What is it I have done, or faid, That should endanger thus my head, And threaten ills my ign'rance near had wrought! But yet 'tis all in vain! we know As Minifters fhall will, 'tis fo! I therefore answered not, but home did poft, J. E. W. FOR THE PHILANTHROPIST. Mr. EDITOR. The early infertion of the following quotation, will be esteemed a favour, and occafionally I will take the liberty of troubling you with others of the fame fort of divinity, which being political, I conceive to be as neceffary to human happiness, as religious. I remain, in Fraternity, your's, LITTLE DIPPER. EXCELLENCE OF A FREE STATE. BY MARCHMONT NEDHAM. Reafons why the Government fhould be in the Hands of the People. BECAUSE this form is most suitable to the nature and reason of mankind: for, as Cicero faith, "Man is a noble creature, born with affections to rule, rather than obey; there being in every man a natural appetite or defire of principality." And therefore the reason why one man is content to submit to the government of another, is, not because he conceives himself to have lefs right than another to govern; but either because he finds himfelf lefs able, or else because he judgeth it will be more convenient for himself, and that community whereof he is a member, if he submits unto another's another's government. Nemini parere vult animus a naturæ bene informatus, nifi, &c. faith the fame Cicero: that is to say, in honeft English, "A mind well inftructed by the light of nature, will pay obedience unto none but fuch as command, direct, or govern, for its good and benefit." From both which paffages and expreffions of that oracle of human wisdom, these three inferences do naturally arife: first, that by the light of nature people are taught to be their own carvers and contrivers, in the framing of that government under which they mean to live. Secondly, that none are to prefide in government, or fit at the helm, but fuch as fhall be judged fit, and chofen by the people. Thirdly, that the people are the only proper judges of the convenience or inconvenience of a government when it is erected, and of the behaviour of governors after they are chosen = which three deductions appear to be no more, but an explanation of this most excellent maxim, That the original and fountain of all just power and government is in the people. This being fo, that a free-ftate-government by the people, that is, by their fucceffive reprefentatives, or fupreme assemblies, duly chofen, is moft natural, and only fuitable to the rcafon of mankind; then it follows, that the other forms, whether it be of a standing power in the hands of a particular perfon, as a king; or of a fet number of great ones, as in a senate, are befides the dictates of nature, being mere artificial devices of great men, fquared out only to ferve the ends and interests of avarice, pride and ambition of a few, to a vaffalizing of the community. The truth whereof appears fo much the more, if we confider, that a confent and free election of the people, which is the most natural way and form of governing, hath no real effect in the other forms; but is either fupplanted by craft and custom, or swallowed up by a pernicious pretence of right (in one or many) to govern, only by virtue of an hereditary fucceffion. Now certainly, were there no other argument to prove the excellency of government by the people, &c. beyond the other forms; yet this one might fuffice, that in the people's form, men have liberty to make use of that reason and understanding God hath given them, in chufing of governors, and and providing for their own fafety in government: but in the other forms of a standing power, all authority being entailed to certain perfons and families, in a course of inheritance, men are always deprived of the ufe of their reafon about choice of governors, and forced to receive them blindly, and at all adventure which courfe being so destructive to the reason, common intereft, and majefty of that noble creature, called man, that he should not in a matter of fo high confequence as government, (wherein the good and fafety of all is concerned) have a freedom of choice and judgment, muft needs be the most irrational and brutish principle in the world, and fit only to be hiffed out of the world, together with all forms of standing power (whether in kings, or others) which have ferved for no other end, but to transform men into beafts, and mortified mankind with mifery through all generations. The truth of this is evident all the world over; firft, by fad examples of monarchy: for the kingly form having been retained in a courfe of inheritance, men being forced to take what comes next for a governor, whether it be male or female, a wife man or a fool, good or bad; fo that the major part of hereditary princes have been tyrannous and wicked by nature, or made fo by education and opportunity: the people have been for the most part bandied to and fro, with their lives and fortunes, at the will and pleasure of fome one fingle unworthy fellow, who ufually affumes the greater confidence in his unrighteous dealing, because he knows the people are tied in that form to him and his, though he practife all the injuftice in the world. This was it that brought on tyranny in Rome, first under their kings, afterwards under emperors: for it is to be obferved out of the story, that all those emperors which have ruled by right of inheritance, proved most of them no better than favage beafts, and all of them wicked, except Titus. 'Tis true indeed, that a nation may have some refpite, and recruit now and then, by the virtue and valour of a fingle prince; yet this is very rare; and when it doth happen, it usually lafts no longer than for his life, because his fon or fucceffor (for the most part) proves more weak or vicions than than himself was virtuous, as you may fee in the several lifts of kings throughout Great Britain, France, Spain, and all the world. But this is not all the inconvenience, that hereditary princes have been, and are for the most part wicked in their own perfons: for, -as great inconveniences happen by their being litigious in their titles; witnefs the bloody difputes between the princes of the blood in France, as alfo in England, between the two houfes of York and Lancafter: to which many more might be reckoned out of all other kingdoms; which miferies the people might have avoided, had they not been tied to one particular line of fucceffion. Therefore, if any kingly form be tolerable, it must be that which is by election, chofen by the people's reprefentatives, and made an officer of truft by them, to whom they are to be accountable. And herein, as kings are on tolerable upon this account, as elective; fo thefe elective kings are as intolerable upon another account, because their present greatness gives them opportunity ever to practife fuch flights, that in a fhort time, the government that they received only for their own lives, will become entailed upon their families; whereby rhe people's election will be made of no effect further, than for fashion, to mock the poor people, and adorn the triumphs of an aspiring tyranny; as it hath been feen in the elective kingdoms of Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and Sweden, where the forms of election were, and are ftill retained; but the power fwallowed up, and the kingdoms made hereditary; not only in Sweden, by the artifice of Guftavus Ericus; but alfo in Poland, and the Empire; where the people's right of election was foon eaten out by the cunning of the two families of Cafimir and Auftria. Let this ferve to manifeft, that a government by a free election and confent of the people, fettled in a due and orderly fucceffion of their fupreme affemblies, is more confonant to the light of nature and reafon; and confequently much more excellent than any hereditary ftanding power whatsoever. To take off all mif-conftructions; when we mention the people, obferve all along, that we do not mean the confufed promifcuous body of the people, nor any part of the people who have forfeited forfeited their rights by delinquency, neutrality, or apostacy, &c. in relation to the divided state of any nation; for they are not to be reckoned within the lifts of the people. A NEW SONG. "Ev'ry joy, ev'ry forrow, WH HAT is a Song?—a happy thing! Of all the joys that crowd the way To death! Friendship and wrath, and hope and grief, Th' varying notes, now high now low, The breath! The honeft fwain, the mighty lord, Who wield the reed, and who the sword: Some in the palace, at the gate Some meet, And amplify the paffing hour; 'Tis fo! Ev'n fuch the sympathy, the love, But, ah! That peace, that love, that vernal joy, Devoted |