of diftinction you please. A government is a mere piece of clock-work; and having such springs and wheels must act after such a manner; and therefore the art is to constitute it so that it must move to the public advantage. It is certain that every man will act for his own intereft, and all wife governments are founded upon that principle: fo that this whole mystery is only to make the intereft of our governors and the governed the fame. In an abfolute monarchy, where the whole power is in one man, his intereft will be only regarded; in an aristocracy, the intereft of a few; and in a free government, the interest of every one. This would be the cafe of England, if some abuses that have lately crept into our constitution were removed. The freedom of this kingdom depends upon the peoples' choosing the house of commons, who are a part of the legislature, and have the fole power of giving money. Were this a true representative, and free from external force or private bribery, nothing could pass there but what they thought was for the public advantage; for their own interest is so interwoven with the peoples, that if they act for themselves (which every one of them will do as near as he can ) they must act for the common intereft of England; and if a few amongst them fhould find it their interest to abuse their power, it will be the the intereft of all the reft to punish them for it. This is the fountain-head from whence the people expect all their happiness, and the redrefs of their grievances; and if we can preserve them free from corruption, they will take care to keep every body else fo. Our conftitution feems to have provided for it, by never suffering the king (till Charles the fecond's reign) to have a mercenary army to frighten them into a compliance, nor places or revenues great enough to bribe them into it. The places in the King's gift were but few, and most of them patent places for life, and the rest, great offices of state enjoyed by fingle persons, which feldom fell to the fhare of the commons, fuch as the lord chancellor, lord treasurer, privy feal, lord high admiral, &c. and when thefe offices were pofeffed by the lords, the commons were severe inquifitors into their actions. Thus the government

(6)

government of England continued from the time that the Ro-
mans quitted the ifland to the time of Charles the firft, who
was the first I have read of that made an oppofition to himself
in the house of commons. He raifed great fums of money up-
on the people but it being without authority of parliament,
and having no army to back him, it met with fuch difficulties
in the raifing, that it did him little good, and ended at last in
his ruin, though by the means of a long and miserable war,
which brought us from one tyranny to another; for the army
had got all things into their power, and governed the nation by
a council of war, which made all parties join in calling in
Charles the fccond: fo that he came in with the general ap-
plause of the people, who in a kind fit, gave him a vast reve-
nue for life. By this he was enabled to raise an army, and
bribe the parliament, which he did to the purpofe; but being a
Juxurious prince, he could not part with great fums at once: he
only fed them from hand to mouth; fo that they found it as
neceffary to keep him in a conftant dependence upon them, as
they had upon him. They knew he would give them ready
money no longer than he had abfolute neceffity for them,
and he had not places enough in his difpofal to fecure a ma-
jority in the houfe; for in thofe early days the art was not
found out of fplitting and multiplying places; as inftead of a
Jord treasurer, to have five lords of the treafury; inftead of a
lord admiral, to have feven lords of the admiralty; to have
feven commiffioners of the customs, nine of the excife, fourteen
of the navy office, ten of the ftamp-office, eight of the prize-
office, fixteen of the commiffioners of trade, two of the poft-
office, four of the tranfports, four for hackney coaches, four
for wine-licences, four for the victualling. office and multi-
tudes of other offices, which are endless to enumerate. I be-
lieve the gentlemen who have the good fortune to be in fome
of thefe employments, will think I compliment them, if I
fhould fay they have not been better executed fince they were
in fo many hands, than when in fewer; and I must confefs, I
fee no reafon why they may not be made twice as many, and

fo

so ad infinitum, unless the number be afcertained by parlia-
ment; and what danger this may be to our conftitution, I
think of with horror: for if in ages to come they thould be all
given to parliament men, what will become of our fo much
boasted liberty? What fhall be done when the criminal be-
comes the judge, and the malefactors are left to try themselves?
We may
be fure, their common danger will unite them, and
they will all ftand by one another. I do not speak this by guess
for I have read of a country where there was a constant series
of mismanagement for many years together, and yet nobody
was punished; and even in our country, I believe, fome men
now alive can remember the time, when if the then king had
but twenty more places in difpofal, or difpofed of those he had
to the best advantage, the liberty of England had been at an
end. If this method fhould be taken in a future reign, the
people must not expect to see men of ability or integrity in any
places, while they hold them by no other tenure than the dif-
service they do their country in the house of commons, and are
fure to be turned out upon every prevalent faction on the other
fide. They must then never expect to fee the house of com-
mons act vigorously for the interest either of king or people
but fome will fervilely comply with the court to keep their
places; others. will oppofe it as unreasonable to get them: and
thofe gentlemen, whofe defigns are for their country's interest,
will grow weary of the best form of government in the world,
thinking by mistake the fault is in our conftitution. I have
heard of a country, where the difputes about offices to the value
of thirty thousand pounds per annum, have made fix millions
ineffectual; what by fome mens prostitute compliance, and
others openly clogging the wheels, it has caused want and necef-
fity in all kinds of men, bribery, treachery, profaneness, atheism,
prodigality, luxury, and all the vices that attend a remifs and
corrupt administration, and a univerfal neglect of the public.
One part of the duty of the house of commons is to punish of-
fenders, and redrefs the grievances occafioned by the executive
part of the government; and how can that be done, if they

should

fhould happen to be the fame perfon, unless they would be public-fpirited enough to hang or drown themselves?

But in my opinion, in another thing of lefs importance, we deviated in Charles the fecond's time from our conftitution; for though we were in a capacity of punishing offenders, yet we did not know legally who they were. The law has been always very tender of the person of the king, and therefore has difpofed the executive part of the government in such proper channels, that whatsoever leffer exceffefs are committed, they are not imputed to him, but his ministers are accountable for them; his great feal is kept by the lord chancellor, his revenue by his treasurer, his laws are executed by his judges, his fleet is managed by his lord high admiral, who are all accountable for their misbehaviour. Formerly, all matters of state and discretion were debated and refolved in the privy council, where every man fubfcribed his opinion, and was answerable for it The late king Charles was the first who broke this most excellent part of our conftitution, by fettling a cabal or cabinet' council, where all matters of confequence were debated and refolved, and then brought to the privy-council to be confirmed. The first footsteps we have of this council, in any European government, were in Charles the ninth's time of France, when refolving to maffacre the proteftants, he durft not truft his council with it, but chofe a few men whom he called his cabinet-council; and, confidering what a genealogy it had, it is no wonder it has been so fatal both to king and people. To the king; for whereas our conftitutión has provided minifters in the feveral parts of the government to answer for mifcarriages, and to fkreen him from the hatred of the people; this, on the contrary, protects the ministers, and exposes the king to all the complaints of his subjects.

(To be continued.)

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No. 14.

THE PHILANTHROPIST.

MONDAY, JUNE 29, 1795.

LONDON:

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1795.

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ABRIDGMENT OF THAT EMINENT PATRIOT
Mr. JOHN TRENCHARD's

HISTORY OF STANDING ARMIES IN ENGLAND.

With An Incomparable PREFACE UPON GOVERNMENT. [Continued from our laft Number.]

PREFAC E..

AND it is as dangerous to the people; for whatever mifcarriages there are, no-body can be punished for them; for they justify themselves by a sign manual, or perhaps a private direction from the king; and then we have run it fo far, that we cannot follow it. The confequence of this must be continual heart-burnings between king and people; and no one can see the event.

ABRIDGMENT, &c.

IF a man doubts whether a standing army is flavery, popery, mahometism, paganism, atheism, free-thinking, or any thing which they please, let him read,

First,