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The observation then arising from hence, is this, that the only way for a people preserve to themselves in the enjoyment of their freedom, and to avoid those fatal inconveniencies of faction and tyranny, is, to maintain a due and orderly succeffion of power and persons. This was, and is, good Commonwealths fanguage; and without this rule it is impossible any nation should long subsist in a state of freedom. So that the wisdom, the piety, the justice, and the self-denial of those governors in free-states, is worthy of all honour and admiration, who have, or shall at any time as willingly resign their trusts, as ever they took them up; and have so far denied themselves as to prefix limits and bounds to their own authority. This was it that made Brutus so famous in the beginning of the Roman Commonwealth. For this also it was that history hath left fo reverend a remembrance of Scipio, Camillus, and Virginus; as did Cato likewise of Pompey : whilst the ten grandee usurpers, with Sylla and Cæsar, and the names of others that practised the contrary, are left as odious

upon the Roman record, as the name of Richard the third will be in our modern chronicle, to all posterity.

A fifth reason to prove the life of liberty lies in succession of powers and persons is, because it is the only remedy against self-seeking, with all the powerful temptations and charms of self-interest: for the attaining of particular ends requires length of time, as well as the creating and promoting of a faćtion : both these designs must lie long in fermentation, or else they can never gain the beloved opportunity to bring mat. ters to perfection. The truth of this appears likewise in the story of the Roman {tate; for, as long as all authority was confined within the walls of a standing senate, they being more studious of their own, than the common good, in a short time the Commonwealth was turned altogether into a private ; infomuch, that the people became not only incapable of any honour and authority; but well-nigh reduced to flat beggary.


Hence it was, that so many quarrels and combustions arose one after another : for, the rest ones having made use of their time, in drawing all to themselves, the people were forced to live upon borrowing; and when they could borrow no longer, they fell into a general mutiny, and forfook the city : nor could they be pacified till all accounts were quities; and then, with much ado, they were wrought upon by the eloquence of Menenius Agrippa, with his excellent fable of a mutiny in a natural body, among the members against the belly.

Thus, as the first infurrection was occasioned by the ufury and exactions of the great ones; who by their long continuance in power had drawn all unto themselves : fo the second was occafioned by the lordliness of those ten perfons, who being elected to do justice, according to the laws, made use of their time, only to confirm their power, and greaten themselves, by replenishing their own coffers, ingroiling of offices, and preferring their own kindred and alliances : and at length, improved self-interest so high, that they domineered, like absolute tyrants, advancing and depresling whom they pleased, without respect to merit or infufficiency, vice or virtue; fo that having secured all in their own hands, they over-ruled their fellow-senators at pleasure, as well as the people.

Many more instances, of after-times might be given ; but these are suficient whereupon to ground this observation, that as the first founders of the Roman liberty did well in driving out their kings; so on the other fide, they did very ill in fettling a standing authority within themselves; for, by this means lying open to the temptations of honour and profit, (which are fails too big for any human bulk) they were immediately swallowed up of felf: and taking their rise from the opportu-nity of a continued power, made use of the public only to ad vance their private, whereby they put the Commonwealth irito frequent flames of discontent and fedition; which might all have bee nrevented, could they have denied themselves at

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first, and settled the state free indeed, (as they ought to have done) by placing an orderly succession of supreme authority in the hands of the people.

A fixth reason, why a free state is much more excellent than a government by grandees or kings; and, that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties, is, because, as the end of all governinent is (or ought to be) the good and ease of the people, in a secure enjoyment of their rights, without pressure and oppression : lo questionless the people, who are most sensible of their own burthens, being once put into a ca. pacity and freedom of acting, are the most likely' to provide remedies for their own relief: they only know where the shoe wrings, what grievances are most heavy, and what future fences they stand in need of, to fhelter them from the injurious aífaults of those powers that are above them: and therefore it is but reason, they should see that none be interested in the supreme authority but persons of their own election, and such as must in a short time return again into the faine condition with themselves, to reap the fame benefit or burthen, by the Jaws enacted, that befals the rest of the people. Then the issue of such a constitution must needs be this, that no load shall be laid upon any, but what is common to all, and that always by cominon confent; not to serve the lusts of


but only to supply the necessities of their country.

But when it happens, that a supreme power long continues in the hands of any perfon or persons; they, by greatness of place, being seated above the middle region of the people, fit fccure from all winds and weathers, and from those storms of viulence that nip and terrify the inferior part of the world: whereas, if by a successive revolution of authority, they come to be degraded of their earthly godheads, and return into the same condition with other mortals, they must needs be the more fenfible and tender of what thall be laid upon them. The strongest obligation that can be laid upon any man in public matters, is, to see that he engages in nothing but what must either offensively or beneficially reflect upon himself: for as if any be never so good a patriot, yet if his power be prolonged he will find it hard to keep self from creeping in upon him, and prompting him to some extravagances for his own private benefit; fo, on the other side, if he be shortly to return to a condition common with the rest of his brethren, self-interest binds him to do nothing but what is just and equal : he himself being to reap the good or evil of what is done, as well as the meanest of the people.

This without controversy must needs be the most noble the most just, and the most excellent way of government in freeftates; without which, it is obvious to common sense, no nation can long continue in a state of freedom : as appears likewise by example out of the Roman story. For what more noble patriots were there ever in the world, than the Roman renators were, whilst they were kept under by their kings, and felt the same burthens of their fury, as did the rest of the people! but afterwards being freed from the kingly yoke, and having secured all power within the hands of themselves and their posterity, they at length fell into the same absurdities that had been before committed by their kings; so that this new yoke became more intolerable than the former. Nor could the people find any remedy, until they procured that necessary office of the tribunes; who being invested with a temporary authority by the people's election, remained the more sensible of their condition, and were as moderators between the power of the great ones, and the rights of the people.

What more excellent patriot could there be than Manlius, till he became corrupted by time and power? Who more noble, and courteous, and well-affected to the common good, than was Appius Claudius at first? but afterwards, having obtained a continuation of the government in his own hands, he foon lost his primitive innocency and integrity, and devored himself to all the practices of an absolute tyrant. Many others might be reckoned up. And therefore henee it

was, that when the senate (for some reasons) thought to continue Lucius Quintus in the consulship longer than the usual time; that gallant man utterly refused it, and chose rather to deny himself, than that a precedent so prejudicial to the Roman freedom should be made for his fake, by a prerogative of authority in his hands, beyond the ordinary custom.

(Po be continued in our next Number.)



(To an Irish tune)

CH! Billy Pit and what will ye be a’ter,
To do next to poor people of men ?
Such a heaven born sort of a crater,

To be sure will be acting again,
But ah! 'tis the Devil's own carving,

That thus us poor Christians you fag:
Not easy to see us all starving,

You stop each man's mouth with a Gag.
But know my sweet jewel, my Billy,

What 'ere you may think of your maws;
We feel most confoundedly filly,

With a padlock fixed to our jaws.
’Its a a terrible nafty decree Sir,

That all who with hunger will grumble,
Shall gently walk over the sea,

Or else into th’ other world tumble.
Now attend if you relish salvation,

And wait while by truths I Mail tell ye;
If you'd stop all the mouths in the nation,

You'd better feed every belly..


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