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blended with the idea of the object, being the indirect or immediate source of it, is called love; the contrary feeling, produced by contrary associations, is called hatred. (We do not here speak of the particular modifications of these feelings, or of their restrictions, but of the general feelings excit ed in our minds by objects causing, or supposed to cause, pleasurable or painful feeling). When either of them, (the love, for instance,) is habitually connected with any object, it is called an affection for that object; and all its various modifications, however, and in whatever degree produced, if they are more than the ebullitions of the moment, being permanent feelings ready to be excited by the appropriate object in appropriate situations, are also termed affections. If from any strength in the exciting cause, or peculiar sensibility of the frame, or peculiarly vivid associations, connected with objects of a specific cast, that cause or produce a vivid excitement of feeling, which (though it may last perhaps for a considerable time, if not excessive in degree), gradually loses its vividness, and altogether ceases, or settles down into a more permanent, but less active feeling, that vivid, vigorous feeling is denominated a passion. The mind may have such a predisposition to a certain set of passions, that these may be easily excited, and by every such excitement increase the predisposition to future excitement, and add to the strength and vivid. ness of the more perm nent corresponding affections, but the excitement itself, and its effect, the passion, cannot, from the nature of the mind, last long. From this account it may appear, that the passions and affections differ from each other principally in their degree and duration. There is a third class of feelings, which may more properly be called emotions, than either passions or affections; where the pleasurable or painful feelings are not explicitly referred to the exciting cause; and have not that vividness and strength which is essential to a passion they are states of pleasure or of pain, following the excitement of some affection, and generally accompanied or blended with trains of conceptions and thoughts. We are aware that we do not use this term in the sense in which Dr. Cogan professes to employ it; but we donbt, whether in this instance the usual penetration and accuracy of that philosopher have accompanied him; and as it appears to us, his own use of it is essentially different from that given in his definition, in which

he confines it "to the external marks or visible changes produced by the impetus of the passions upon the corporeal system." A tendency to the exercise of affections, and to the excitement of emotions or passions, is called a disposition: in those cases in which the disposition is habitual, and regulates a considerable proportion of the affections or passions, it seems appropriately termed the temper.

71. Respecting the classes of affections, passions, and emotions, we must not here enlarge. It is a most copious and difficult subject; and, as pursued with different objects, different classifications appear preferable. Supposing the object to be, to take these feelings as they are, and to arrange them so as to show their relationship, and tendency to affect one another, having in view the phenomena rather than the causes of them, we should be led to give a decided preference to the elegant arrangement of Dr. Cogan, in his very valuable work on the passions; but if it be to trace them to their sources, in order to show how they are formed, directly or indirectly, of the relicts of sensations, and modified by the various combinations of them, which is an object of the greatest importance, as has been already observed, Dr. Hartley's arrangement, even if somewhat deficient in philosophical accuracy, as perhaps Dr. Cogan has shown, must have the preference, having been founded on that object. The arrangement of Dr. Cogan is by himself stated as follows: "When the nature of the exciting cause is more accurately ascertained, it will be found to respect either the selfish or the social principle. Hence arise two important distinctions, forming two different classes. In each class, the predominant idea of a good, and the predominant idea of an evil, will constitute two different orders. The leading passions and affections under each order, point out the genera. The complicated nature of some of the passions, and other contingent circumstances, may be considered species and varieties under each characteristic genus." Dr. Hartley's arrangement is two-fold: first, the passions and affections in general; secondly, the passions and affections, as excited by the different classes of intellectual pleasures and pains. Respecting the latter, we shall have an opportunity of speaking under the different classes: we shall here briefly state the arrangement of the general passions and affections. As all the passions and affections arise from pleasure

and pain, the first and most general distribution is into love and hatred. When these are excited to a certain degree, they stimu late us to action, and may then be termed desire, or aversion, understanding by the last word, active hatred. Hope and fear arise from the probability or uncertainty of obtaining the good desired, or of avoiding the evil shunned. Joy and grief are love or hatred exerted towards an object when present, so as to occupy the whole attention of the mind. After the actual joy or grief is over, and the object withdrawn, there generally remains a pleasing or displeasing recollection, which recurs with every recurrence of the idea of the object, or of the associated ones, and keeps up the love or hatred. These ten; five grateful, and five ungrateful, passions or affections, Dr. Hartley considers as comprehending all the general passions of human nature.

OF THE CLASSES OF INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES AND PAINS, WITH A SPECIFIC ACCOUNT OF THEIR ORIGIN.

72. The intellectual pleasures and pains are arranged by Hartley in six classes. Perhaps the arrangement, and certainly the appellations of the classes, are not unexceptionable; but so much light is thrown upon this part of our mental structure by the analysis of them given by Hartley, and it is so much easier to find fault than to improve, that we shall probably do best by taking the arrangement and (with a few passing remarks) the appellations as we find them, and by laying before our readers such a specimen of the analytical investigations of that profound philosopher, as may lay a solid foundation for correct notions on this important point, and lead them to seek for further information in his observations. The intellectual pleasures and pains are, 1. Those of imagination, arising from natural or artificial beauty or deformity. 2. Those of ambition, arising from the opinions of others concerning us. 3. Those of self-interest, arising from the possession or want of the means of happiness, and security from, or subjection to, the hazards of misery. 4. Those of sympathy, arising from the pleasures and pains of others. 3. Those of theopathy, arising from the eonsideration of the attributes of the Deity, and the relation in which we stand to him; and, 6. Those of the moral sense, arising from the contemplation of moral beauty and deformity.

1. Of the Pleasures and Pains of Imag ind

tion.

73. This class of feelings may be distinguished into seven kinds: the pleasures arising from the beauty of the natural world; those from the works of art; from the liberal arts of music, painting, and poetry; from the sciences; from the beauty of the person; from wit and humour; and the pains which arise from gross absurdity, inconsistency, or deformity.-As the pleasures of the first class admit of the most simple analysis, we shall select this as a specimen. The pleasant tastes and smells, and the fine colours of fruits and flowers, the melody of birds, and the grateful warmth or coolness of the air in the proper seasons, transfer the relics of these pleasures upon rural scenes, which rise up in. stantaneously so mixed, with each other, and with such as will immediately be enumerated, as to be separately indiscernible. If there be any object in the scene calcu lated to excite fear and horror, the nascent ideas of these magnify and enliven all the other ideas, and by degrees pass into pleasures by suggesting the security from pain. In like manner the grandeur of some scenes, and the novelty of others, by exciting surprise and wonder (that is, by making a great difference in the preceding and subsequent states of mind, so as to border upon or even enter into the limits of pain) may greatly enhance the pleasure. Uniformity and variety, in conjunction, are also principal sources of the pleasures of beauty, being made so partly by their association with the beauties of nature, partly by that with the works of art, and with the many conveniences which we derive from the uniformity and variety of the works of nature and of art: they must therefore transfer part of the lustre borrowed from the works of nature, and from the conveniences they afford upon the works of nature. Poetry and painting are much employed in setting forth the beauties of the natural world, at the same time that they afford us a high degree of pleasure from other sources: hence they blend some or other of the relics of those other pleasures with those of natural beauty. The many amusements which are peculiar to the country, and whose ideas and pleasures are revived in a faint degree by the view of rural scenes, and so mixed together as to be separately indiscernible, further augment the pleasures suggested by the beauties of

nature. To these we may add the opposition between the offensiveness, dangers, and corruption of populous cities, and the health, tranquillity, and innocence, which the actual view or the mental contemplation of rural scenes introduces; and the pleasures of sociality and affection, which have many connections with them; and those pleasures which the opinions and encomiums of others respecting natural beauties produce in us, in this, as in other cases, by means of the contagiousness observable in mental, as well as in bodily dispositions. It is also to be remarked, that green, which is the most agreeable to the organ of sight, is the most general colour of the vegetable kingdom, that is of external nature; but at the same time with so many varieties, that it loses little or none of its effect in producing pleasure, which it would do if it were all of the same tint. Those persons who have already formed high ideas of the power, knowledge, and goodness of the author of nature, with suitable affections, generally feel the exalted pleasures of devotion upon every view and contemplation of his works, either in an explicit and distinct manner, or in a more secret and implicit one: hence part of the general indeterminate pleasures here considered, is deducible from the pleasures of theopathy.

74. The above may be considered as the principal sources of the beauties of nature to mankind in general. Inquisitive and philosophical persons have some others, arising from their peculiar knowledge and study of natural history, astronomy, and philosophy in general: for the profusion of beauties, uses, fitnesses, elegance in minute things, and magnificence in great ones, exceed all bounds of imagination; and new scenes, and those of unbounded extent, separately considered, ever present themselves to view, the more any one studies and contemplates the works of God. Upon the whole the reader may see that there are sufficient sources for all those pleasures of imagination which the beauties of nature excite in different persons; and that the differences which are, in this respect, found in different persons, are sufficiently analogous to the differences of their situations in life, and of the consequent associations formed in them. Those who are closely attentive to what passes within them, may also, when contemplating the beauti s of nature, frequently discern the relicts of many of the particular pleasures here enumerated, while they recur in a

separate state, and before they coalesce with the general indeterminate aggregate, and this verifies the account here given. It is also a confirmation of it, that an attentive person may observe great differences in the kind and degree of the relish which he has for the beauties of nature in different periods of his life; especially as the kind and degree will be found to agree in the main with the foregoing account. To the same purpose it may be observed, that these pleasures do not cloy very soon, but are of a lasting nature when compared with the sensible ones; since this follows naturally from the great variety of their sources, and the evanescent nature of their constituent parts.

2. Of the Pleasures and Pains of Ambi-
tion.

75. The opinions of others concerning us, when expressed by corresponding words or actions, are principal sources of happiness or misery. The pleasures of this kind are usually referred to the head of honour, the pains to that of shame. We are here to inquire by what associations it is brought about, that men are solicitous to have certain particulars concerning themselves made known to the circle of their friends and acquaintance, or to the world in general; and certain others concealed from them: and also, why all indications that these kinds of particulars are made known, so as to produce approbation, esteem, praise, &c. or dislike, censure, contempt, &c. occasion such exquisite pleasures as those of honour and shame.-These particulars may be classed under four heads; external advantages or disadvantages; bodily perfections and imperfections; intellectual accomplishments and defects; moral ones, that is, vir tue or vice. We shall, as before, select the analysis of one of these classes of the feelings of ambition.

76. The intellectual accomplishments and defects which occasion the feelings of ambition, are, sagacity, memory, invention, wit, and learning; and their opposites, folly, dulness, and ignorance. Now, it is evident, that independent of the intrinsic value of the former class, and disadvantage of the other, the circumstance of their being made known to others, respectively produces certain privileges and pleasures, or subjects to inconveniencies and pains. It follows, therefore, that every discovery of this kind to others, also every mark or associate of such discovery, will, by association, raise

up the relicts of those privileges and pleasures, or inconveniencies and pains respectively; and these being gradually blended together, and united with those with which each repetition of the producing cause is accompanied, afford in each instance a peculiar compound pleasure or pain, which, by the custom of our language, has the word honour or shame respectively connected with it. The general account will apply to each of the four classes of the feelings of ambition; but the feelings of honour or shame connected with this particular class, require a more minute analysis. A great part, perhaps the greatest, is derived from the high-strained encomiums, applauses, and flatteries, paid to talents and learning, and the outrageous ridicule and contempt thrown upon folly and ignorance, in all the discourses and writings of men of genins and literature; these persons being extremely partial to their own excellencies, and carrying the opinion of the world along with them by the force of their abilities and eloquence. It is also to be observed, that in the education of young persons, and especially of boys and young men, great rewards are conferred in consequence of intellectual abilities and attainments, and great punishments follow negli gence and ignorance; which rewards and punishments, being respectively associated with the words expressing praise and cen sure, and with all their other circumstances, transfer upon praise or censure compound vivid relicts of those pleasures and pains.

77. In like manner, all the kinds of honour and shame, by being expressed in words and symbols which are nearly related to each other, enhance each other; thus, for instance, the caresses which are given to a child when he is dressed in fine clothes, prepare him to be much more affected with the caresses and encomiums bestowed upon him when he has been diligent in getting his lesson: and, indeed, it ought to be remarked, that the words and phrases of the parents, governors, superiors, and attendants, have so great an influence over children, when they first come to the use of language, as instantly to generate an implicit belief, a strong desire, or a high degree of pleasure. Unless very improper treatment has been practised, they have at that early period no suspicions, jealousies, recollections, or expectations, of being deceived or disappointed; and therefore a set of words expressing pleasure of any kind which they have experienced, put together

in almost any manner, will raise up in them a pleasurable state, and the opposite words a painful one. Whence it is easy to see, that the language expressing praise or blame, must instantly form the mere associations connected with the separate words, put them into a state of hope and joy, or of fear and sorrow. And when the foundation is thus laid, praise and blame will keep their influences from the advantages and disadvantages attending them, though the separate words should lose their particular influences, as they manifestly do in our progress through life.

78. The honour and shame arising from intellectual accomplishments, do often, in learned men, after some time, destroy, in a great measure, their sensibility in respect of every other kind of honour and shame ; which seems chiefly to arise from their conversing much with books and learned men, so as to have a great part of the pleasures which they receive from such intercourse, closely connected with the encomiums on abilities and learning, and to hear all terms of honour applied to them, and the keenest reproach, and the most insolent contempt, cast upon the contrary defects. And, as the pleasures which raillery, ridicule, and satire, afford to the by-standers, are very considerable, so the person who is the ob ject of them, and who begins to be in pain upon the first slight marks of contempt, has this pain much enhanced by the contrast, the exquisiteness of his uneasiness and confusion rising in proportion to the degree of mirth and insolent laughter in the by-standers; so that it happens that very few persons have courage to stand the force of ridicule, but rather subject themselves to considerable bodily pains, to losses, and to the anxiety of a guilty mind, than appear foolish, absurd, singular, or contemptible to the world, or even to persons of whose judgment and abilities they have a low opinion.

of the Pleasures and Pains of Self-Interest.

79. Self-interest may be distinguished into three kinds: gross self-interest, or the pursuit of the means whereby the pleasures of sensation, imagination, and ambition, are to be obtained, and their pains avoided; refined self-interest, or the explicit, deliberate, seeking for ourselves of the pleasures of sympathy, theopathy, and the moral sense, and a like explicit endeavour to avoid their pains; and, rational self-interest, or the explicit pursuit of our greatest happi

ness without any partiality to any particular kind of happiness, or direct or indirect means of happiness.

80. The love of money may be considered as the chief species of gross self-interest; and, in an eminent manner, assists in unfolding the mutual influences of our pleasures and pains, with the factitious nature of our intellectual ones, and the doctrine of association in general, as well as the particular progress, windings, and endless redoublings of self-love. For, it is evident at first sight, that money cannot naturally and originally be the object of our faculties: no child can be supposed to be born with a love of it; yet we see, that some small degrees of this love rise early in infancy; that it generally increases during youth and manhood; and that at last, in some old persons, it so engrosses and absorbs all their passions and pursuits, as that from being considered as the representative, standard, and means of obtaining the commodities which occur in real life, it shall be esteemed the adequate symbol and means of happiness in general, and the thing itself, the sum total of all which is desirable in life. But we have already said so much on the origin and progress of this affection (§ 43), that we shall only here attend to the checks which, in the course of life, usually prevent the love of money from acquiring that power which, without such restraint, would overcome all the particular desires on which it is founded.

81. First, then, it is checked by the strong desires of young persons, and others, after particular gratifications; for these desires, by overpowering their acquired aversion to part with money, weaken it gradually, aud consequently weaken the pleasure of keeping it, and the desire of obtaining it, all which are closely connected together in this view; notwithstanding that the last, viz. the desire of obtaining, and consequently (in an inverted order) the pleasure of keeping, and the aversion to part with, are in another view strengthened by the desires of particular pleasures to be purchased by money. And this contrariety of our associations is not only a means of limiting certain passions, but it may be considered as a mark set upon them by the Author of nature, to shew that they ought to be limited even in this life, and that they must ultimately be annihilated every one in its proper order. Secondly, the insignificance of riches in warding off death and diseases, and, in many cases, shame and contempt

also, and in obtaining the pleasures of religion and the moral sense, and even those of sympathy, ambition, imagination, and sensation, first lessen their value in the estimation of those who reflect, and afterwards assign to them a very low rank among the means of happiness.-Thirdly, the eager pursuit of any other apprehended source of happiness, such as fame, learning, &c. leaves little room in the mind for avarice, or any other foreign end.

82. These considerations not only ac count for the limitation set to the love of money, but for the various apparent inconsistencies and pecularities observable in it in different individuals. Thus profuseness with respect to sensual and selfish pleasures, is often joined with avarice; covetous persons are often rigidly just in paying as well as in exacting, and are sometimes generous where money is not immediately and ap parently concerned; they have also moderate passions in other respects, and for the most part are suspicious, timorous, and com plaisant: and the most truly generous, charitable, and even pious persons, are highly frugal, so as to put on the appearance of covetousness, and even sometimes, and in somethings, to border upon it. We also see why the love of money must in general grow stronger with age, and especially if the particular gratifications, to which the person was most inclined, become insipid or unattainable: why frequent reflections upon money' in possession, and the actual viewing of large sums, strengthen the associations by which covetousness is generat ed: and why children, persons in low life, and indeed most others, are differently af fected towards the same sum of money in different forms, gold, silver, notes, &c.

83. The love of money is universally deemed a more selfish passion than the pursuit of the pleasures of imagination, honour, or sympathy; yet all are generated by association from sensible pleasures, baving their origin in self: all in their several degrees tend to private happiness; and all are, in certain cases, pursued coolly and deliberately from the prospect of obtaining private happiness by them. The reasons why the love of money has in so peculiar and decided a manner the shame of selfishness connected with it, appear to be as follow. The pleasures which it produces are nearly, and in general, completely of a solitary nature, and shun participation. As far as money is deemed a mean to the accomplishment of some useful purpose, it

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