there is an important textile industry at Mülhausen, which has flourished since about 1745 and employs some 78,000 persons. But the great wealth of Alsace is the recently discovered potash field in the Mülhausen region. The value of these deposits, which are not fully worked, is estimated at the enormous figure of sixty-two milliard marks (3,100,000,0007.). Even without the Alsace beds Germany claimed a practical monopoly of the available potash deposits of Europe; and it will be a great advantage to the Allies to be made independent of German potash. Alsace also possesses considerable salt mines and a small deposit of petroleum.

The great mineral wealth of Lorraine is her coal and iron fields, especially the latter. Of the 463 square miles covered by the famous Minette ironfield-the most important on the continent and possibly in the world, France already possesses 282 (61 per cent.), Germany 166 (36 per cent.), and Luxemburg 14. Owing to the large proportion of sulphur in the ore, the value of the field was not appreciated till the discovery of the basic process in 1878, or Germany might have been even more acquisitive in 1871 than she actually was. The total production of this vast area is 48,200,000 metric tons of ore per annum, thrice as large as that of Great Britain and three-quarters of that of the United States. Its reserves are estimated at 5,100,000,000 tons, of which France possesses 3,000,000,000, Germany 1,830,000,000, and Luxemburg 270,000,000. Before the war France produced in all 21,700,000 tons per annum, of which 90 per cent. was derived from the Minette (a figure which alone exceeds the total output of Great Britain); while Germany produced 28,600,000 tons, of which 73 per cent. was derived from the Minette. At this rapid rate she would have exhausted her share of the field in eighty years, without any allowance for increased production. Deprivation of her most valuable ironfields would be a serious blow to Germany, and would make it extremely difficult for her to engage in war on a grand scale. The transference of the German Minette to France would add to her already great resources in iron and compensate her for some of her losses. But there are certain difficulties attendant on the transfer, the most serious of which is the question of coal.

The broad fact as to coal is that France is not selfsupporting. She produces 41 million tons and consumes 63 millions. On the other hand, Germany is a large exporter, her total production being 278 million tons. The Minette ironfields of France are largely dependent on German coal, a fact which has been a grave hindrance to their development. If France recovered her frontiers of 1870, her disadvantage in the matter of coal would be even greater (by 5,500,000 tons) than before. There remains the question of the Saar basin, and the 1814 frontier, or even an improvement on that frontier. The major part of this coalfield (350 square miles) lies within the borders of Rhenish Prussia; 194 square miles lie in the Bavarian Palatinate; and 186 square miles in German Lorraine. The total reserve is estimated at 16,548,000,000 metric tons. A return to the 1870 frontiers would restore the German Lorraine portion of the field to France; a return to the 1814 frontiers would add a substantial part of the Rhenish Prussia portion; and of course further frontier adjustments of the frontier in favour of France are not impossible.

Unfortunately the Saar coal is not reckoned suitable for conversion into coke; and it is coke that is required for the Lorraine ironfields, so that the cession to France of the German share of the Saar fields would not help to solve the smelting question. If the Minette district is connected, by a development of the canal system, with Dunkirk, it is possible that England may help to supply the deficiency; but it is probable that, for some time to come, the ironfields will have to depend on Germany for the necessary coal; and this will no doubt not be lost sight of in the consideration of terms of peace. It is obvious that this immense transfer of potash and iron would be beset with difficulties, and that some dislocation would be inevitable. The fact that it is in the power of the Allies to dictate terms to Germany ought, however, to falsify Mr Coleman Phillipson's prophecy that the surrender to France of the German Minette would be a blow to Europe.'

J. R. MORETON MACDONALD.

Art. 11.-THE 'FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.'

1. The Freedom of the Seas. By Charles Stewart Davison. New York: Moffat, 1918.

2. The Freedom of the Seas. By Michael Cababé. Murray, 1918.

3. Die Freiheit der Meere und das Völkerrecht. By Prof. Fritz Stier Somlo. Leipzig: Veit, 1917.

4. Die Freiheit der Meere und der künftige Friedensschluss. By Prof. Heinrich Triepel. Berlin: Springer, 1917. 5. Das Problem der Meeresfreiheit und die deutsche Völkerrechtspolitik. By Prof. Wilhelm van Calker. Jena: Fischer, 1917.

GEOGRAPHERS compute that the waters cover the globe's surface to the extent of nearly 72 per cent. of the whole. All this area, with negligible deductions, is 'free,' in the sense that no State claims dominion or sovereignty over it. The meaning of this freedom may be summarised as follows. Vessels, whether sea-craft or air-craft, are subject to no other sovereignty than that of the State to which they belong. Navigation and the transport of men and goods are free to all States and the citizens of all States on and under and over the sea, by all available means of locomotion; nowhere is any restriction imposed by any authority external to the vessel as regards cargo or load-line or equipment or route; no seaconstable cries Halt' or 'Move on'; nature alone can close the thoroughfare. As with the sea, so with all that therein is. Fishing is open to all; so are the extraction of salt or other organic matter, the gathering of marine plants, amber, etc., and the utilisation of the sea for the generation of electric power, and so forth.

The freedom thus sketched is, of course, not utter licence. It must be exercised with due regard to the rights of others. This condition operates, apart from the right to treat the pirate as a common enemy, in two ways. Firstly, every vessel, public or private, carries with it the sovereignty of its own State, and every unjustified violation of that sovereignty may be ground for diplomatic action; secondly, injuries wrongfully caused to one vessel by another, as by negligence, may entitle the injured party to obtain redress in municipal courts.