favoritism, 565, 566; Answer to
ecutive departments, 552; lis power of the objection that the President, by the in-
pardoning, 253, 554; Answer to the objec- fluence of the power of nomination, may
iion against his having the sole power of secure the complaisance of the Senate to
pardon in cases of treason, 554; His power his views, 566, 567, 568, 569; Its consent
in relation to treaties, 656, 559, 561; His would be necessary to displace as well as
power in regard to the appointment of Fed- to appoint officers, 568.
eral officers, 562, 566 ; Less apt than a nu. SERVIUS TULLIU8, 291.
merous assembly of men, to consult per- Suay's REBELLION, 78.
sonal or party feelings in appointments, Ship BUILDING: The wood of the Southern
563, 564; The coöperation of the Senate, a States preferable for it, 118.
check on a spirit of favoritism in the Pres. SLAVES: The importation of them after the
iilent. 565 ; llis power in regard to the re- year 1908, prohibited, 331; Possess the
moval of officers, 568; The constitution of mixed character of persons and property,
the President combines the requisites to 417, 418; Defence of the provision of the
public safety, 573.

Constitution combining them with free
Press: The liberty of the, 631, 632; Tax on citizens as a ratio of taxation, 416, 421.

newspapers in Great Britain, 682, Note. SOCRATES, 424.
Public Acts : Records, &c., Provision of the Solox, 291.
Constitution concerning them, 536.

South CAROLINA: Provision in her constitution
Publio Debt: Would be à cause of collision concerning the separation of the legisla-

between the separate States or Confedera- tive, executive, and judiciary powers, 350;
cies, 87; Obligation of the Federal Govern- Provision concerning elections, 410; Nun.
ment concerning public debts, prior to the ber of Representatives in the more nume-
adoption of the Constitution, 345.

rous branch of her legislature, 423; Pro-
PUBLIC LANDS: A fruitful source of contro- vision concerning impeachments, 497,
versy, 83, 86.

REMOVALS OF FEDERAL OFFICERS : (See " Presi. Sparta: Her Senate, 477; Her Ephori, 479, 482.

STANDING ARMIES : (See Constitution,") Ono
REPRESENTATION: The principle of it, said to advantage of them in Europe, 90, 91; Would

be an invention of modern Europe, 132, be an inevitable result of the dissolution
405, 479; Idea of an actual representation of the Confederacy, 92, 95; Their fatal ef-
of all classes of the people by persons of fects on liberty, 91, 92. See pp. 820, 321;
each class, vi-ionary, 269, 270; Distinction Why they did not spring up in the Greciau

Republics, 93; Nor to any considerable ex- power denied, 249; Except as to importa
tent in Great Britain, 94, 321, 322, 823; Wis- and exports, the United States and the sete
dom of the provision of the Federal Con- eral states have concurrent powers of tas.
stitution in this particular, 202, 206, 216, 217 ation, 251; No repugnancy between those
218, 322; Why it is better for an arıny to concurrent powers, 252; the Decessity of
be in the bands of the Federal Government them, 252, 253, 256, 265; Dangers of restrict-
than of the State Governinents, 205; Silence ing the Federal power to laying duties oa
in regard to them in the constitutions of all imposts, 266; Effect of exorbitant duties
the states except two, 202, 203, 211, 213; 266, 267; Answer to objections to the powe
Provision concerning them, in the English er of internal taxation in the Federal Gov.
Bill of Rights framed at the Revolution in ernment, derived from the alleged want of
16-3, 214, 215; llighest proportion of a a sutlicient knowledge of local circum-
standing army to the population of a coun. stances, and from a supposed interference
try, 871.

between the recente laws of the Unica
STATES : (See "Constitution," “Taxation," and those of the partien lar States, 174;

**Union,") Advantages of an unrestrained Suggestion of donble tasatian answered,
intercourse between them, 121, 122, The 278, 279; Evils of poll taxes admitted, but
consequences of the doctrine that the in-

the propriety of vesting in the Feleral
terposition of the States ought to be re- Government the power of imposing them,
quired to give effect to a measure of the asserted, 279, 280 ; Provision of the Con.
Union, 151, 152, 153; Easier for the state stitution concerning taxation, 852.
governments to encroach on the National THESEUB, 291.
Government than for the latter to encroach Titles of NOBILITY: The probibition of them
on the former, 154, 247, 258, 864; The state the corner stone of Republican Govern.
governments will in all possible contingen. ment, 629.
cies afford complete security against all in. TREASON: Power under the Constitution con-
vasions of public liberty by the national corning it, 340; Why the power of parden
authority, 223, 360, 872; Power of Congress ing in cases of treason is properly rested in
to admit new states into the Union, 840; the President solely, 253, 254.
Obligation of Congress to guaranty a re- TREATIES : Power under the Constitution code
publican form of government to every cerning them, 349; Why they onght to be
state, 841, 42, 843, 344; Provision of the the supreme law of the land, 487; Poser
Constitution concerning its ratification by of the President in regard to them. 456
nine states, 346; Why the state magistracy 561; Why the House of Representatives
should be bound to support the Federal ought to have no power in forming thein,
Constitution, 356; Discussion of the sup- 659; Why two-thirds of the Senators pres-
posed danger froin the powers of the Union ent are preferable to two-thirds of the
to the state governments, 358, 372; exam- whole Senate as a co-ordinate power with
ination of the comparative means of influ. the President, in regard to treaties, 36).
ence of the federal and state governments, Tullus HOSTILITB, 291.
367, 372; Provisions in the constitutions of UNION: (See" Co federacies," * Constitntion.")
the several states concerning the separation Its importance, 54; Its capacity to call into
of the legislative, executive, and judiciary serrico the best talents of the country. 81;
powers, 376, 381; Provisions, etc., conceru- A bulwark against foreigh force and inte.
ing elections, 424; Provisions, etc., con- ence, 66, 74; Its capacity to prevent wars,
cerning the size of electoral districts, 439, 61, 62, 63, 69; A safeguard against domestic
440; As fair o presume abuses of power by insurrections and wars, 76, 90, 97, 119: A
the state governments as by the federal safeguard against standing armies as coese-
government, 450; ** Portion of sovereignty quent on domestic insurrections and was
remaining in the individual states," recog- 90), 95; Its utility in respect to commerce
nized by the Constitution, 467, 468; Pro- and a Navy, 118, 121; Its atility in respect
visions of the constitutions of the several to revenue, 121, 130; Principal purposes
states concerning impeachments, 497, Note ; to be answered by it, 195; Il founded on
New York and New Jersey the only states considerations of public happiness the sot.
which have entrusted the executive anthor- ereignty of the states, if irreconcileable to
ity wholly to single men, 524; Difference it, should be sacrificed, 3.59.
between the limits of the jury trial in the UNITED STATES: Their actual dimensions, 188
different states, 617, 618.

VENICE: Not a Republic, 802.
SWEDEN: Corruption the cause of the sudden VICE-PRESIDENT, 511, 012.
despotism of Gustavus III., 191.

VIRGINIA: (See "Jefferson, Thomas,") Pro-
Swiss CANTONS: Their Government, 170, 171, vision in her Constitution concerning the
TAXES: Indirect taxes, tho most expedient separation of the legislative, esecutire,

source of revenue in the United States, 123, and judiciary powers, 379, 8, 85; Was
1.2. 153; Suggestion of a tax on ardent the colony which stood first in resisting
spirita, 126; Taxation, 287, 281; Incompe- the parliamentary usurpations of Great
tency of the Turkish Sovereign to impose Britain, 407; Was the first to espouse by a
a new tax, 288; Intention, and practical de- public act the resolution of independence,
fects of the old confederation in regard to 407; Elections under her former Govern.
taxation, 238, 239; Distinction between in.

ment, 407.
ternal and external taxes, 239; Inadequacy WEST INDIA TRADE, 115, 116.
of requisitions on the States, 240, 241; Ad WOLSEY, Cardinal, 77, 78.
vantages of vesting the power of taxation WYOMING, lands of:' Dispnte between Con-
in the Federal Government, as it regards necticut and Pennsylvanis concerning
borrowing, 242; Positions manifesting the them, 85.
necessity of so vesting the power, 245; Ob- ZALECCCB, 291.
jections, 246, 247; Danger of so vesting the

[ocr errors]
« PreviousContinue »