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The obfervation then arifing from hence, is this, that the only way for a people preferve to themselves in the enjoyment of their freedom, and to avoid thofe fatal inconveniencies of faction and tyranny, is, to maintain a due and orderly fucceffion of power and perfons. This was, and is, good Commonwealths language; and without this rule it is impoffible any nation fhould long fubfift in a state of freedom. So that the wisdom, the piety, the juftice, and the felf-denial of those governors in free-ftates, is worthy of all honour and admiration, who have, or shall at any time as willingly resign their trufts, as ever they took them up; and have fo far denied themselves as to prefix limits and bounds to their own authority. This was it that made Brutus fo famous in the beginning of the Roman Commonwealth. For this also it was that history hath left fo reverend a remembrance of Scipio, Camillus, and Virginus; as did Cato likewife of Pompey: whilst the ten grandee ufurpers, with Sylla and Cæfar, and the names of others that practifed the contrary, are left as odious upon the Roman record, as the name of Richard the third will be in our modern chronicle, to all posterity."

A fifth reafon to prove the life of liberty lies in fucceffion of powers and perfons is, because it is the only remedy against self-seeking, with all the powerful temptations and charms of self-intereft for the attaining of particular ends requires length of time, as well as the creating and promoting of a faction both thefe defigns muft lie long in fermentation, or elfe they can never gain the beloved opportunity to bring matters to perfection. The truth of this appears likewise in the ftory of the Roman ftate; for, as long as all authority was confined within the walls of a ftanding fenate, they being more ftudious of their own, than the common good, in a short time the Commonwealth was turned altogether into a private; infomuch, that the people became not only incapable of any honour and authority; but well-nigh reduced to flat beggary.

Hence

Hence it was, that fo many quarrels and combuftions arofe one after another: for, the great ones having made ufe of their time, in drawing all to themselves, the people were forced to live upon borrowing; and when they could borrow no longer, they fell into a general mutiny, and forfook the city: nor could they be pacified till all accounts were quitted; and then, with much ado, they were wrought upon by the eloquence of Menenius Agrippa, with his excellent fable of a mutiny in a natural body, among the members against the belly.

Thus, as the firft infurrection was occafioned by the ufury and exactions of the great ones; who by their long continuance in power had drawn all unto themfelves: fo the fecond was occafioned by the lordlinefs of thofe ten perfons, who being elected to do juftice, according to the laws, made ufe of their time, only to confirm their power, and greaten themselves, by replenishing their own coffers, ingrofling of offices, and preferring their own kindred and alliances: and at length, improved felf-intereft fo high, that they domineered, like absolute tyrants, advancing and deprefling whom they pleased, without refpect to merit or infufficiency, vice or virtue; fo that having fecured all in their own hands, they over-ruled their fellow-fenators at pleafure, as well as the people.

Many more inftances, of after-times might be given; but thefe are fufficient whereupon to ground this obfervation, that as the first founders of the Roman liberty did well in driving out their kings; fo on the other fide, they did very ill in fettling a standing authority within themselves; for, by this means lying open to the temptations of honour and profit, (which are fails too big for any human bulk) they were immediately fwallowed up of felf: and taking their rife from the opportu nity of a continued power, made ufe of the public only to advance their private, whereby they put the Commonwealth into frequent flames of difcontent and fedition; which might all have bee revented, could they have denied themselves at

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firft, and fettled the ftate free indeed, (as they ought to have done) by placing an orderly fucceffion, of fupreme authority in the hands of the people.

A fixth reason, why a free ftate is much more excellent than a government by grandees or kings; and, that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties, is, because, as the end of all government is (or ought to be) the good and ease of the people, in a fecure enjoyment of their rights, without preffure and oppreffion: fo queftionless the people, who are moft fenfible of their own burthens, being once put into a capacity and freedom of acting, are the moft likely to provide remedies for their own relief: they only know where the fhoe wrings, what grievances are moft heavy, and what future fences they ftand in need of, to fhelter them from the injurious affaults of thofe powers that are above them: and therefore it is but reason, they fhould fee that none be interested in the fupreme authority but perfons of their own election, and fuch as muft in a fhort time return again into the fame condition with themfelves, to reap the fame benefit or burthen, by the laws enacted, that befals the reft of the people. Then the iffue of fuch a conftitution must needs be this, that no load fhall be laid upon any, but what is common to all, and that always by common confent; not to ferve the lufts of only to fupply the neceffities of their country.

any, but

But when it happens, that a fupreme power long continues in the hands of any perfon or perfons; they, by greatness of place, being feated above the middle region of the people, fit fecure from all winds and weathers, and from thofe ftorms of violence that nip and terrify the inferior part of the world: whereas, if by a fucceffive revolution of authority, they come to be degraded of their earthly god heads, and return into the fame condition with other mortals, they muft needs be the more fenfible and tender of what fhall be laid upon them. The ftrongeft obligation that can be laid upon any man in public matters, is, to fee that he engages in nothing but what must

either

either offenfively or beneficially reflect upon himself: for as if any be never fo good a patriot, yet if his power be prolonged he will find it hard to keep felf from creeping in upon him, and prompting him to fome extravagances for his own private benefit; fo, on the other fide, if he be fhortly to return to a condition common with the rest of his brethren, felf-intereft binds him to do nothing but what is just and equal: he himself being to reap the good or evil of what is done, as well as the meaneft of the people.

This without controversy muft needs be the most noble the moft juft, and the moft excellent way of government in freeftates; without which, it is obvious to common fenfe, no nation can long continue in a flate of freedom: as appears likewife by example out of the Roman ftory. For what more noble patriots were there ever in the world, than the Roman fenators were, whilft they were kept under by their kings, and felt the fame burthens of their fury, as did the reft of the people? but afterwards being freed from the kingly yoke, and having fecured all power within the hands of themselves and their pofterity, they at length fell into the fame abfurdities that had been before committed by their kings; fo that this new yoke became more intolerable than the former. Nor could the people find any remedy, until they procured that neceflary office of the tribunes; who being invented with a temporary authority by the people's election, remained the more fenfible of their condition, and were as moderators between the power of the great ones, and the rights of the people.

What more excellent patriot could there be than Manlius, till he became corrupted by time and power? Who more noble, and courteous, and well-affected to the common good, than was Appius Claudius at firft? but afterwards, having obtained a continuation of the government in his own hands, he foon loft his primitive innocency and integrity, and devoted himself to all the practices of an abfolute tyrant. Many

others.

others might be reckoned up. And therefore hence it was, that when the fenate (for fome reafons) thought to continue Lucius Quintus in the confulfhip longer than the ufual time; that gallant man utterly refufed it, and chofe rather to deny himself, than that a precedent fo prejudicial to the Roman freedom fhould be made for his fake, by a prerogative of authority in his hands, beyond the ordinary cuftom.

(To be continued in our next Number.)

For the PHILANTHROPIST.

A NEW SONG.

(To an Irish tune)

OCH! Billy Pit and what will ye be a’ter,

To do next to poor people of men?
Such a heaven born fort of a crater,
To be fure will be acting again.
But ah! 'tis the Devil's own carving,

That thus us poor Chriftians you fag:

Not eafy to fee us all starving,

You ftop each man's mouth with a Gag.

But know my sweet jewel, my Billy,

What 'ere you may think of your maws;
We feel most confoundedly filly,

With a padlock fixed to our jaws.
'Its a a terrible nafty decree Sir,

That all who with hunger will grumble,

Shall gently walk over the fea,

Or elfe into th' other world tumble.

Now attend if you relish falvation,
And wait while by truths I fhall tell ye;
If you'd stop all the mouths in the nation,
You'd better feed every belly.

The

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