by reason simply of the inadequacy of reconnaissance and of information-that is to say-of the idea of sûreté.'

If we contrast Ludendorff's conduct in the campaign of 1918 with that of Foch, it will be found that tactically the great difference between them lies in this same province of sûreté, neglected by Ludendorff and faithfully cultivated by Foch. Ludendorff's first blunder was moral-that he failed to take into account and rightly assess the unknown element of which von Moltke had spoken, the will of the enemy. His second blunder was tactical-that he neglected the cardinal virtue of sûreté, whereas, though he suffered one disaster at the end of May, Foch, from July 18 onwards, guarded and covered himself at every step and gave the Germans no single opening by which to strike at him and recover the initiative. The Germans had imbibed the Napoleonic theory, but their national vice of vanity and overconfidence led them to distort it and to ignore one side of it-that by which the master of war secured for himself liberty of action. Bonaparte,' says Clausewitz, 'always marched straight on his object without in the least preoccupying himself with the strategic plan of the enemy. Knowing that everything depends on tactical results and never doubting that he would obtain them, he sought occasions for battle everywhere and without ceasing.' Never did any Staff absorb this doctrine more thoroughly than the German; and in the Franco-Prussian War they put it into execution with brilliant success. Sir Edward Hamley has pointed out that, when Bazaine was driven back into Metz, the Germans simply pushed on over the Meuse, leaving him in a most threatening position on their northern flank; and the German official history of the war confirmed his view that this complete neglect of prudent military precaution would have been disastrous against any enemy but one so supine and spiritless as was Bazaine. In 1918 Ludendorff followed the same tactics, but he had a different enemy to deal with. He not only wrote off the Allies as broken in spirit, but, as he piled one offensive on another, he accumulated risks without guarding himself against the possibility of an Allied counter-stroke or even discovering what was the strength of which Marshal Foch disposed.

It is impossible to read the constant references of the German military critics all through the spring of 1918 to the dissipation and exhaustion of Marshal Foch's reserves without believing that they did in fact represent the belief of the German General Staff, which was therefore basing its plans on the unfounded and unverified convictions' which Marshal Foch condemns.

Contrast, on the other hand, the methods by which Marshal Foch conducted the campaign after the successful counter-stroke of July 18. Ludendorff had dealt a series of gigantic blows and thereby left a vulnerable flank between the Marne and the Aisne-and others elsewhere-at which the Allies could strike. Marshal Foch gave no such opening to his opponent. He had, after a month or two, almost a dozen separate offensives at work on his four hundred kilometres of front, each operating over a comparatively short section, each helping and each also safeguarding-sûreté at work!-the advance of others. It was by no means certain at the end of July that the Germans would not be able to regain the initiative. That was their one hope of averting failure. In the semi-official communications published in Germany the General Staff admitted the check, but declared that it was subordinating everything to the aim of recovering the power of the offensive. But, when a great offensive or series of offensives is in progress, the initiative can only be recovered if an opportunity is given by one's opponent. It was not in the power of the Germans to resume the offensive of their own motion. They were compelled to wait until Marshal Foch made a slip and let them in, as he had had to wait since March 21 for them to give him his opportunity. It is the glory of Marshal Foch not only that he could be audacious and resolute in the attack, but that he could be cautious also, and that by means of sûreté sovereign mistress in the realm of tactics-he provided a firm foundation on which the Allies built up victory.

W. P. CROZIER.

Art. 14.--THE END OF THE WAR.

THREE months ago, although it was plain that the war had entered on the final stage, few probably ventured to hope that it would have run its course before another campaigning season. The winter was approaching, with its short days and uncertain weather. On the western front the Germans were making a resolute defence against odds which were by no means overwhelming. They showed, as yet, no signs of general demoralisation; and their 1920 contingent, which would yield some half a million men, was intact. Indications of a weakening on Germany's home-front were naturally suspect; the resignation of Count Hertling, and the appointment of the 'liberal' Prince Max of Baden as Chancellor, savoured of a political manoeuvre; and the appeal to President Wilson to bring about an armistice suggested an attempt to gain time to extricate the armies in France from a difficult position, to repair the breach in the Balkans, and to re-animate the faltering Turks. The Italian front was quiet.

Bulgaria's surrender was the beginning of the end. It resulted in the plain disclosure, obvious to all the world, of the inadequacy of Germany's available resources to meet her liabilities. To the Germans the re-establishment of the situation in the Balkans was a necessity hardly less vital than the maintenance of their front in France. Reinforcements were despatched in haste; but, thanks to the unrelenting pressure of the Allied armies in France, the numbers that could be spared proved powerless to stay General D'Espérey's advance. Defeated in an engagement fought, on Oct. 10, a few miles south of Nish, the Austro-German force was driven back, fighting, to the Danube, which was reached, in the neighbourhood of Semendria, by Serbian cavalry on Oct. 30. Concurrently with these events, the Austrian force in Albania, threatened in rear by an Allied column advancing through Montenegro, was in full retreat, closely pursued by the Italians. The moral effect of this defeat in the very region of Teutonic pre-war ambitions does not seem to have been generally appreciated. It advertised the fact that Germany, through military impotence, had

failed in the primary object for which she had provoked the world-war. It wrecked the hopes and aspirations which had been instilled into her people as a preparation for war, and nourished, during the war, to sustain them through four years of effort and privation. It broke the last threads of the bond which, throughout a long series of defeats, had bound Turkey to the Central Empires, proving to the Turks-if proof were needed-that they could no longer hope either for help or reward from Germany. Small wonder, then, that our enemies' home-fronts began to crumble, and that discouragement spread in the ranks of their armies.

The military results, though less immediate, promised to be no less decisive. General D'Espérey's attack broke the left flank of the enemy's European front, laying Austria-Hungary and Turkey open to attack in new quarters which they were powerless to defend. Germany, if able to prolong her resistance in the west, would ultimately have again to reckon with a war on two fronts, the hopelessness of which was proved by her inability to stem the advance of the comparatively small force under D'Espérey's command. The military situation was clearly desperate.

Turkey, already on the brink of fresh disasters, took the only course open, and surrendered. The shattered remnants of the Syrian army, 12,000 strong, were in full retreat on Aleppo; and the forces in Mesopotamia were retiring towards Mosul, closely pressed by General Marshall. On Oct. 15, a few hours after the last Baghdad to Berlin Express' had left Constantinople, notification of surrender was despatched by the Porte to Washington. But, before hostilities were suspended (Oct. 31), Aleppo was occupied (Oct. 26); and, on Oct. 30, General Marshall won a decisive battle at Kalat Sherghat (50 miles south of Mosul), which resulted in the capture of the entire Turkish force in Mesopotamia.

In the meantime the Austrians were engaged in a last desperate struggle with the Allied forces in Italy, which had taken the offensive between the Brenta and the Middle Piave. General Diaz's plan was to force the Piave with the 10th, 8th, and 12th Armies (in the order named from right to left), to drive the 5th Austrian Army eastwards, and interpose between it and the 6th

Army (in the Monte Grappa sector), which was to be attacked simultaneously in front. On the right of the 10th Army the 3rd Army prolonged the front to the sea. The operations are of considerable interest, and deserve a closer study than is possible in this article.

The forcing of the Piave by the 10th Army was a complete success. It was a formidable enterprise; for the river, which was one and a half miles wide, being swollen by recent rains, flowed with a swift current which frequently swept away the bridges; and the enemy, strongly posted on the east bank, and supported by a numerous artillery, offered considerable resistance. The course of the river is broken up by numerous islands, of which the largest, the Grave di Papadopoli, was chosen as the point of passage. This island was, at the time, some three miles in length, with a breadth of one mile; and to reach it the main channel had to be crossed by means of boats or bridges. The channel on the enemy's side was fordable by infantry.

Lord Cavan decided to occupy the island before the date fixed for the general advance. Accordingly, on the night of Oct. 23-24, detachments crossed in boats, each of which carried six men, and gained a footing on the island, surprising the Austrians who held it as an advanced post. Bridges having been thrown, the occupation of the island was completed by the close of Oct. 26. The general attack began on the following day, when the 10th Army carried the positions on the east bank, and established a bridge-head, under cover of which the bridging operations were completed. The 8th and 12th Armies having been less fortunate, part of the former was passed across by the 10th Army bridges, and, advancing northwards, cleared the left bank. One of Lord Cavan's divisions, attacking southwards, performed a similar service for the 3rd Army. On Oct. 29 the enemy was driven back on the whole of the Piave front. The 10th Army, pursuing eastwards, covered the right flank of the 8th, which moved north-eastwards through Vittorio, aiming at the Piave valley above Belluno, in order to cut the communications of the 6th Austrian Army; while the 12th Army, advancing astride of the river, reached Quero on the right bank, and, on the left bank, captured the heights north of