says Hallam ("Constitutional History of England"), "merely in an exemption from the superintendence of a licenser."

He states that when, in the reign of Henry VIII (15091547), the political importance of the art of printing began to be apprehended, that monarch thought it necessary to take absolute control of it. Not only did he limit the privilege of keeping a press, but he also required previous inspection of the matter by a licenser. The same authority states that "the Long Parliament (1640-1660) did not hesitate to copy this precedent of a tyranny they had overthrown."

What our forefathers meant by the liberty of the press was defined by Blackstone (1758) two centuries after the time of Henry VIII as "in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; .. but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity."

That is, he will be held accountable, by criminal proceeding or in civil action for damages, should he slander or libel another. And his oral and written speech is subject to restriction by the police power for the protection of the moral health of the community. Nor is he free to advocate the overthrow of civil order.

In 1771, following the publication of imperfect reports of the debates in Parliament, the sessions of which were then secret, the House of Commons issued a proclamation forbidding the publication of debates. A printer who disobeyed and who ignored a summons to appear at the bar of the House was arrested by its messenger. The magistrates of London released him on the ground that the proclamation was without legal force. Then the House sent the lord mayor of the city to the Tower, but the crowds

that followed him showed to Parliament that public opinion was against it. Further attempt to prevent reports was not made. "The first great English journals," says Green ("The English People", Vol. 5, sec. 1504), "date from this time."

By the Sedition Law of 1798, which expired by limitation on March 3, 1801, the end of Adams's administration, Congress, in the opinion of many, went to the limit of its power under this clause; but in the cases which arose at the time the courts sustained the legislation. The law was designed to suppress seditious newspapers which were attacking the Government chiefly because it had, upon the declaration of war against England by the new Republic of France, issued a proclamation of neutrality, declaring a policy which has ever since been followed. There was such widespread sympathy in the United States with the French Revolution that people exulted in the guillotining (1793) of Louis XVI and of Queen Marie Antoinette, whose assistance had made American independence possible. The belief was that the United States should become involved in the European conflict and many foreigners were publishing papers assailing the Government for not doing so. The first minister from the French Republic and other emissaries had taken advantage of this sentiment and openly worked against our policy of neutrality. The Sedition Law forbade the publication of matter which was intended to defame the Government or to bring its officers into disrepute. The fact that Washington favored it explains the fear which was entertained by sober men that the end of all government and law which had come in France would eventually destroy the United States.

Freedom to speak and freedom to print, guaranteed by this clause, must be considered in the light of other clauses, for the Constitution is to be read as a whole and effectuated in all its parts, as nearly as may be done. Thus

another clause (Note 56) empowers Congress to raise armies. May speaking or writing under the former clause impede or cripple the Nation in its measures of defense under the latter clause? The Supreme Court has answered No. And so a Federal court remarked (1921) that while it is very desirable to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, that end must not be accomplished by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, or by making a citizen bear witness against himself in violation of the Fifth. And while under the clause respecting the post office the Government has almost absolute power and may exclude objectionable matter from the mails, it may not, in disregard of the Fourth Amendment, search or seize letters to find whether the sender has committed a crime. Those examples show how the various clauses of the Constitution must be coördinated and applied together.

Freedom of speech is not abridged by the prohibition of addresses in public parks or of the publication of libelous, indecent or blasphemous articles or matter injurious to public morals or private reputation.

In many States it has been held under similar constitutional provisions (for, as before mentioned, the First Amendment here restricts Congress only) that freedom of speech and printing is not abridged by State laws for the censoring of moving pictures.

Among the laws of Congress springing from the World War was the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, which forbade any one wilfully to cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States. Every one of those who spoke and wrote against our being in the war, or who tried to dissuade men from enlisting, promptly invoked in self-defense this constitutional provision for free speech. But the Espionage Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in the first case to reach it, and that decla

ration was repeated in many following cases of varying facts and circumstances. On March 1, 1920, affirming a sentence to the penitentiary of the editor of a foreignlanguage newspaper who had, during recruiting, published articles against our action in the War, abusing and belittling the American and his government, and showing up what he called "the failure of recruiting", the Supreme Court said:

"But simple as the [Espionage] law is, perilous to the country as disobedience to it was, offenders developed, and when it was exerted against them challenged it to decision as a violation of the right of free speech assured by the Constitution of the United States. A curious spectacle was presented that great ordinance of government and orderly liberty was invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies of the United States, and by a strange perversion of its precepts it was adduced against itself."

In March, 1921, the Supreme Court upheld the action of the Post Office Department in excluding from the mails during the World War a newspaper which had denounced our government as a "plutocratic republic", a financial and political autocracy, which denounced the Selective Service Law of Congress as unconstitutional, arbitrary, and oppressive, which denounced the President as an autocrat, and the war legislation as having been passed by "a rubber stamp Congress", and which contended that soldiers could not legally be sent outside of the country and that the United States was waging a war of conquest. The National Defense Act of 1917 said that any newspapers published in violation of its provisions should be "nonmailable" and "should not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier." Pointing out that the published matter "was not designed to secure the amendment or repeal of the laws denounced but to create hostility to and to encourage violation of them", the Supreme Court said:

"Freedom of the press may protect criticism and agitation for modification or repeal of laws, but it does not extend to protection of him who counsels and encourages the violation of the law as it exists. The Constitution was adopted to preserve our government, not to serve as a protecting screen for those who, while claiming its privileges, seek to destroy it."

In an earlier case (1892) it was held to have been no abridgment of the freedom of the press for Congress to exclude from the mails newspapers containing advertisements of lotteries, as the government could not be "compelled arbitrarily to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its judgment."

The State supreme courts, under State constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press, have stated the doctrine as it has been expressed in the foregoing decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, the Constitution of New York provided for freedom in speaking and writing and prohibited restraint of the "liberty of speech or of the press"; but it made the citizen "responsible for the abuse of that right." The court of last resort in that State held (1902) that a seditious publication instigating revolution and murder and suggesting the persons in authority to be murdered was not protected by the State constitution, which, the court said, places "no restraint upon the power of the legislature to punish the publication of matter which is injurious to society according to the standard of the common law it does not deprive the State of the primary right of self-preservation."

And in 1918 the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a law of that State (1917) which had been passed in aid of the Nation and which made it unlawful "for any person to print, publish, or circulate in any manner whatsoever" anything "that advocates or attempts to advocate that men should not enlist in the military or naval forces of the