are yet deft, before the English conftitution fhall have become a name which it is dangerous to pronounce, a fhade which it is fatal to revoke. While it is yet permitted to appeal to the feelings and understanding of the nation, while there are no laws which fetter. the activity of the mind, while neither perpetual imprisonment, nor death, nor torments, are denounced against the hardy citizen that fhall remind his countrymen of their expiring privileges, they dare to perform that mournful but neceffary duty. They therefore fet before them their undoubted rights, fo often vindicated, fo often confirmed; rights established by immemorial ufage, confirmed by the pureft decifions of their legiflators, and illustrated by the labours of men, whofe understandings have been the ornament of humanity, as much as their private virtues were the honor of their country. Convinced, that those who wish to enslave mankind will always attempt to divert their attention from the danger which threatens their liberty, till the mortal wound has been received, they prefent an antidote to the poisons which have been fo induftroufly diffused. They believe, that whatever difputes may happen concerning the origin of government, there can be none concerning its end and object. They are neither awed by the clouds of myfterious darkness which time has thrown around the bafis of human establishments, nor by the fictitious rays with which fuperftition encircles particular brows: and they acknowledge no divinity in any form of gcvernment, farther than as it is a method of producing the common good, fanctified by the confent, and founded upon the neceffities of the people. He that can believe otherwise, and while he admits that the Deity has given equal powers to all the fpecies, paffions to ftimulate them to the purfuit of good, and reason to direct their choice, afferts that they are subjected, without resource, to the caprice of a few mortals, weak, contemptible, and bounded as themfelves, may be called the friend of fovereigns, but must be reputed the enemy of human kind: he may as well imagine, that the lion is not to be refifted because he has fangs to tear; or the ferpent, because he has poifon to infect; but he will not perfuade the African, that the arrow with which he pierces the monster's breast, or the javelin with which he nails the bloated reptile to the ground, does not equally enter into the defign of Providence :--nor are fuch principles lefs dangerous to the fafety of the ruler, than fatal to the rights of his fubjects; for while they establish the throne of defpotism upon the necks of half the species, they are equally favourable to the firft ufurper that can vault into the feat, and lafh the affrighted fteeds over the body of their former mafter. If we mention thefe great principles of all human fociety, it is not because we appeal to them against the conftitution of our country, but becaufe this conftitution is more immediately derived from them than is generally known. Amongst the many falfe and injurous calumnies which have been thrown upon those who diftinguish between the intereft of their country and that of an iniquitous faction, none is more common nor more unjuft, than that of their attempting innovation. We cannot, therefore, better conclude our addrefs upon this important subject, than by declaring, in the most explicit manner, that nothing is more foreign to the opinions and defigns of the Society. But we have the lefs reafon to be furprized at imputations like thefe, because they have always been the weapons made use of by the abettors of falfhood against the friends of truth. With them it has always been the most unpardonable sedition to queftion the omnipotence of the prevailing power; and while the oppreffors of mankind are allowed to avail themselves of every engine to overthrow the established privileges of their country, it is rebellion in the people to vindicate their invaded rights, or even to murmur at the encroachment. But it is not to fuch men that we appeal. Let the ingenuous and uncorrupted part of our countrymen decide which are the real friends of the conftitution, and which the introducers of innovation; thofe who would preferve it in its original vigour, or those who, with a feeming reverence for the forms, would annihilate the fpirit; those who wish to free it from the dirt and filth which impede its motion, or those who would deftroy the machine itfelf, rather than reftore it to its former purity; thefe who contend for the clearest rights established in the most folemn manner, or those who, after having bafely and furreptitiously invaded them, appeal to their own perfidy as a precedent. Left what we have already faid, fhould not be fufficiently clear, we think it neceffary to add, that wè confider an hereditary fovereignty and nobility as effential parts of the conftitution which we claim, and admirably adapted to the genius of the English nation. But at the fame time that we decláre our approbation of a limited prerogative and a privileged nobility, we would hope that there is no Englishman that is not falfe to the name, and a traitor to his country, that would wish to increase either of these powers at the expence of the third and most effential, the Commonalty of England. By what means the people have been deprived of their effential rights, by what imperceptible degrees the reprefentatives of a whole nation have been changed into the deputies of a few paltry and venal boroughs; by what unconstitutional innovations these pretended representatives have affumed a power of extending their own existence, though it may be doubted, whether the acts they paffed for that purpose are more valid than those of the Long Parliament after the abolition of the king and lords, we have fufficiently explained in the tracts we have already printed and dispersed. By what fteps the immediate creatures of the people, invested with delegated powers to express the sense and protect the rights of their conftituents, have been gradually converted into the inveterate enemies and deftoyers of every thing they were chofen to defend, will be fufficiently evident to all who have remarked the proceedings of our late parliaments. This only will we obferve, that corruption has now fo far exceeded its former limits, fuch widely-diffused calami ties have been occafioned in its courfe, and fuch an open contempt has been expreffed for the interefts and approbation of the people, that the measure of our wrongs is full. As we can have no remaining hopes of redress from any thing but our own exertion, we folemnly invite the free and uncorrupted part of the nation to unite for the affertion of their long-neglected rights, in the most dangerous crifis that ever threatened their deftruction, And, as nothing feems better calculated to keep alive 1 alive the faered fire of public freedom, than to diffuse politicar and conftitutional knowledge through the great body of the people, as nothing can more forcibly impel a community to ftruggle for its rights, than to give it juft notions of their importance, and of the inevitable evils which must attend their lofs, we prefume to folicit the approbation and concurrence of all our generous countrymen to the design in which we are engaged. Let them reflect, that the battle is loft while every individual consults his private ease and fafety, and that those are feparately trampled upon, who collectively would be felt in the balance, and incline the feale. If there is yet room for additional evils, or new difgraces; if a people can submit to more degrading infults than have been already heaped upon our heads, it may be the part of prudence to wait the event, or embrace a mean and precarious neutrality; but if we have already reached the utmost verge of freedom and of honor, if the leaft advance is flavery and perdition, it becomes us here to make a stand with the determined obftinacy of men, who know they have neither retreat nor hope beyond the fpot which they' now occupy and defend. ON THE DURATION OF PARLIAMENTS, FROM THE SECOND EDITION OF STUART's PEACE AND REFORM AGAINST WAR How far it is Conftitutional to shorten the duration of Par liaments, does not require much investigation, because the facts relating to the question are of recent date, and clearly underfood. Originally, Parliaments were only called for a particular purpose, and often fat only a few days: Sometimes there were two, but generally one new Parliament, in a year. In the feventeenth century the ufage varied, and was most grofsly abufed by the long Parliament, at laft diffolved by Cromwell. Yet, the vile precedent was approved, and imitat ed ed by the Kings who followed, and William the IIId. made it a great favour to agree to the Triennial Bill. The Septennial Bill is justified by Mr. Young, who says, "the members of the House of Commons, when elected, and in combination with the other branches of the Legiflature, affume and poffefs, and give themselves fuch powers and privileges, as rendered the feptennial act juft as conftitutional as the biennial." That act, however, was by thofe who made it, juftified only upon the exigency of the times, and ought to have been repealed when that exigency was paft; but, without confidering its legality, I shall remark, that if Mr. Young's pernicious doctrine were true, there would not be the leaft fecurity for the Liberties of the Nation; the three branches of the Legislature, in combination, might affume a power to repeal the Habeas Corpus Act, abolish the Trial by Jury, and the Liberty of the Press; give to the King's Proclamations the force of law, as was done in the reign of Henry the VIIIth, and vefting the whole executive and legislative authority in the Crown, diffolve themfelves for ever, and annihilate at once the Constitution and Freedom of Britain: This, according to Mr. Young, they might conftitutionally do, by affuming powers and privileges; and indeed, he feems defirous that they should do it, when he fets up as precedent, the example of Richard the IId. who dictated to the sheriffs the names of those perfons whom they fhould return to Parliament, and levied money without the confent of Parliament. On the subject of the Time for making a Reform, I can fay nothing new. "To minds unwilling to do right, all times are equally inconvenient and improper. To him who dislikes the voyage, all the winds of Heaven are unpropitious: he looks for nothing but pretences to avoid it.*.” This, indeed, is a never-failing argument, equally in times of profperity and adverfity; in times of War and peace. If our fituation happens to be profperous, it is then asked, whether we can be more than happy or more than free? In the feafon of adverfity, on the other hand, all Reform or Innovation is Vide Mr. Francis's fpeech, May 7th. deprecated, |