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up fo long; but that we know the intereft of Chriftendom, being concerned in her fecurity, the hath been chiefly supported by ne fupplies and arms of others.

Therefore our conclufion fhall be this, that fince kings, and all standing powers, are so inclinable to act according to their own will and interefts, in making, expounding, and executing of laws to the prejudice of the people's liberty and security; and feeing the only way to prevent arbitrarinefs, is, that no laws or dominations whatfoever fhould be made, but by the people's confent and election: therefore it muft of neceffity be granted that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties, being fettled in a due and orderly fucceffion of their fupreme affemblies.

The twelfth reafon, to prove the excellency of a free-state above any other form, is, because in free-ftates there are fewer opportunities of oppreffion and tyranny, than in the other forms. And this appears, in that it is ever the care of free-commonwealths, for the most part, to preserve, not an an equality, (which were irrational and odious) but an equability of condition among all the members; fo that no particular man or men fhall be permitted to grow over-great in power; nor any rank of men be allowed above the ordinary ftandard, to affume unto themselves the ftate and title of nobility.

The obfervation of the former fecures the people's liberty from the reach of their own officers, fuch as being intrufted with the affairs of high truft and employment, either in camp and council, might perhaps take occafion thereby to aspire beyond reason, if not reftrained and prevented.

The obfervation of the letter fecures the people from the preffures and ambition of fuch petty tyrants, as would ufurp and claim a prerogative, power, and greatnefs above others, by birth and inheritance. Thefe are a fort of men not to be endured in any well-ordered commonwealth; for they always bear a natural and implacable hate towards the people, making

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it their intereft to deprive them of their liberty; fo that if at any time it happen, that any great man or men whatsoever, arrive to fo much power and confidence, as to think of ufurping, or to be in a condition to be tempted thereunto; these are the first that will fet them on, mingle interefts with them, and become the prime inftruments in heaving them up into the feat of tyranny.

For the clearing of these truths; and firft, to manifest the inconvenience of permitting any perfons to be over-great in any ftate; and that free-ftates that have not avoided it, have foon loft their liberty, we fhall produce a file of examples. In Greece we find, that the free-ftate of Athens loft it's liberty upon that account once, when they fuffered certain of the fenators to over-top the reft in power; which occafioned that multiplied tyranny, made famous by the name of the thirty tyrants at another time, when by the fame error they were constrained, through the power of Piftratus, to stoop unto his fingle tyranny.

Upon this fcore alfo, the people of Syracufe had the fame misfortune under the tyrant Hiero, as had they of Sicily, under Dionyfius and Agathocles.

In Rome alfo the cafe is the fame too: for during the time that liberty was included within the fenate, they gave both Mælius and Manlius an apportunity to aspire, by permitting them a growth of two much greatness: but by good fortune efcaping their clutches, they afterwards fell as foolishly into the hands of ten of their fellow-fenators, called the Decemviri; in giving them fo much power as tempted them unto tyranny. Afterwards, when the people fcuffled, and made a shift to recover their liberty out of the hands of the fenate, they committed the fame error too, by permitting of their fervants to grow over-great; fuch as Sylla, who by power tyrannized and made himself dictator for five years, as Cæfar afterwards fettled the dictatorship upon himself for ever; and after Cæfar's death they might have recovered their liberty again, if

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they had taken care (as they might eafily have done) to prevent the growing greatness of Auguftus, who gaining power firft by the courtesy and good will of the fenate and people, made use of it to establish himself in a tyranny, which could never after be extinguished, but in the ruin of the Roman empire itself.

Thus also the free ftate of Florence foolishly ruined itself by the greatning of Cofmus; firft, permitting him to engross the power, which gave him opportunity to be a tyrant; and then as foolishly forcing him to declare himself a tyrant, by an unfeasonable demand of the power back out of his hands. Many more inftances might be fetched out of Milan, Switzerland, and other places: but we have one nearer home, and of a later date, in Holland; whereby permitting the family of Orange to greaten a little more than befeemed a member of a free-ftate, they were infenfibly reduced to the lost cast, to run the hazard of the lofs of their liberty.

Therefore one prime principle of state, is, to keep any man though he have deserved never so well by good fuccess or fervice, from being too great or popular it is a notable means (and so esteemed by all free-states) to keep and preserve a commonwealth from the rapes of ufurpation.

A fourteenth reafon, (and though the laft. yet not the leaft) to prove a free-state or government by the people, fettled in a due and orderly fucceffion of their fupreme affemblies, is much more excellent than any other form, is, because in this form, all powers are accountable for misdemeanors in government, in regard of the nimble returns and periods of the people's election: by which means, he that ere-while was a governor, being reduced to the condition of a subject, lies open to the force of the laws; and may with eafe be brought to punishment for his offence; fo that, after the obfervation of fuch a course, others which fucceed will become the lefs daring to offend, or to abuse their truft in authority, to an oppreffion of the people. Such a course as this, cuts the very throat of all tyranny;

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and doth not only root it up when at full growth, but crusheth the cockatrice in the egg, deftroys it in the feed, in the principle, and in the very poffibilities of its being for ever after. And as the safety of the peopie is the fovereign and supreme law; fo an establishment of this nature is an impregnable bulwark of the people's fafety, because without it, no certain benefit can be obtained by the ordinary laws; which if they should be difpenfed by uncontroulable, unaccountable perfons in power, fhall never be interpreted but in their own fense; nor executed but after their own wills and pleasure.

Now this is moft certain, that as in the government of the people, the fucceffive revolution of authority by their confent hath ever been the only bank againft inundations of arbitrary power and tyranny; fo on the other fide, it is as fure, that all ftanding powers have and ever do affume unto themselves an arbitrary exercise of their own dictates at pleasure, and make it their only intereft to fettle themselves in an unaccountable state of dominion: fo that, though they commit all the injuf tice in the world, their cuftom hath been ftill to perfuade men partly by ftrong pretence of argument, and partly by force that they may do what they lift; and that they are not bound to give an account of their actions to any but to God himself. This doctrine of tyranny hath taken the deeper root in men's minds, because the greateft part was ever inclined to adore the golden idol of tyranny in every form: by which means the rabble of mankind being prejudicated in this particular, and having placed their corrupt humour or intereft in base fawning and the favour of prefent great ones, therefore if any refolute fpirit happen to broach and maintain true principles of freedom or do at any time arife to fo much courage as to perform a noble act of justice, in calling tyrants to an account, presently he draws all the enmity and fury of the world about him. But in commonwealths it is and ought to be otherwife; for, in the monuments of the Grecian and Roman freedom we find, thofe nations were wont to heap all the honours they could in

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vent, by public rewards, confecration of ftatutes, and crowns of laurel, upon fuch worthy patriots: and as if on earth all were too little, they inrolled them in heaven among the deities. And all this they did out of a noble sense of commonweal-intereft; knowing that the life of liberty confifts in a strict hand and zeal against tyrants and tyranny, and by keeping perfons in power from all the occafions of it: which cannot be better done, than (according to the cuftom of all states that are really free) by leaving them liable to account: which happiness was never seen yet under the fun, by any law or custom established save only in thofe ftates, where all men are brought to taste of fubjection as well as rule, and the government fettled by a due fucceffion of authority, by confent of the people.

In Switzerland the people are free indeed, because all officers and governors in the cantons, are questionable by the people in their fucceffive affemblies.

The inference from the foregoing particulars, is easy, that fince freedom is to be preferved no other way in a commonwealth, but by keeping officers and governors in an accountable ftate and fince it appears no ftanding powers can ever be called to an account without much difficulty, or involving a nation in blood or mifery. And fince à revolution of government in the people's hands hath ever been the only means to make governors accountable, and prevent the inconveniences of tyranny, diftraction, and mifery; therefore for this, and those other reasons foregoing, we may conclude, that a free ftate, or government by the people, fettled in a due and orderly fucceffion of their fupreme affemblies, is far more excellent every way than any other form whatsoever.

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