Serm. ons; so that he may deserve the Character XII. of an hard or cruel Man: Whereas the other,

having Compaffion in just the same Degree only, yet having Refentment or Ambition in a lower Degree, his Compaffion may prevail over them, fo as to Influence his Actions, and to denominate his Temper compaffionate. So that, how ftrange foever it may appear to People who do not attend to the thing, yet it is quite manifeft, that, when we say one Man is more Refenting or Compaffionate than another, this does not ne ceffarily imply that one has the Principle of Resentment or of Compaffion stronger than the other. For if the Proportion, which Refentment or Compaffion bears to other inward Principles, is greater in one than in the other; this is itself fufficient to denominate one more Refenting or Compassionate than the other. Further, the whole System as I may speak, of Affections (including Rationality) which conftitute the Heart, as this Word is used in Scripture and on moral Subjects, are each and all of them stronger in fome than in others. Now the Propor tion which the two general Affections, Be nevolence and Self-love, bear to each other, according to this Interpretation of the Text, denominates

denominates Men's Character as to Virtue. Serm. Suppose then one Man to have the Princi- XII. ple of Benevolence in an higher Degree than another: It will not follow from hence, that his general Temper or Character or Actions will be more Benevolent than the others. For he may have Self-love, as well as other Paffions, in fuch a Degree as quite to prevail over Benevolence; fo that it may have no Influence at all upon his Actions: Whereas Benevolence in the other Person, though in a lower Degree, may yet be the strongest Principle in his Heart; and ftrong enough to be the Guide of his Actions, fo as to denominate him a good and virtuous Man, The Cafe is here as in Scales: It is not one Weight, confidered in itself, which determines whether the Scale fhall afcend or defcend; but this depends upon the Proportion, which that one Weight hath to the other. Love of our Neighbour then must bear fome Proportion to Self-love, and Virtue to be fure confifts in the due Proportion. What this due Proportion is, whether as a Principle in the Mind, or as exerted in Actions, can be judged of only from our Nature and Condition in this World. Of the Degree in which Affections and the Princi

t

ples

Serm. ples of Action, confidered in themselves XII. prevail, we have no Measure: Let us the proceed to the Courfe of Behaviour, the Actions they produce.

Both our Nature and Condition require, that each particular Man should make parti cular Provifion for himself: And the Inquiry, what Proportion Benevolence fhould have to Self-love, when brought down to Practice, will be, what is a competent Care and Provifion for ourselves. And how cer tain foever it be, that each Man must determine this for himself; and how ridiculous foever it would be, for any to attempt to determine it for another; yet it is to be obferved, that the Proportion is real; and that a competent Provision has a Bound; and that it cannot be all which we can poffibly get and keep within our Grafp, without le gal Injuftice. Mankind almost universally bring in, Vanity, Supplies for what is called a Life of Pleasure, Covetoufnefs, or imaginary Notions of Superiority over others, to determine this Queftion: But every one, who defires to act a proper Part in Society, would do well to confider, how far any of them come in to determine it, in the Way of Moral Confideration. All

that

that can be said is, fuppofing, what, as the Serm. World goes, is fo much to be fuppofed that XII. 'tis, scarce to be mentioned,that Perfons do not neglect what they really owe to Themfelyes; the more of their Care and and Thought, and of their Fortune they employ in doing Good to their Fellow-creatures, the nearer they come up to the Law of Perfection, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy felf.

A Comparison being made in the Text between Self-love and the Love of our Neighbour; and it being evident, that the Love of Others which includes in it all Virtues, muft neceffarily be in due Proportion to the Love of ourselves; these joint Confiderations afforded fufficient Occafion for treating here of that Proportion: It is plainly implied in the Precept, though it fhould not be thought the exact Senfe of the Words, as thy self.

Thirdly, If the Words, as thy felf, were to be understood of an Equality of Affection; it wou'd not be attended with thofe Confequences, which perhaps may be thought to follow from it. Suppofe a Perfon to have the fame fettled Regard to Others, as to Himfelf; that in every deliberate Scheme or Purfuit He took their Intereft into the Account

Serm. in the fame Degree as his own, so far as an XII. Equality of Affection would produce this :

Yet He would in fact, and ought to be, much more taken up and employed about Himself, and his own Concerns; than about Others, and their Interefts. For, besides the one common Affection toward Himself and his Neighbour, He would have several other particular Affections, Paffions, Appetites; which he could not poffibly feel in common both for Himself and others: Now these Senfations themselves very much employ us; and have perhaps as great Influence, as Selflove. So far indeed as Self-love, and cool Reflection upon what is for our Interest, would fet us on work to gain a Supply of our own several Wants; fo far the Love of our Neighbour would make us do the same for him: But the Degree in which we are put upon seeking and making use of the Means of Gratification, by the feeling of those Affetions, Appetites and Paffions, must neceffarily be peculiar to ourselves.

That there are particular Paffions, (fuppofe Shame, Refentment) which Men feem to have, and feel in common both for Themfelves and Others, makes no Alteration in Refpect to thofe Paffions and Appetites